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Abstract 
Family law in multi-religious settings poses a problem for gender equality. However, 
there is a need to learn more about the dynamics of this process and its effect on 
women's capacity for taking action. This thesis asks the following research question: 
'How does the enactment of family laws impact on the ways women negotiate their 
personal relationships in post-conflict Lebanon?' 
Mainstream statutory and cultural explanations failed to analyse the gendering effect 
of family law for three reasons. First, these explanations dissociate legal frameworks 
from broader social norms. Second, they reduce gender equality to entitlements 
rather than outcomes. Third, they fix women's agency as static and one-dimensional. 
The thesis presents a broader view of the 'enacted' aspects of family laws and 
examines their impact as historically bound social institutions with a dynamic 
gendering effect. It uses qualitative research methods to examine the case of post-
conflict Lebanon (1990-2005). 
Findings suggest that family law forms an order of 'gender governance' that sustains 
institutional gender inequality and restricts women's agency in three ways. At the 
judicial level, women's legal personhood is blurred in both legal texts and in judicial 
practice. At the normative level, women's subjectivity is confined within dominant 
gendered norms on family relations and womanhood ideals. Finally, at the level of 
social spaces for action, women are restricted in their individual and collective 
capacity for negotiating their rights. Hence, women's subjectivity is found to be 
composite and fluid continuously shaping various directions for agency beyond 
narrow western definitions of freedom. 
The thesis' main contribution is to argue for the need to engage more thoroughly 
with family law's institutional complexity and the processes of their enactment. The 
concept of 'gender governance' helps explain why women have so far been unable to 
organise effectively towards challenging or reforming family law. It also informs the 
complexity of citizenship in multi-religious settings by contextual ising the religious 
influence and framing it within political discourses on national identity and post-
conflict state building. 
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1 CHAPTER ONE Introducing the research projed 
1.1 Aims of the study and research questions 
It is the 2nd of April 1997 on a sunny late afternoon in Clemenceau -a chic, urbanite 
neighbourhood of Beirut. Outside the AI-Madina theatre, an alternative literary hub, 
around two hundred activists gathered from all walks of the leftist, anarchist, and 
secularist (democracy and human rights) civil society space, and I was one of them. 
The atmosphere was electric, with music, cheers, toasts, and a sense of defiance; 
people congratulated each other for the success of the event. Centre stage gathered 
twenty newlyweds in celebratory clothing and smiles. They were the event. They 
went all the way and back from Cyprus, the nearest place they could get a civil 
marriage contract. The crowd was publicly denouncing the current religious 
framework under which personal relations were organised in Lebanon. They voiced 
one demand that took civil society by storm at the time: to issue legislation for an 
optional civil family code where willing citizens could organise their family issues 
outside of the existing plural religious family law frameworks. 
No doubt that these demands, popular among many activist and academic accounts, 
highlighted a pressing form of injustice in the ways people organise their personal 
relations. However, they provide a problematic understanding of the ways people 
engage in personal relationships under a given legislation. The assumption is that 
individuals who do not choose to contract a civil marriage are deemed happy with 
their religious marriage arrangements. Thus, individuals are rational subjects who 
hold fixed, manifest, and coherent beliefs on personal status (Shachar 1998). They 
chose to belong to mutually exclusive and all-encompassing secular and religious 
identities (Modood, Triandafyllidou et al. 2005). Their agency was fixed and non-
mediated by any social influences. They had equal power to take intentional steps for 
action that matched statutory directives. 
According to these demands, the problem - and solution- of personal relations were 
statutory and gender-blind, primarily located at the level of out-dated legislation. 
Following from this logic, endowing structural reforms with a secular morality was 
more equitable than a religious one (An-Nairn 2008). Men and women would be on 
an equal footing in negotiating their personal affairs once legislation is amended. 
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Three months later, on 18 August 1997, I received a call from a very close Lebanese 
friend (hereby WI) who lives in France. WI was horrified as she returned home after 
work to find it empty. Her then husband and her two sons were nowhere to be found, 
nor were their belongings. Her husband called her a few hours later telling her that he 
landed in Beirut with their five and two year olds and expected her to follow him 
there. WI and her husband met in Beirut and lead a secular way of life. Both were 
well educated professionals who had married ten years earlier in Lebanon in the 
Shica family law court. They then contracted a civil marriage in France where they 
settled and eventually gained citizenship and embraced a French secular mode of life. 
Two weeks before the incident, WI had asked her husband for a divorce in order to 
opt out from what she considered an unhappy marriage. A few months after the 
incident and an intense litigation process in Lebanon, WI was baffled to learn that, in 
Lebanon, she was effectively bound by the directives of the religious marriage they 
had contracted in Lebanon before their relocation to France. WI could not make 
sense of the multiple and contradictory jurisprudence advice she received. Shta 
judges ruled that, as a woman, she was not entitled to ask for divorce. WI was also 
legally bound to follow her husband. If not, her two and five year old sons would be 
immediately placed under her husband's custody. 
More than a decade later, WI is still living in France having won all her lawsuits 
against her former husband there, including divorce and criminal charges for 
kidnapping minors. Yet, these decisions failed to be enforced by transnational legal 
mechanisms. In Lebanon, WI's family mediation attempts with religious judges 
bowed under her husband's political connections with them. As a result, she lost all 
her lawsuits and is forced to remain married to her former husband. Although the 
family law court granted her legal visiting rights to her children, her former husband 
refuses her any contact with them. If WI travels to Lebanon, with the view of seeing 
them, she is banned from leaving the country. Hence, in a combination of ill-fated 
frameworks, interpretations, and practices of personal relations, she is in forced exile. 
The case of WI shook the activists' claims about the fixed nature of people's 
engagement in family law. It throws, in my view, several pertinent questions about 
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VarIOUS possibilities and constraints that individuals - and especially women -
encounter when negotiating their personal relations. Often people do not seem to 
know about, believe in and act upon their personal relations in a carefully planned in 
a rational path (McNay 1992). Their beliefs and actions are not always coherent and 
slotted in a mutually exclusive secular-religious binary (Fay 2001). Their action and 
practices are restricted by external constraints beyond their control (Hartsock 2003). 
These constraints are not only enacted at a statutory level, nor are secular 
frameworks always helpful in enacting justice (Cheriet 1997). 
My involvement with these two stories raised questions about the ways in which 
gender discrimination in family law is assessed and tackled. The potential reform in 
legislation for optional secular family code would not help women like WI with their 
negotiations of their personal relations. It does not explain what makes women who 
are neither manifestly adherent to religion, nor fall within the stereotypical destitute 
profile of abused women, contract marriages that are so disadvantageous for them. 
Nor does it explain why they do not have prior knowledge of the details of these 
marriage contracts, or why do they contract them in the first place. More importantly, 
it does not answer why, under the same legal frameworks, some women are more 
successful than others in gaining favourable family law settlements. 
Therefore, my starting point is that static analyses of frameworks, subjectivity and 
agency cannot explain the full impact of family law regulations on claims for gender 
equality. I had to look at the interaction between the socio-political formulation and 
enactment of current legislation in relation to the lived experiences of women within 
the multi-religious context of Lebanon. For this, the analytical lens needs to zoom in 
to the enacted negotiations of personal relations in the courtroom and beyond it, to 
women's lived social spaces. It also needs to analyse the history, moralities, and 
ethics that drive the politics of these negotiations. These negotiations and moralities 
are shaped by and enacted within particular constructions of national identity, state 
building, and citizenship frameworks. Locating my study in post-conflict Lebanon is 
particularly suited for the purpose because it has been a fertile context for debates of 
renegotiation of citizenship since the end of the civil war in 1990. 
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Through this thesis, I am thus concerned with understanding how the regulation of 
personal relations through family law influences the ways in which women view 
themselves as social beings and act on their claims of gender equality. This research 
is about the construction of women's subjectivity and agency in the process of 
negotiating their personal relations with their social environment. It poses the 
following research question: 'How does the enactment of family law impact on the 
ways women negotiate their personal relationships in post-conflict Lebanon?' This 
question addresses two concerns: i) the ways in which family law constitutes and 
perpetuates gender inequality, and ii) how it affects women's sUbjectivity and 
agency. 
1.2 Justification of the subject and domain of research 
Much academic research tends to stern from personal interest, especially the first 
major work like a thesis. Hence, my interest in understanding gender equality and 
personal relations draws on a strategic and political feminist stand. I am primarily 
concerned with dispelling some academic and policy biases around the formulation 
of knowledge on and political action around women's experiences of personal 
relations. One such bias is that women tend to be represented as a homogenous group 
that is more of an 'aggregate' rather than a diverse and heterogeneous social group 
(Young 1998). Another bias is the focus on macro frameworks of analyses that tend 
to overlook the variety of women's experiences due to their varying positioning in 
their socio-political environment (for example see Moghadam, Karshenas et al. 2006; 
Weldon 2002). This thesis depicts women's lived experiences as a stock for 
effectively analysing and advocating their rights in family law in Lebanon and other 
complex contexts. 
At the analytical level, this investigation is necessary to expand our knowledge at 
four levels: 
• First, how we understand the problem of gender discrimination in family 
law 
The thesis addresses the limitations of adopting a statutory comrnunitarian approach 
to family law. This approach relies on a double gender-blind sectarian-secular 
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dichotomy. Family law has been often analysed in relation to various principles of 
sovereignty, citizenship and cultural rights based on individualist and communitarian 
frameworks of citizenship (Siim 2000). In this approach women are drawn into ideal 
representations of citizenship that are also heavily statutory or reductionist (Lister 
1997). For a long time, gender equality in the family sphere was negated or 
dismissed based on the two interrelated grounds of liberalism and communitarianism 
(Phillips 1998). In classical liberal thought, the private domain often refers to a social 
space that is unregulated by the 'external' authority of the state. In communitarian 
debates, private particularly refers to de-politicised intra-community consensual 
relations. This debate analysed women's positioning mostly in the family as 
belonging to historically 'immigrant' communities and only when cultural politics of 
citizenship showed tension between 'non-western' and western frameworks of family 
law. 
There are very few answers provided on the complexity of negotiating gender 
equality in family law among women belonging to equal nationalist claims but 
competing 'cultural' ones such as Lebanon. It is not clear how the codification of 
family law, or lack of, affects gender equality in pluralist contexts (Rabo 2005). 
There is a need to recognise the institutional gender discrimination channels across 
policy frameworks, norms of subjectification, and spaces of action. 
• Second, how we understand family law policies 
The thesis is concerned with the politics of family law policies - law making, 
interpretation, and implementation. Much research on gender equality and religious 
family law tends to focus on locating and interpreting legal texts in terms of a fixed 
religious tradition, such as Islamic jurisdiction or 'jiqh' (see Esposito and Bas 2001; 
Diduck and O'Donovan 2006). Much of these analyses are mainly taken with the 
debate over universalist and relativist rights (Wolfe 2006). These traditions are often 
analysed outside of a historical institutional context (Amirmokri 2004) and are 
treated as positive law. Most importantly, little attention is paid to the un-official side 
of legal frameworks, or "customary rules" that are recognised to be "a stronger 
controlling force than 'law'" (Welchman 2000:16). 
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These shortcomings reflect on the types of policies devised for achieving gender 
equality in personal relations. Many of the instruments such as the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDA W), as well as 
international actors such as multilaterals, governments and civil society groups 
sustain this legal-enactment distinction. These policies imposed a particular 
framework of analysis that might not concord with women's lived experiences 
(Briar, Munford et al. 1992). 
This bias was rectified through comparative historical research on Islamic law and 
courtroom dealings (Sonbol 1996; Tucker 1998). This thesis focuses on the 
contemporary reworking of religious directives of competing legal jurisprudence 
sources. It proposes to collapse the distinction between a 'text' and 'enactment'. 
Thus it focuses on "examining the specifics of the 'contested ground'" as Lynn 
Welchman (2004:1) explains in the context of Islamic family law, and looking at 
"what different levels, why, how, and by whom this ground is contested in the 
particular contexts[ ... ]". It elaborates on the gendering processes resulting from 
competing law making. 
• Third, how we understand women's subjectivity 
Fixed analyses of family law draw women as statutory subjects that are uniform, 
fixed, and mutually exclusive (Mullally 2004). In research on the Middle East, 
family law was analysed from a historical perspective (Sonbol 1996; Tucker 2008) 
or from a socio-economic policy approach (example: Moghadam, Karshenas et al. 
2006). These constraints are largely reported as external from women's 
understandings of themselves and their actions. Another is a cultural bias that also 
fixes women's experiences within essentialist analytical frameworks of patriarchy, 
culture, religion, or colonialism (example: Esposito and Bas 2001; Roded 1999). 
These gaps relating to women's engagement in personal relations were redressed to 
an extent by research on gender, social policy, and psychology especially within the 
recently elaborated concept of Violence Against Women (for example Cling 2004; 
Lewis and Open University. 2004; O'Toole, Schiffman et al. 2007). Much research 
in this area relies on various theoretical feminist schools ranging from liberal to 
radical views (for example Fawcett and Waugh 2008; MacKinnon 2005) However, 
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there is a need to explore in detail the relationship between family law morality and 
the construction of gendered cultural selving that results from the multiple 
positionings of women within the institutions of the family, religion and state 
building. I 
• Fourth, how we understand women's agency 
Women's agency is the Achilles Heel of research on gender equality and family law. 
With a focus on the 'gendered' effect of family law, research tends to overlook the 
'gendering' process that extends from women's subjectivity to their agency. Hence, 
as women are considered to hold a fixed subjectivity, they are assumed to hold linear 
and unidirectional 'engendering' tendencies in their individual and collective action. 
The thesis traces the link between subjectivity and agency by analysing the internal 
dynamics of women with family law issues within feminist collective action. It is 
concerned with the crossings of social policy and human development that links the 
lived experiences of populations and the regulation of their lives within society 
(Petersen 1999). It addresses the intricate and convoluted aspects of social relations 
within structures, institutions, and action (Sabatier 2007). 
1.3 Contribution of the thesis 
In order to understand the broader gendering effect of family law frameworks on 
women's subjectivity and agency I propose an analytical shift. I start by inverting the 
entry point of the analysis of family law from religion to gender. This shift is crucial 
in capturing the multi-layered dynamics of gendering processes. I therefore depart 
from mainstream analysis where religion is considered as the analytical constant 
because it essentialises the institution of religion (Gellner 1994) and ossifies gender 
as a marker of differentiation and categorisation (Williams 2002). 
In my research, I adopt an analytical framework that combines Michel Foucault's 
concept of govemmentality with post-structural research on gender. I propose to 
I Western-focused social policy literature includes family law under a broad umbrella of 'family 
policies' studies. This grouping includes anything from research on economically related issues of 
work-life balance to unpaid domestic care. In fact, the impact of family law on women's subjectivity 
and agency is absent from most major works in public and social policy. Even in the exceptional cases 
where marital policy issues are discussed, the emphasis is on the possible adverse effects of divorce 
on social fragmentation and not on a concern with the overall situation of women (Stone 2002). 
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understand family law as an 'order of gender governance'.2 This order is underpinned 
by a gendered logic and relies on particular moralities (such as socio-cultural and 
political expressions of religion) to shape women's subjectivity and agency within a 
gendered system of social differentiation. It is animated by particular contextually 
specific gendered institutional frameworks, norms and practices of family law. 
Foucault's (2000) notion of governmentality is particularly useful to understand 'the 
conduct of conduct' of family law frameworks. This means that the statutory and 
enacted elements of laws, and in this case family law, are not separated dichotomies 
but rather constitutive of the same governance order (Burchell, Gordon et al. 1991). 
The enactment of family law is an ongoing process that exercises discursive power 
aimed at maintaining gender inequality in personal relations. 
Applying Foucault's view to family law is useful for two reasons. First, unlike other 
theoretical schools, it collapses the structural distinctions between individuals and the 
state (McNay 1992). It thus accounts for the most crucial limitations of statutory 
feminist perspectives on family law that are based on these distinctions (O'Toole, 
Schiffman et al. 2007). Second, it highlights the importance of broader socio-
political changes that affect the changes in legislation and application. This helps us 
locate the disciplining effect of family law within a specific socio-political normative 
context. Adopting the analytical framework of 'order of gender governance' on 
family law offers the three following contributions. 
First, it contributes to understanding the gendered socio-political dynamics animating 
gender discrimination in family law. This adds to the existing valuable legal and 
structural analysis on the topic. It adds a new angle to the existing textual and 
structural analyses of family law. It analyses family law frameworks as dynamic 
historically bound social institutions whose gendering impact goes well beyond 
women's statutory rights. This understanding is useful because these institutional 
legal frameworks constitute essential components of an order of governance that 
controls individuals by advocating a certain vision of welfare (Foucault and Hutton 
1988). 
2 I am indebted to Dr Hakan Seckinelgin for suggesting the tenn 'order of gender governance' and 
helping me construct the conceptual framework during our several supervision discussions. 
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Second, it ties gender and governance to understand discrimination as an active 
political process. Hence discrimination is enacted at the discursive levels of policy 
making and implementation rather than a policy outcome. In this sense, the 
framework helps us understand the various roles played by state and non-state actors 
in the gendering process of family law. It draws an analytical continuum between 
micro and macro institutional influences and discrimination. It explains how actors 
are involved in the multiple dynamics of the gendering process. They transfer 'family 
law knowledge' in the Foucauldian sense of politically mediated exercise of power 
relations. 
It also helps us understand how family law disciplines individuals into legal subjects 
through a process of subjectification. It thus elaborates on the formation of women's 
subjectivity and agency within family law, a less-developed research area. There is 
no doubt that women's legal status in family law legislation is a crucial component in 
constructing women's subjectivity. However, it is the tip of the iceberg of the 
subjectification process. As Butler (1999) reminds us, there is no subjectivity outside 
of legal subjectivity. Thus legal subjectivity provide a basis for 'categorising' women 
and 'naming' them as gendered subjects within broader society (Douglas 2001). This 
approach traces how legal subjectivity transpires, reverberates, and is compounded 
through broader social norms and relations (Butler 2003). Thus, legal subjectivity 
turns into a gendered categorisation of a gendered personal subject within the less 
formal social relations. 
Third, this analytical framework brings a dynamic understanding of the relationship 
between gender and religion. Rather than having religion as a precursor of gendered 
personal relations, it unpacks what is meant by 'religious' family law and links it to 
contextual socio-cultural expressions of norms around family law. It draws a 
symbiotic and dynamic conceptual relationship between the gendered institutional 
norms on personal relations, gender discrimination in family law, and the failure of 
women-based activism to achieve reform in family law. 
With this framework, we are able to move beyond the dichotomies of universal and 
relativist, individual and communitarian, religious and secular inherent within family 
law debates. People often display enmeshed secular and religious practices (G()~ek 
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and Balaghi 1994). The basis of these choices they make is not always manifest or 
intentional (Kousha 2002). Statutory legislation is only one aspect of the 
manifestations of gender inequality (Parpart, Rai et al. 2002). Secular frameworks do 
not always have all the answers (Afkhami and Friedl 1997). 
Furthermore, it de-essentialises the religion as a distinct moral order. Instead, it 
concurs with critical perspectives that argue for demystifying religious moralities. It 
does so by revealing the blurring between their moral basis and secular or modernist 
rationales (Asad 2003). Thus, the claims of religion's moral 'exceptionalism' are 
dispelled. Religious laws become one example of an ideological and moral system 
that is continuously modified by political, social and cultural influences, not least 
those of modernist components of secularism. This angle is crucial in making sense 
of the context-specific amalgamation of scriptural and modernist secular political 
discourses on gender, national identity, and the politics of post-conflict state 
building. It challenges western-centric perspectives of a unitary personal citizenship 
in family law debates. The personal becomes a mosaic of multi-layered, competing 
ideological claims of legal subjectivity. 
Finally, at the political and strategic feminist level, this thesis primarily contributes 
to voicing women's concerns. It is positioned from the post-structural vantage point 
of women with family law problems. In this sense, it is grounded in women's 
experiences and qualitatively assesses the effect of family law in as much as it relates 
to their daily lives. It explains why women have so far been unable to organise 
effectively towards challenging or reforming family law. It is different from a 
feminist stand-point approach in that women's experiences are analysed discursively 
rather than taken at face value as discussed in chapter 3.3 In doing so, the thesis 
focuses predominantly on the discursive relations between women with family law 
issues, women groups, and the religious institution. 
3 The feminist stand-point approach was developed by Marxist feminist theorist Nancy Hartsock 
(1983) to challenge the hegemonic gendered 'truths' about women's lives. Its merits lie in valuing 
women's experiences and knowledge. However, it is limited as it claimed unified basis for the 
oppressed experiences of women. Donna Haraway (1988) later suggested the notion of 'situated 
know\edges' to move beyond the universalist bias of this approach. 
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1.4 Framing the argument 
This thesis seeks to understand the impact of family law on women's subjectivity and 
agency. It invites us to understand family law as a political system of ideas and 
practices that govern populations to maintain institutional gender inequality. This 
order is historically bound and dynamic, transmitted through various institutional 
state and non-state actors. 
This framework is drawn from Foucault's (2000) concept of governmentality. 
Governmentality is a method of governance used by nation-states with the aim of 
'managing populations' in addition to establishing sovereignty over territory.4 It is 
enacted through three modalities of power. First, the state and other institutional 
actors establish sovereignty over popUlations by producing regimes of truth about 
their existence. Applied to family law, the thesis identifies actors involved in 
establishing sovereignty over women's legal subjectivity. It also traces the legal 
frameworks, structures and practices that are used to sustain gender inequality in 
family law and the ways that they do. 
The framework also examines the category of women as 'gendered legal subjects' 
and traces it at both the statutory and the applied levels. The moralities constitute the 
basis for the various local and global gender nonns and include particular notions of 
'womanhood ideals'. It analyses the extent to which these frames concord or are 
removed from women's experiences and their constructions of themselves as social 
actors. It probes into the fonnation of these categories by broader political processes 
and social interactions as well as their meanings and effect on shaping women and 
notions of gender equality. 
A second element of governmentality involves controlling populations through 
specific disciplinary techniques of rule setting that produce processes of compliance 
and punishment. These techniques are enacted by the actors who claim legal 
authority over the mechanisms of law making and enforcement. Adapted to family 
4 Foucault is critiqued for providing a unitary analysis of state power (McKee 2009). Later 
elaborations acknowledge the heterogeneity and fragmentation of the state into several components 
that might exercise power in contradictory directions. Furthennore, the order of governance is also be 
sustained by non-state actors. The thesis incorporates these additions to the concept. 
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law, this dimension highlights the enacted aspects of legal frameworks, and the 
related legal and social practices that influence women's understanding of 
themselves as actors in personal relationships, and shape their actions while 
negotiating their personal issues. 
Third, governmentality is also transmitted through the control of the bodies of 
populations referred to by Foucault (1981) as bio-power. This form of power is 
exercised on populations through the 'management of flows and norms' aimed at 
creating spatial control of the bodies and movements of the populations. The thesis 
expands this dimension of governmentality and adapts it to family law. First, it 
analyses the ways in which family law frameworks influence the ways in which 
women with family law issues relate to their bodies, and manage their social and 
physical movements during their engagement with personal relations. 
In addition, bio-power affects the ways women move physically and discursively 
across various institutional social spaces -formal and informal- related to family law, 
such as legal, advocacy, and family/community spaces. As the research untangles 
individual and collective agency construction, it traces the ways women practice 
different types of agency. They address family law issues in ways that are more 
complex than standard notions of submission and resistance, questioning the plain 
roles usually attributed to women groups as actors of feminist resistance (Braig and 
Wolte 2002; Mateo-Diaz 2005). Their ideals and practices are analysed in relation to 
the contradictions inherent in the civil society spaces (Chatterjee 2004; Fisher 1997). 
This analysis allows for gauging how family law frameworks construct women's 
agency in variable degrees of influence over their personal relations. 
1.5 Defining Terms and Concepts 
As the title suggests this thesis is concerned with family law, gender equality, 
subjectivity, and agency. I define below these terms and concepts as they are used 
throughout the thesis. 
The thesis focuses on family law issues that mainly refer to socio-Iegal arrangements 
related to marriage, divorce and custody laws regulated by local religious and/or civil 
frameworks. I therefore exclude not least important issues of gender discrimination 
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such as inheritance, matrilineal nationality transfer, 'honour' crimes, and alternative 
sexuality. 
My decision to use the term 'family law' throughout the thesis goes against that of 
'personal status law' (qaniln al-a/:zwal al-shakhsiyya), a term commonly used in most 
academic and policy accounts on Lebanon. Both terms include some historical and 
descriptive biases of particular importance to the overall argument. In the case of 
Lebanon, the term 'personal status law' is derived from the French mandate's 
codification of religious communities in Lebanon, Decision 60 (13/0311936) and its 
amendments. As explained in chapter 6, 'personal status law' refers to the legal 
provisions organising the legal personhood of individuals circumscribed under 
recognised religious communities. In this sense, the category of the 'personal' was 
meant to signify 'religious' (Eekelaar 2006). The term was popularised through the 
historical development of related policies. Its meaning was modified by secularist 
activists who called for 'secular personal status law'. 
However, in order to avoid any confusion, I opted for the term 'family law' instead, 
and refer to women's 'personal lives' or 'personal issues'.5 My reservations on this 
term is that it emphasises group affiliation and places the 'family' as the analytical 
unit, at the expense of individuals involved in it, not least women who often are at a 
disadvantageous position. In order to account for this bias in the term 'family law', I 
use whenever appropriate the term of personal relations to refer to the dynamics 
between women and men engaged in pre-marital, marital, or post-marital 
relationships. 
The definition of family law probes into the meanmg of 'law'. Recent 
conceptualisations moved away from the classical view of 'positive' law as an a-
historical set of regulations within a unitary state. Instead, law was found to be 
historically bound and evolving within the political and normative institutional 
settings of various state and non-state actors (Dupret 1999). In non-western and post-
colonial settings in particular, scholars acknowledged 'indigenous' or 'customary' 
5 Eekelaar (2006) acknowledges the religious connotation underlying the tenn 'personal status' law. 
He also recognises the usefulness of focusing on the 'personal' because it relates to the varying issues 
touching upon intimate or personal issues involved. As I agree with his perspective, I emphasise the 
use of 'personal' lives or issues rather than 'personal status law' to avoid confusion. 
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law that was excluded from colonial and post-colonial state legal frameworks. Here I 
consider both the Ottoman rule (1516-1918) and the French mandate (1920-1943) as 
imperialist powers defined by Said as "the practice, the theory and the attitudes of a 
dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory". Throughout the thesis, I 
refer to both rules as 'colonial powers' and 'colonialism' to refer to the apparatus, 
processes, and mechanisms that these imperialist powers have enacted, also going by 
Said's (1993:9) definition: "colonialism almost always a consequence of 
imperialism, is the implanting of settlements on distant territory". 
A move away from state legal centralism brought the notion of 'legal pluralism' 
(Griffiths 1986). Legal pluralism was defined as "the condition in which a population 
observes more than one body of law" (Woodman 1999:3). These various legal 
frameworks are often conflicting, and dictated by state and non-state actors. This 
multiplicity has been later nuanced into 'plurality of legal orders' (Santos 2002). 
However, criticism of legal pluralism questioned where to draw the line between 
'legal' and 'normative' frameworks that constitute social control. 'Normative 
pluralism' or 'plurality' are used to refer to social norms that are not necessarily 
coded by the state (Dupret 1999). Here it is useful to provide a working definition of 
social norms as "rules which are shared inter-subjectively by many people in a 
society - not necessarily everyone, but enough to make it a reasonable expectation 
that people in that society will conform to the rule." (Mullard and Spieker 1998:7). 
Pierre Bourdieu's conceptualisation of the 'juridical field' is useful to come up with a 
working definition. Bourdieu (1987:806) considered the juridical field as part of the 
process of cultural production in society that is "organised around a body of internal 
protocols and assumptions, characteristic behaviours and self-sustaining values". 
Bourdieu (1987:842) asserted that law revolves around ''the activity ofjormalization 
and [ ... ] the interests of the formalizing agents as they are defined in the competition 
within the juridical field and in the relationship between this field and the larger field 
of power" (original emphasis). 
Following the above discussion, I use a working definition of law as the set of rules 
and regulations that are formalized (in writing or not) by political actors (state or 
non-state) who assert a certain political authority over popUlations. This definition 
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helps specifying the array of actors and institutions involved in making up the 
juridical field of family law in Lebanon. This web of legal frameworks does not fit 
with the simplistic categorisations of 'state' and 'non-state' law, or with 'civil' and 
'religious' law. As Griffiths (1999:ix) mentions these distinctions are "primitive folk-
taxonomies" that "tell us nothing about the sort of social control involved, nor about 
[ ... ] the degree of morally binding force generally attributed to a rule and the choices 
actors make between rules of different provenance[ ... ]". Here while acknowledging 
the importance of the institutional approach to my research, I have specified 
whenever possible the bureaucratic capacity of the actors who make up the 'state' 
and 'religious' institutions in order to show the different power that they hold on 
gender equality of family law. 
These institutions require further detailing. Hence, I differentiate between the two 
national and communitarian types of legal systems that regulate family law in 
Lebanon - including codes, courts, and the judiciary body. These two systems are 
commonly referred to- and often opposed as- civil or secular and religious 
institutions. Civil or 'secular' refer to legal systems that followed the codification by 
western states following the enlightenment era. In non-western contexts, these 
systems developed under various direct or indirect colonial or Western influences at 
the tum of the 20th century.6 However, the use of the term secular is problematic 
because these systems are not completely distinct from any religious influence. The 
term religious is commonly used to refer to systems that have been traditionally 
developed and administered by religious authorities, Canon law or Shari'a law being 
two prominent examples. However the distinction between the two systems is not 
sustained. Although some states that their religious family law regimes are 'God-
made' (Mayer 1995) and thus not open to scrutiny, it is increasingly recognised that 
religious family laws are 'man-made' in the sense that they are codified by 
legislators - religious leaders, based on their particular interpretation of doctrinal 
moral codes. Hence their role is crucial as pointed by Bourdieu above. In this sense, 
religious systems can be conceptualised as communitarian as they rely on the 
codification of particular moral doctrines of specific social groups. However, there is 
conceptual relevance in retaining the term 'religious' system due to the specific basis 
6 One example is the civil codification of family law in Kemalist Turkey. 
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of morality. Legislators attribute the morality behind religious systems from a 
seemingly divine source of legitimacy and jurisdiction that they only can mediate the 
access and interpretation. The source of authority moves from the conception of a 
civil nation-state, to the authority of a highly mediated and exclusive supra-national 
authority. 
However these two systems overlap more than often suggested. In many western and 
non-western contexts alike, 'civil' or 'secular' systems of family law are often based, 
with varying degrees, on religious morality. Similarly, religious systems are often 
codified and administratively structured as civil institutions. In this sense a 
hybridisation of systems is increasingly recognised. For the purpose of the thesis, I 
adopt the term 'civil' to refer to legal categories of systems/codes/personhood to 
refer to national frameworks on family law that draw their moral and legal legitimacy 
from the gradual establishment of modern Lebanon since 1840. I also use 'religious 
systems' to refer to communitarian frameworks deriving their moral and legal 
legitimacy from supra-national divine authority mediated by learned legislators and 
judiciary. 
Throughout the thesis I contrast two sets of terms. The first set is the secular and 
sectarian categories of citizenship/legal personhood/subjectivity. These two terms are 
used to refer to patterns of classification found in, and constructed by, legal 
frameworks and dominant social norms that categorise individuals according to the 
presence (sectarian) or absence (secular) of an ascribed religious identifier. 
The second set of terms is the universalist and communitarian citizenship/legal 
personhood/subjectivity. I use these two terms to refer to the construction of 
individuals' entitlements and rights (in the broadest sense) within frameworks of 
uniform equality (universalist) or differentiated fairness (communitarian) in relation 
to their nationality, ethnicity, or religious ascription. 
Thus moving away from state-centred distinctions of 'state' or 'non-state' actors, I 
use the term 'governmental' to refer to actors within the executive and legislative 
state apparatus. I also use the term 'official' to distinguish between formal religious 
judges as opposed to 'community' religious leaders. Finally, in order to de-
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essentialise the religious aspect of these institutions, I use the term 'communitarian' 
rather than the more common 'sectarian' or 'confessional' to refer to organisational 
and institutional aspects of social and political arrangement within religious 
communities. 
In terms of defining women's subjectivity and agency, I follow Butler in her view 
that it is important to use the category 'women' for lobbying purposes, while 
recognising the need to differentiate within the category (Butler 1992). Following 
post-structural understandings of subjectivity (Foucault and Rabinow 1997), I use 
subjectivity to analyse the ways individuals understand themselves onto logically and 
ethically as constituted from within positions of power within which they are located. 
The subject "is constructed through acts of differentiation that distinguish the subject 
from its constitutive outside, a domain of abjected alterity conventionally associated 
with the feminine, but clearly not exclusively" (Butler 1992: 12). In order to 
differentiate between the social process of subjectification and the legal 
categorisation of individuals, I use the concept of 'legal personhood' (Mundy 2002) 
to refer to the ways in which individuals and groups are defined in the various legal 
provisions, in terms of individual and collective 'personae'. 
In the same way that subjectivity is constructed, women's 'agency' refers to a 
constructed ability to change their situation. Agency is analysed in the thesis at two 
levels. First is the level of 'collective' spaces where women with family law 
problems engage with women groups into solving their issues. Second is the level of 
'individual' spaces where women act on their own issues within communal or 
governmental spaces. In order to differentiate between various respondents, I use the 
term 'women respondents' to refer to women with family law problems. I also opted 
for the term 'women groups' to refer to the collective efforts by actors concerned 
with gender equality in family law because they use it for self-reference. 
The final definition in this section is that of gender equality in family law. I rely on 
Joan Scott's (1999:2) definition that considers gender as historically shaped 
"knowledge that establishes meanings for bodily differences". I use equality beyond 
the common statutory liberal notions and extend it to the equal access and use of 
power over the terms and effects within the institution of marriage. Thus, policies 
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relating to gender equality in family law are any initiatives by institutional local and 
global actors that explicitly or implicitly impact discursive, legal and/or 
practiced/lived aspects of women's experiences of personal rights. Within this 
definition, related policies are those aimed at shaping, modifying or implementing 
family issues. 
1.6 The Case: Gender equality and family law in Lebanon 
In order to reflect on the enactment of family law on gender equality, this thesis 
explores the case of post-conflict Lebanon. The discussion of the impact of family 
law on gender equality is set against the backdrop of the period of renegotiation of 
'consociational' citizenship in the national post-war reconciliation pact era (1990-
2005). The case is selected mainly because it provides a complex context for 
understanding the link between the personal, gender, and religion at severalleve1s. 
First, it challenges the fixed mainstream notions of both liberal and communitarian 
analyses of family law and national identity, including secular-religious, individual-
communitarian, and universalist-relativist ones. It aims to dispel the binary often 
drawn between social freedoms and the rigidity of the religious institution. The state 
system is composed of a complex juxtaposition of religious and secular legal and 
governance frameworks. While the state does not adopt an official religion, it has 
been established based on a consociational approach to religious communities living 
there. All branches of the judiciary are organised in civil courts with the exception of 
family law that enjoys 15 different 'exceptional' religious courts. 7 The legislation 
and legal structures of family law were set in the pre-independence era by the 
Ottoman rule (1516-1918), reinforced by the French mandate (1920-1946), and 
maintained by the post-colonial Lebanese state. Family law frameworks organise all 
Lebanese citizens according to nineteen sectarian denominations under the Christian, 
Muslim and Jewish faiths. These diverse religious frameworks contest an 
essentialised take on particular religious frameworks, such as Islam for instance, as 
an exceptional and fixed moral order (for example Gellner 1994). 
7 The administrative government system is practically organised in terms of specific sectarian 
allocation, including parliamentary, cabinet and presidential posts as well as high ranking civil service 
positions. The National Reconciliation Pact of 1990 and the amended constitution dictated the gradual 
abolition of sectarian allocation, but this is not applied to date. 
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The complexity of the Lebanese case allows us to analyse the historical, institutional 
and contextual influences on the development of family law and its impact on gender 
equality. Family law frameworks reflect the colonial and post-colonial configuration 
of Lebanon as a nation of 'sectarian minorities'. In the Lebanese case like many non-
western contexts, the interplay of internal and external forces thoroughly remodelled 
family law. The current state structure is a mix of importations of the western state 
model and colonial reconfiguration of cultural influences such as religion. The 
Lebanese case allows for recognising the power relations generated by various 
groups (Pringle and Watson 1998). These power relations mainly include historically 
specific political influences, such as colonial powers, that shaped and normalised 
unjust social structures on the political, legal, and collective awareness levels (for 
example Said 1979; Spivak 1987). In Lebanon, Ottoman and French colonialism 
have tailored the territories of modern Lebanon, emphasised religious group 
affiliation and imposed a set of religious laws to drive this segregation (Makdisi 
2000; Salibi 1988). 
Therefore, family law in Lebanon also elucidates the relationship between gender 
equality and the renegotiation of post-conflict citizenship. The case of Lebanon 
indicates that gender equality in personal relationships is compromised in favour of 
adopting communitarian political governance frameworks in a way to mend war-torn 
societies. As the case of post-Baathist Iraq illustrates, family law was a crucial issue 
of debate used by various political groups to reinforce sectarian identity. (Cole 
2009). 
Second, the Lebanese case allows for a nuanced understanding of the generation, 
perpetuation and subscription to gendered norms. Often Lebanese society is 
portrayed as the 'border case', holding liberal gender social freedoms in comparison 
to the surrounding Arab countries. This portrayal is often posited against a fixed 
system of family law (Shehadeh 1998). Gendered norms are often referred to as 
'external' to the make-up of the Lebanese society (Shehadeh 1999). The gender 
related socio-economic indicators include high levels of literacy, low maternal 
mortality and fertility, and average levels of participation in the workforce (Schulze 
1995). Social freedoms are also expressed in low reported incidence of honour 
killings and kidnappings (Khalaf 2002). These basic indicators are countered by a 
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severe gap in political participation and representation indicators. The case 
problematises this view and elaborates on the various channels of norms formation 
and perpetuation. 
While Lebanon enjoys a history of thriving feminist action, most feminist 
achievements were in the field of socio-economic indicators. Political participation 
and personal issues have been harder to secure. For instance, the Lebanese 
government ratified the CEDA W convention in 1996 and placed reservations only on 
family law issues. The indicators for parliamentary and municipal women's 
representatives have been extremely low also in the post-conflict period. Similarly, 
Lebanese family law regulations fall well behind other Arab countries such as 
Egypt's khufS law, and Morocco's 2004 Mudawwana. The case of Lebanon provides 
an interesting setting for analysing the complexity of legal frameworks and women's 
agency. 
The contradictions involving the status of women show that women's SOClO-
economic rights issues are addressed successfully, while political, civic and personal 
rights are highly ignored. Figures from the UNDP Millennium Development Goals 
report (UNDP 2004) show that women's literacy rates are 90.7%, and women's 
economic activity constitute 49.3% of the total economically active population. 
However, women have low access to positions of responsibilities and decision-
making in the private sector, as they constitute 8.5% of employees in high 
managerial positions in 1996. Access to decision-making in executive public 
positions is also very weak as women accessed ministerial posts for the first time 
only in 2004. The proportion of women in the first and second civil service ranks is 
low, 2% and 10%, respectively. Krayem (2003) finds that women's representation in 
the house of parliament is 2.3% much lower than that of municipal councils (20% in 
1998). These figures contrast sharply as rates of women's participation in the voting 
process that was almost equal to men. 
8 khuf is a clause in Islamic Sunni law allowing women to end the marriage without the husbands' 
prior approval. However this law denies women many of the fmancial entitlements stipulated in the 
regular form of divorce. The Mudawwana is the Moroccan civil family law amended in 2004 granting 
full gender equality in most clauses. It is considered a breakthrough as it was approved by the King 
Mohammad VI despite it departing from common directives attributed to Islamic law. 
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Electoral candidature does not depend on party affiliation. Individual candidates run 
for the religiously distributed seats and form fluid and contradictory political 
alliances. The political dimension of religion is prominent in the peculiarity of the 
political parties structure that are practically closer to a mix of politico-religious 
movements with patron leadership, rather than distinctive ideologically-based right 
and left wing parties. Several of these movements exist within one sectarian group. 
Instead of promoting political vibrancy, they rest on religious identity. These 
politico-religious considerations and other communal influences would constitute the 
main criteria for voters' choice, and many Lebanese women voters tend not to 
particularly run, vote or engage in campaigns of women candidates (Krayem 2003). 
Cases of gender-based marital and family offences are partly legislated in the penal 
code but hardly recognised by religious courts. For instance, domestic violence falls 
under physical assault crimes of the Lebanese Penal Code (L.R 18/09/1948, A. 554-
559) but is not criminalised in most religious courts provisions (Zalzal2000). Marital 
rape is not recognised as a criminalised offence in Articles 503 and 504 of the penal 
code (L.R. 18/09/1948). Adultery is still penalised more heavily for women than for 
men in the penal code provisions 478, 488, 489 (L.R 18/09/1948). Punishment for 
'honour' crimes is relaxed in the Article 562 of the Lebanese penal code (RL. 
18/09/1948). 
With the lack of reforms in family law in Lebanon, the case allows for drawing links 
between subjectivity and agency through the exploration of individual and collective 
agency of women facing family law problems and women groups. The role of 
secular feminist civil society tends to be widely attributed as a role of resistance, 
based on the premise of identity politics. The major problems faced by conventional 
group formations such as women organisations relate to identity politics, where 
collective action is based on lobbying for particular issues or specific interests while 
silencing differences (Young 1998). However, when women's subjectivity is 
destabilised away from the 'womanhood' category, women's agency develops in less 
linear ways than some feminist readings suggest. Such understandings of the role of 
women groups is closer to functional notions of social group membership (Conover 
1988) and fit more with the definition of social aggregate or category based on 
arbitrary attributes (Butler 1998; Young 1998). These assumptions also marginalise 
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different types of women and sets of problems within different power structures 
(Reagon in Mohanty 2003). 
The construction and implications of individual and collective agency on gender 
equality becomes an important component in the gender governance order. The role 
of women groups needs to be studied in relation to the complexities of social group 
formation, the internal and external perceptions of affinity, and the fluidity and 
overlap of several social groups membership at one time (Young 1998). The case of 
Lebanon thus helps to redress the secularist bias in relation to studying women 
groups. In much of the literature, the notion of feminist resistance is attributed to 
secular women groups and as a result, their subjectivity and agency is little 
problematised. This contradicts the intense interest in scrutinizing women groups by 
probing into their subjectivity and agency as well as the direction of the social 
change they aim to achieve. This discussion feeds into the broader aim of the 
research in that it furthers our understanding of the nature and extent of the impact of 
the gender governance order on women's negotiation of their personal rights. 
This follows that the Lebanese case provides a dynamic understanding of women's 
subjectivity and agency construction. It provides a fertile setting for exploring the 
ways in which women become gendered subjects amid a multitude of conflicting 
religious and social identities. Such a charged discursive setting destabilises 
mainstream feminist assertions on a primary womanhood and sisterhood identities. 
These premises are refuted as subjectivities are increasingly recognised as a 
continuous and multilayered process of conflicting and ever changing identities 
(Butler 2003; Castells 1997). In this way, while the thesis adopts a women-centred 
approach, it moves away from an empiricist feminist approach (Hartsock 2003). 
Instead, it holds as its starting point the fluidity of subjectivity characterised in 
multiplicity, complexity and volatility (Butler 1998). 
1.7 Organisation of the thesis 
The thesis contains seven chapters. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of 
'gender governance' adopted throughout the thesis. This chapter outlines the 
conceptual framework of 'gender governance'. It exposes the limitations of statutory 
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approaches and builds on post-structural and feminist literature to make the case. It 
concludes by pointing to the methodological plan. 
Chapter 3 discusses the methods used to gather field data. This chapter makes a case 
for the validity and manageability of the research plan by (i) justifying the approach, 
methods, and the changes to the fieldwork plan; (ii) clarifying the positioning of the 
researcher, and the ethical considerations to the respondents, (iii) detailing the data 
collection and analysis processes, and the limitations of the research. 
Chapter 4 is the first of five substantive chapters that present the argument of the 
thesis. It details the historical developments of the institutional socio-political context 
of family law frameworks since the Ottoman and French pre-independence rule onto 
the formation of the Lebanese state. 
Chapter 5 elaborates on the policy process of family law frameworks in the post-
independence and post-conflict periods. It studies the policy making process in terms 
of the influence of various discourses on citizenship and gender equality and the 
power relations between various actors. It analyses the construction of policy 
episodes, the formulation of the policy problem, the framing of concerned 
populations, and policy outcomes. The chapter highlights the importance of focusing 
on the 'enactment' of policies in order to assess the full gendering impact of family 
law order of governance. 
Chapter 6 discusses the techniques of blurring women's legal subjectivity. It 
highlights the institutional scope of the gender governance order of family law that 
results in blurring women's legal subjectivity. It argues that legislative 
inconsistencies define only partially women's legal subjectivity at the statutory level. 
Women's legal subjectivity extends to additional institutional layers sustained by 
various actors and disciplinary practices. The chapter concludes by signposting the 
moralities underpinning these frameworks. 
Chapter 7 explores the gendered moralities and the ethics of subjectification. It 
asserts that women construct their legal subjectivity by enrolling in and contesting 
the gendered moralities produced by the gender governance order. It unpacks the 
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gendered moral basis as a collection of intertwined scriptural and modernist secular 
dominant social norms. It discusses how women construct their personal ethics 
through negotiating these gendered categories of womanhood ideals. It concludes by 
drawing links with women's agency at individual and collective levels. 
Chapter 8 analyses the governance spaces and women's agency. This chapter 
contends that the gender governance order fragments women's agency over 
individual and collective social spaces. These spaces emerge through clashes of the 
discursive regimes of local family law frameworks on one hand, and universalist 
gender equality and activism on the other. It also constructs women's agency in 
multiple directions through contested notions of resistance and freedom beyond the 
conventional Western perspectives. 
The thesis concludes with chapter 9. This chapter sums up the thesis by (i) 
summarising the argument for order of 'gender governance', (ii) stating the thesis 
contribution, (iii) discussing policy implications on women's action on family law, 
(iv) stating the limitations of the research, and the areas of future research. 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the overall purpose of the research project. The aims of the 
thesis were specified as researching the impact of family law frameworks on 
women's subjectivity and agency. The research was justified at two levels. At the 
academic level, the research questions the fixed analyses of family law frameworks 
and its statutory uniform effect on women, and aims at dispelling the myths 
surrounding women's responses to and action on discrimination in family law. It 
contributes to knowledge on gender equality and personal relations in multi-religious 
and post-conflict contexts by revealing the complexity of the interplay between legal 
frameworks of family law and women's experiences within their environment. By 
adopting a govemmentality approach it analyses the styles of an 'order of gender 
governance' that women are enrolled in through these frameworks. By doing this, it 
probes into the varied and overlapping forms of subjectivity and agency that women 
experience in the enactment of family law. Finally, the thesis also contributes to 
policy on gender equality and family law by providing thorough evidence based 
research of the lived conditions of women experiencing family law issues. The 
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argument of the thesis draws on the three elements of governmentality: 1) the 
production of sovereignty and regimes of truth on gender equality and family law; 2) 
the disciplinary techniques that control women's subjectivity and agency during their 
encounters with structures and institutions relating to family law; and 3) the 
management of social spaces through bio-power that manage women's voice and 
agency. The research project applies this theoretical framework to the case of gender 
equality and family law frameworks in post-conflict Lebanon. 
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2 CHAPTER Two Family law as an order of gender governance 
2.1 Introduction 
The examples set out in the introduction reveal the tension between women's lived 
experiences of gender inequality in family law and the ways in which policy actors 
understand and formulate family law frameworks. In this chapter, I review the 
available literature and construct a theoretical framework to bridge this gap and 
provide a thorough understanding of the issue. 
The research question driving this thesis positions the discussion at the heart of these 
disciplinary intersections of legal, gender, social and political analyses. For this, the 
theoretical discussion below relies as much on the knowledge specific to family law, 
as on selectively drawn broader sociological concepts in as much as they inform the 
conceptual framework. It funnels various analyses into one central concern: to 
explain how family law frameworks impact on the ways women engage in personal 
relations. 
The starting point of this inquiry is in the next section, which reviews what I refer to 
as fixed approaches to analysing gender equality. By fixed I refer to approaches that 
reduce the gendering factors to structural social processes, and confine women's 
subjectivity and agency to normative notions of 'womanhood'. It argues that, while 
they provide a valid starting point for analysis, they offer only a partial analysis of 
the problem. Their limitations are explained in relation to their formal level of 
analysis and the idealised relations to women citizenship. 
The second section attends to the gaps of fixed approaches by drawing on notions of 
governance, power, subjectivity, and agency. These concepts reveal the social 
construction of gender equality in family law, the historically specific institutional 
legal practices, the role of various institutional actors, and the broader institutional 
forms of gender inequality produced in the process. These dimensions locate gender 
discrimination in family law in the context-specific, historical, and political 
dynamics and away from the idealised notions of womanhood mentioned in the 
previous section. 
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Finally, the last section presents and discusses the theoretical framework of 'order of 
gender governance'. This framework is based on Foucault's (2000) concept of 
governmentality that analyses state policies as a way of 'managing' populations. The 
concept of governmentality is adapted to gender equality in family law and explained 
at three levels: disciplinary technologies, moralities of truth, and the management of 
family law spaces. This framework allows for the analysis of family law in relation 
to their implications on women's subjectivities and agency. By conceptualising 
family law as a governance issue, it is possible to understand the kind of agency that 
is produced in the process. The chapter concludes with a summary of the overall 
argument. 
2.2 Fixed approaches to the impact of family law on women's subjectivity and 
agency 
As a starting point to developing the order of gender governance framework, I 
analysed the various ways in which gender equality in personal relations has been 
conceptualised in the feminist literature. I grouped the different perspectives 
according to the understanding of 'equality' into three typologies -the statutory, 
structural, and cultural respectively. As I analysed these perspectives, I noted that 
they fail to capture the complexity of gender equality in family law in two ways. 
First, they hold a 'static' understanding of equality. Second, they rely on fixed 
definitions of the 'female' subject. These perspectives are detailed below in relation 
to their understanding of the problem of gender equality, and their conceptualisation 
of subjectivity and agency. 
2.2.1 Gender inequality in penonal relations as statutory discrimination 
In western-centred liberal academic thought the gendering impact of family law is 
considered primarily in relation to the statutory bias it holds against women. With the 
rise of modern feminism in the 20th century, the uneven fonnal rights of women in 
marriage contracts were denounced as the dark side of a gender-blind liberal 
citizenship that is based on contractual individualism (Pateman 1988). 
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The liberal model of family law focuses on the divide between the public and private 
social sphere.9 As a result, it does not question the compromised position of women 
in the family, the beacon of individual freedoms. 10 A feminist critique of liberalism 
challenged the male bias in the private sphere and denounced it as disguised under a 
'false gender neutrality' (Okin 1998: 120). In many western societies, existing family 
law frameworks tied women - through marriage- into a 'sexual contract' (Pateman 
1988). Inequality lies essentially in the legal texts, as they disowned women from 
any rights to own property or conduct separate business following the concept of 
'couverture' that merges their legal rights with those of their husbands. Gender 
inequality in the private sphere was mainly translated as formal and statutory bias to 
be remedied with the acquisition of equal legal rights. 
The statutory framework was also adopted by scholars researching religious family 
law in non-western contexts. It appealed particularly to legal and political research 
on family law in Middle Eastern and Islamic societies (Esposito and Bas 2001; 
Sonbol 1996). Statutory equality also led the way for the early elaborations of the 
'rights' approach to gender equality that were enshrined in the universalist 
formulation of the international human rights instruments as early as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (IDHR) and carrying on to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).II This approach holds several 
implications on women's subjectivity and citizenship. 
9 Brennan and Pateman (1998:93) argues that "women, more specifically married women, constitute a 
penn anent embarrassment and problem" for the liberal tradition based on freedom and equality. Iris 
Young (1998) noted the misunderstanding entailed in favouring the public sphere as its proponents 
confuse between plurality and privatisation of issues. In this sense, both public and private issues need 
to be debated and addressed. 
10 The first generation of liberal feminists sidelined personal gender issues. They turned to the 
statutory exclusion from the public sphere and lobbied for access to 'public' issues of voting, 
education, and health (Okin 1998). They viewed the domestic role of women as part of her 'natural' 
occupation, and sought to refonn the legal structure granting them access to the public sphere such as 
Wolfencroft (mentioned in Tong 1998) Second generation liberal feminists, such as Betty Friedan 
(1963), showed dissatisfaction with their domesticity as a 'feminine mystique' and turned to joining 
men in the public sphere, instead of probing into the conditions of their domestic plight (Wbelehan 
2007) 
II The rights approach was critiqued for being based on universalist grounds. This point was made by 
Spivak who still adhered to it as a 'strategic' position despite the many pervasive implications on 
subaltern populations (Spivak and Harasym 1990) 
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First, legal provisions are essentialised and considered as a comprehensive and 
definitive body of legislation that is largely fixed and dissociated from socio-political 
influence (Amirmokri 2004; Burgat and Esposito 2003; Rehman 2007) This applies 
to both western (secular) and to non-western (religious) legislation. A central 
problem here is that secular western legislation is historically influenced by religious 
moral frameworks especially when it comes to considering men as the heads of the 
household and attaching women to them as dependents (Asad 2003; Wolfe 2006). 
Statutory approaches reduce gender equality in family law to a legalistic 
interpretation of equality that ignores structural and institutional factors and equates 
entitlement with access to gender eqUality. 
The emphasis on statutory equality also assumes a unitary view of the State. For 
instance, in the 'Sexual Contract', Pateman (1988:224) called for a new conceptual 
framework for analysing the state in a way that 'open[s] up space for two figures: 
One masculine and one feminine'.12 Brown (1995) critiqued Pateman for subscribing 
to dominant state configurations, without questioning the make-up, fragmentation, 
and effect of the state. 
Similarly, for non-western contexts, religious provisions such as Islamic ones were 
drawn as an overarching doctrine that was synonymous with the State. For example 
Mernissi's (1991; 2003) work on the veil carries an essentialist reading of Islam 
across several countries. In such works Islam is attached to a unified notion of the 
state, thus erasing any fragmentation resulting from political and historical factors 
that are related to colonialism for instance (also found in the works of Moghadam in 
Moghadam 1992; Moghadam 2007; Moghadam, Karshenas et al. 2006). Research on 
women's position in 'Muslim law', essentialises Islam as a unified set of clear and 
definitive directives on family law. However alternative views indicated that 
religious directives vary across contexts and are as much constructed in relation to 
the local historically-specific social norms (Moaddel 2005). 
12 Post-structural perspectives, such as Foucault in the History of Sexuality, also critiqued it further by 
showing how this 'privatisation' of the 'personal' was constructed as a way to control individuals in 
society. 
38 
In the same vein, the statutory 'rights' perspective holds a legalistic connotation that 
is analytically and practically separated from the actual materialisation of justice for 
women (Tong 1998).13 Statutory approaches tend to de-politicise relations within the 
family. Gender equality is a 'consumed good' and women as a "consumer subject" 
(Brown 1995:5). They mask the political and institutional dimensions of sexual 
violence and practices of family law. 14 The liberal overemphasis on "individual 
culpability" masks "deep political distress in a culture" (Brown 1995:27). 
The 'rights' approach was also considered "reactionary", providing a "mirror of 
reversal" which are framed around the enemy (Brown 1995:8).15 The concern with 
'rights' through identity politics serves as "mirroring" of a state of "injury" which 
focuses on individualised blame (Brown 1995:27). The mirroring process reinforces 
the category of injury attached to the subjects and legitimates the need for protection 
by protectors such as the state, thus compromising their calls for freedom. The focus 
on statutory rights is thus inadequate as it allows for the "political ground [to] cede to 
a moral and juridical ground" and injured identities are imprisoned in a "plastic 
cage" that is largely invisible and considered "normal" (Brown 1995 :27). 
Statutory approaches consider women's subjectivity and agency as fixed and based 
on entitlements. Carole Pateman (1988) provides a thorough analysis of the legal 
status of women's civic records. These records illustrated a gendered state order as 
they confined women in the legal category of 'dependent'. Women's statutory 
citizenship was thus embedded within the primary category dedicated to men. 
Pateman's analysis sheds light on the importance of linking the individual/micro 
level to a collective or macro level of gender discrimination. However, it does not 
explain how this statutory citizenship is translated and contested in practice. 16 
13 Liberal feminists tried to distance themselves from radical feminism which was blamed for too 
much focus on victim feminism, hostility to men, and emphasis of sexual violence (Bryson 2003). 
14 Phillips calls for distinguishing between everyday politics and formal politics. She supports Elshtain 
in rejecting the slogan of radical feminists 'the personal is political, mainly because in her view the 
latter dilutes the magnitude or specificity of formal politics (Phillips 2003:4). 
IS Dismissing the liberal conception of freedom as an a-historical, abstract notion focused on property 
and personhood, she charges at the leftist view that is negative and against injustice. 
16 The demise of the statutory approach to gender equality in personal relations is that it buys into the 
nurture versus nature and the identity and difference debates. While it focused on instating statutory 
equality and identity, this maintained the binary of absolute and other. Statutory law was considered to 
entrench sexual social roles or 'gender' roles maintained by women and men across the world, 
shaping individuals into culturally gendered 'feminine' and 'masculine' roles with distinctive 
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Women were considered autonomous individuals endowed with agency to 
automatically benefit from statutory reform of family law. 
2.2.2 Gender inequality in personal relations as structural injustice 
Another feminist strand turned to women's uneven economic power within the 
household and society and away from citizenship statutory constraints. The 
household was considered for long as an economic black box in terms of uneven 
distribution of resources for women who are unpaid for their contribution to 
domestic work. Following a Marxist argument;7 women were considered to be held 
in uneven personal relationships through their purse strings. The household was the 
main space for oppressing women through the control of income by the male 
members of the family (Whelehan 2007). A causal link was drawn between 
economic independence and gender equality in the family, endowing equality with 
the meaning of materialist parity. Thus, socialist feminists lobbied for structural 
changes to economic relations within the structure of the family. 
Developmental feminists also raised the economic impact of family law in their 
critique of economic liberalism. 18 Martha Nussbaum's (Nussbaum, Glover et al. 
1995) use of the 'capabilities approach', developed by Amartya Sen is an example 
of this perspective. The capabilities approach recognises the structural constraints to 
individuals' freedom and is concerned with providing the basis for individuals' 
flourishing functioning in various areas of life. In this way, a reform of the 
distribution of resources was advocated. 
The economic approach understood women's subjectivity and agency as part of their 
free will to make choices. Nussbaum was criticised for conceptualising gender 
behaviours and perceptions (Okin 1989). These 'feminine' social roles - or gender as the term was 
coined- were considered fixed in the sense that women's identity is moulded according specific 
'feminine' attributes. This conception relates to the earlier interpretations of the differences brought 
by de Beauvoir's famous slogan 'one is never born a woman, one becomes a woman'. It was meant to 
explain the social influences dividing men into' Absolute' beings and women as the 'Other'. De 
Beauvoir's critique was to the hierarchy of order, rather than to a questioning of the nature and fixity 
within the identity of the 'other' (Beauvoir and Parshley 1993) 
17 Marxist feminists also held the bias that the family was a space away from the hegemony of the 
state. Later on socialist feminists applied the Marxist market analysis to the household as an extension 
of the patriarchal order- the hegemonic state and capitalist market dynamics (Tong 1998) 
18 Phillips points to the diversification of contemporary liberalism by distinguishing between political 
and economic liberalism, as one could adhere to the former stream while uphold criticism of the latter. 
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equality as a choice for accessible possibilities of function. While broadly agreeing 
on the need for feminists to reconcile with liberalism, Anne Phillips (2001) found 
that analysing gender equality in terms of choice is inadequate because it understands 
it as sufficiency rather than substantive equality. It portrayed women as endowed 
with unconstrained choice and autonomy that would allow them to make use of any 
opportunities they are presented with (Charusheela 2008). 
The theoretical premise of a fixed 'womanhood' identity also underpinned the 
economic perspective. In this view, women displayed two types of identities. First, 
they were victims of oppression and thus in touch with their core womanhood. 
Second. they could be in denial or in 'false consciousness', subscribing to the 
gendered order of economic domination. However this view provided a fixed and a 
negative dimension of identity (that is to be differentiated from a relational one), and 
defined by what it is not, and depicted as injury (Brown 1995). 
The structural approach sums up the authority for regulating family relations within a 
unified state. The state is composed of several exclusionary economic mechanisms 
that marginalise women and keep them within the grip of uneven household 
relations. In explaining the impact of family law in non-western contexts, this 
approach considers religious structures as part of the state hegemonic role. However, 
there is increasing recognition of the diversified political and cultural role of religion, 
which makes claims of a unitary state structure more questionable. 
2.2.3 Gender inequality in penonal relations as cultural subordination 
Beyond statutory and economic frameworks, culture was the centre of explanations 
relating to the gendering effect of societal norms and values. Cultural feminists 
analysed it from two different angles focused on a fixed concept of patriarchy. 19 
In western contexts, gendered personal relations were exposed by radical feminists 
using Carol Hanisch's (1969) iconic statement 'the personal is political'. This 
statement was meant in response to liberal feminists' reluctance to problematise 
19 Most of these perspectives are underpinned by the notion of patriarchy. Patriarchy is an institutional 
structure of fixed traditional male-biased cultural norms maintained through customary and religious 
influences that perpetuate gender inequality in various areas including family law (Walby 1989) 
Patriarchy was critiqued for providing a fixed and essentialist view of gendered norms and values. 
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private personal relations considered of little relevance to the broader experiences of 
women. The merits of this perspective is that it located the pervasiveness of uneven 
relations between men and women in the intimate and sexual realm (MacKinnon 
2005). The oppression experienced by many women was primarily sexual and 
translated in the pervasive power of forced sexual practices whose extreme and 
common form was rape.20 This school elaborated the concept of Violence Against 
Women (VA W) to expose sexual aggression by pinning it down to cultural norms 
and practices.21 
The 'personal is political' slogan was also used to different effect by multicultural 
feminists to contest the essentialist take of culture and religion found in western-
centric feminist claims. They considered gender equality in family law as part of the 
struggle against their disadvantaged position in the hegemonic western frameworks 
(Narayan 1997). Multicultural and third world feminists problematized racial 
discrimination in women's personal lives. Starting with the plea of Black feminism 
in the US, feminists showed that family relations are less uniform and more complex 
than initially assumed by western-centric feminist views (Hooks 2000). On one hand, 
the multicultural family was a sanctuary for marginalised racialised women to affirm 
their identities away from the oppressive white hegemonic society. However, it was 
also acknowledged for its oppressive practices that were legitimised by cultural or 
religious premises reinforced by colonial powers (Mohanty 2003).22 
Development feminists also denounced the detrimental effect of culture on women's 
personal relations. Mainstream feminist development perspectives rejected 
traditional and 'backward' customs and relied on a universalist understanding of 
equality. They adapted various ideas from liberal, radical and socialist feminism to 
back their claims. These claims considered equality within a de-culturalised 
20 An opposing view of maternal feminism saw the family as a forum for women to express their 
innate 'motherhood' abilities and special nurturing gift. The family was seen as the building block of 
society contributing to its cohesion. 
21 This constituted a revolutionary approach at the time that held support groups for victims of 
domestic violence and running shelters for battered women. A segregationist approach was the 
solution for Lesbian feminists who denounced the pervasive patriarchal order and the heterosexual 
marriage institution calling for 'women for women' support. This school saw equality as 
independence/disengagement/distinction. The critique for this approach was the essentialist cultural 
distinctions attributed to men and women. 
22 Multicultural feminists claims are imbued with relativist perspectives. 
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universalist gender identity. They emphasised a modernist secular-religious divide, 
translated into a progress-backwardness dichotomy.23 This mainstream stand on 
personal relations contrasts with more nuanced and culturally sensitive analysis of 
gender inequality of household dynamics when analysed in conjunction with 
economic and reproductive health issues. 
In an alternative take on cultural influence, religious feminists considered local 
cultural norms as a diversion from the essence of equity provided by religion. 
Religion was seen as an exceptional moral order that had the capacity to provide 
answers to transcend gender inequality. In this framework equality was understood 
as equity and fairness that surpasses man-made conceptions of justice (Badran 2009; 
King 1994). Gender inequality in personal relations stemmed from defective 
religious interpretation and practice by people.24 In Islamic contexts, recent feminist 
scholarship finds that multiple interpretations of Islamic Sharia can provide 
opportunities for a progressive reading and application of women's rights in the 
family (Mayer 2007; Mir-Hosseini 2003; Mir-Hosseini 2006). 
There are several critiques for the emphasis on the cultural effect of gender 
inequality in personal relations. First, it operates in a religious-secular binary and 
creates an artificial schism between the two concepts and conceals their moral and 
philosophical intertwining (Sharma and Young 1999). Second, it also constructs a 
false binary between 'script' and 'practice' and portrays it as a clash between 'high' 
and 'low' religion. 25 This distinction is refuted as the meaning of the 'script' IS 
always subject to the interpretation of the reader (Derrida and Caputo 1997). 
These cultural perspectives analysed women as inherently different from men. 
Womanhood identity was essentialised and fixed. It marked a constitutive positive 
23 The modern-backward dichotomy does not apply to issues of reproductive health. Taking the 
example of clitoridectomy that has been erroneously attributed to Islam, Spivak (1990) draws the 
attention to the different understandings attributed to the meaning of the operation in different 
countries and the difference in the cultural relevance perceived by men and women of those 
communities. Similarly women's veiling in Islam, not categorically imposed in the scripts, has 
multiple derivations ranging from Judaic and Christian influences, colonial reinforcement, class 
distinction, and a political affirmation (Hashim 1999) 
24 This latter view relies on a relativist stand, which contests the moral-legal and political framework 
of secular equality. It relates to other cultural relativist feminists who argue for different frameworks. 
25 An example of such binary is found in Gellner's (\994)'s work on Islam 
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difference between men and women especially through the views of maternalist and 
environmentalist feminists. In these views, women held generative and nurturing 
qualities.26 As men were considered lacking of these qualities, women were deemed 
to operate in the special moral framework of 'emotions' that is outside of rigid 
rational masculinist logic (Elshtain 1995). The perceived abundance of the maternal 
logic was an antidote to the male oppressive rational logic. From this view, the 
gender roles involved in personal relations were complementary. It also implied that 
women had a common core identity of 'womanhood' translated within a sense of 
'sisterhood'. These assumptions held problematic claims of homogeneity of 
women's identity (Naghibi 2007). 
This view of a fixed womanhood identity concur with classical conceptualisations of 
identity as "having a clearly delineated self-definition, a self-definition comprised of 
those goals, values and beliefs which the person finds personally expressive, and to 
which he or she is unequivocally committed" (Watennan 1984:331). This view 
draws a clear definition of the self and one's choices. It was critiqued for portraying 
women as an "exclusionary category and reveal [ing] coercive and regulatory 
consequences, even if this construction is for emancipatory purposes" (Butler 
1998:6). 
2.3 Moving beyond: Enacted freedom and the construction of SUbjectivity and 
agency 
With the shortcomings of the static approaches, I located alternative conceptions of 
gender equality and its impact on women's notions of self and their capacity for 
action. These three notions constitute the backbone of the gender governance 
framework explained in details later in the chapter. 
2.3.1 Equality as enacted freedom 
As discussed in the previous section, classical notions of gender equality in personal 
relations fall short of accounting for the various influences on women's subjectivity 
and agency. Statutory equality overlooks a whole range of enacted aspects of 
inequality. Similarly, structural justice does not account for the deeper institutional 
26 A celebration of women's maternal identity also extended to drawing a link with the natural powers 
of mother earth (Tong \998). 
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constraints that reproduce inequality in vanous ways. In mainstream cultural 
explanations, the norms and values perpetuating inequality devolve are dissociated 
from the worldviews and lived experiences of individuals. For this, alternative 
elaborations equality account for these shortcomings. 
One contribution to understanding equality as enactment is as Nancy Fraser (Fraser, 
Honneth et al. 2003) view of equality as 'participatory parity' (Fraser and Olson 
2008) that promotes the need to accommodate distribution, recognition and 
representation. While this notion highlighted the crucial enacted aspects of justice, it 
however does not account for the politics of access, issue selection, level of 
involvement and extent of participation (Olson 2008). 
These shortcomings of participation featured in the alternative view of equality from 
a radical democratic perspective. The democratic radical project elaborated by 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantale Mouffe (1985) places dissent and difference at the heart 
of equality. This framework allows for engaging with oppressive views and 
neutralising them. However, this notion of equality, as inclusive as it might be, still 
holds some statutory biases of liberal conceptions. It still circumscribes the 
sovereignty of subjects by virtue of state laws and regulations and maintains liberal 
dichotomy of freedom and responsibility (Brown 1995:11). Second, the normative 
basis of this idea of equality is removed from historical specificities, or as Brown 
(Brown 1995: 12) puts it "their political ideals are de linked from historical 
configurations of social powers and institutions". In a critique of the liberal notion of 
equality, Brown finds that there is an artificial liberal dichotomy between freedom 
and responsibility which brings in the concept of "liberty as licence" and legitimates 
discourses of freedom as selfishness and sacrifice as responsibility (Brown 1995:25). 
These conventional notions decouple freedom from power. 
In an attempt to understand equality in terms of historical configurations and power 
relations, Brown (1995) proposes the idea of equality as enacted freedom. Building 
on the Foucauldian notion of 'freedom as practice', this view contends that freedom 
cannot be void of power. 27 Brown considers freedom as a process of "permanent 
27 Brown refers to Foucault's notion of 'freedom as practice' originally mentioned in Space, 
Knowledge, and Power. 
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struggle against what will otherwise be done to us or for us" (Brown 1995:25). She 
stressed the importance of "taking full measure of power range and appearances - the 
powers that situate, constrain and produce subjects as well as the will to power 
entailed in practicing freedoms" (Brown 1995:25). In Brown's view, freedom 
becomes constitutive of action and a process. Hence she proposes to pay attention to 
the "style of political practices" rather than simply the procedures, policies and laws 
(Brown 1995:8). This notion of freedom is grounded in Foucault's (1980) 
understanding of the genealogy of knowledge and is pertinent here as it traces the 
historical crafting and validity of norms around family law. 
Applying this notion to gender equality in personal relations, the gendering impact of 
family law lies in the power dynamics of political practice. Family law produces 
fluid dynamics between legislative frameworks and socio-cultural norms and 
practices. These frameworks and practices shape the ways individuals see themselves 
as gendered subjects and enact their subjectivity through a constructed agency 
(Mahmood 2005). This perspective adds to the earlier statutory and structural 
analyses of gender equality in two ways. First, it expands statutory frameworks 
towards broader normative social influence. Second, it indicates that these multiple 
normative and legal frameworks bring fluidity to the process of subjectification and 
construction of agency in multiple directions. 
Equality as enacted freedom reconciles family law with historicity beyond the de-
contextualised statutory, socio-economic, or cultural explanations. Foucault's (1980) 
notion of genealogy of knowledge is pertinent here as it traces the historical crafting 
and validity of norms around family law. Touraine's (1988:40) notion of historicity 
also provides a dynamic understanding of culture. Historicity is unpacked to imply 
more than the "historical nature of a social phenomenon". In Touraine's view it 
means "the set of cultural, cognitive, economic, and ethical models by means of 
which a collectivity sets up relations with its environment [ ... and] produces [ ... ] 
culture". It is a "set of instruments, of cultural orientations, through which social 
practices are constituted". It also draws attention to the role of historically bound 
social institutions - values and norms in a society - that shape individuals and 
animate power relations. Based on this view, it is important to bring historicity to law 
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and understand it as a historically located, changeable set of enforceable socio-
cultural norms that constitute social-cultural practices. 
This view also highlights the political aspect of family law as a dynamic set of power 
relations between different actors. Extending beyond statutory rights and fixed 
conceptions of the individual, this Foucauldian approach focuses on the practiced 
aspects of family relations. Thus, statutory rights are one aspect of broader power 
relations. They classify people into certain statutory categories and manage their 
actions through particular 'codes of legal conduct'. As the power dynamics between 
different individuals are constantly changing, the negotiations within family law are 
more complex than the formal understanding assumed earlier. This also means that 
these power relations are not unidirectional. They can be positive as well as negative 
as power is a productive force (Foucault 1980). This view allows us to analyse 
gender equality in family law within a more open frame of analysis. 
2.3.2 Constructing Subjectivity 
With the understanding of gender equality as enacted freedom, there is a need to 
problematize the way women engage in these power struggles and what effect it has 
on their own perceptions of themselves as social beings. This raises questions as to 
the validity of the fixed womanhood identity conceptualised by the static approaches 
to gender equality discussed earlier. In those views women's subjectivity is 
essentialised and fixed. While liberal feminist views separated subjectivity into a 
statutory and social divide, socialist and multicultural feminism bridged the two and 
questioned the shared basis of womanhood across contexts (Mohanty 2003). 
With the diversity in experiences and social influences, it is not possible to define 
subjectivity in relation to physical sexual attributes. Women's selving was 
acknowledged to be formed on the basis of differentiated social roles attached to sex 
in a dynamic process of 'doing gender' (West and Don 1987). Women were 
recognised as bearing a gendered 'identity' holding positive or negative socially 
constructed gendered attributes. 
This perception of a gendered identity fits with broader structural and interactionist 
perspectives on identity formation that acknowledge the role of complex mechanisms 
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of social forces. Pierre Bourdieu (1994) proposed the notion of relative positions 
where individuals and groups are located in the social field of forces. People's 
perception of the world, or their social identity, is socially structured rather than 
detached, in combinations whose probability varies widely.28 Applied to women, 
Hartsock (2003) claims that the structural inequalities women are subjected to 
endows them with a particular worldview that is expressed in terms of a 'feminist 
standpoint'. The limitations of this view lie in that individuals hold a singular 
position even though this position is plotted by several structural factors. It does not 
explain the shifts in identity that individuals display while in different settings and 
under different influences. 
In order to fill the gap of single positioning, Castells (1997:7) proposes a conception 
of plurality of identity that is a process of conflict, negotiation, and internalisation: 
[I]dentity, as it refers to social actors, [is] the process of construction of meaning on the 
basis of a cultural attribute, or related set of cultural attributes, that is/are given priority 
over other sources of meaning. For a given individual, or for a collective actor, there 
may be a plurality of identities. Yet, such a plurality is a source of stress and 
contradiction in both self-representation and social action. Their relative weight in 
influencing people's behaviour depends upon negotiations and arrangements between 
individuals and these institutions and organisations. Identities can also be originated 
from dominant institutions, they become identities only when and if social actors 
internalize them, and construct their meaning around this internalisation. 
This definition brings in a multifaceted view of identity. Identity takes shape through 
socio-cultural constructions of meaning, the plurality and conflict of these meanings 
and a mechanism of exchange and negotiation with surrounding factors. Various 
socio-cultural attributes affect the ways individuals appropriate multiple and 
conflicting identities. These conflicting identities affect the way different women 
perceive and handle their experiences29 (Hartsock 2003:396). 
28 This perception results from previous symbolic struggles and expresses the state of symbolic 
relations of power. These symbolic relations of power are acquired through different sets of capitals 
(cultural, social economic etc) that people acquire through their life. Their perception of social 
identity is the sum of their overall capital. 
29 Haraway considers this as a justification for adopting a feminist standpoint theory. This theory 
however still assumes an essentialist view of women's identity even if multi-dimensional. 
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While these views acknowledge the construction of identity, they still conceptualised 
it as a 'status-like' nature, and thus failed to account for the dynamics and action 
oriented processes that make up subjectivity. Although identity was changeable, it 
still referred to an 'attribute' that is 'acquired'. Alternative understandings of identity 
saw it as a fluid relational construct. Haraway (2003:396) proposes that individuals 
engage in multiple and shifting 'located positionings', which are defined as 
A commitment to mobile position and to passionate detachment is dependent on the 
impossibility of entertaining innocent "identity" politics and epistemologies as 
strategies for seeing from the standpoints of the subjugated in order to see well. One 
cannot "be" either a cell of a molecule-or woman, colonized person, laborer, and so on-
if one intends to see and see from these positions critically. 
In her argument, Haraway (2003) considers that identity is a fluid process that is 
always in the making and incomplete. Selving is critically experienced as a state of 
flux as we constantly move across time and social space and engage with situated 
knowledges that are produced in lieu of the 'real' world and are based on the power-
charged social relation of 'conversation'. 
In order to analyse the fluidity of women's subjectivity it is important to understand 
various subjective and anti-subjective theories of subjectivity (Mansfield 2000). 
Subjective theories acknowledge the formation of subjectivity as a product or an end 
result and theorises the process of formation and the effects of this process on the end 
product. Anti-subjective theories refer to an anti-foundational approach that rejects 
subjectivity as a concept/product and dispels it as a tool for domination and control 
of individuals and populations. 
Theories of fluid SUbjectivity move away from this dichotomy and are concerned 
with understanding different aspects of subjectivity formation. They are concerned 
with bridging the external and internal influences affecting the formation of 
subjectivity, the mechanics of subjectivity formation, the process of internalisation of 
subjectivity, and the effects that this process has on the ways people perceive and act 
in society. 
49 
Psychoanalytic theories from Freud, to Lacan, Irrigaray, and Kristeva elaborated 
universalist claims to understanding the external influences of subjectivity formation. 
However, they considered subjectivity within essentialised western-biased notions. 30 
They all rely on Freud's foundational notion of the sexual difference embedded in 
the Oedipal complex. These theories are a-historical and do not account for other 
patterns of parental structures. The emphasis on sex difference is critiqued by Judith 
Butler (Butler 1999) as she pushes us to move away from assuming a foundational 
validity of sex difference. For Butler, the very emphasis on sex difference is in itself 
socially constructed and given validity in various cultural contexts. In other words 
the difference in sexes is constructed as a political category of segregation that is 
used for gender discrimination. 
Subjectivity formation was also found to be historically grounded. Foucault 
considered that the process of subjectification was a contextually-located tool to 
control individuals (Burchell, Gordon et al. 1991). Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
argued on the need to analyse subjectivity in non-western contexts within the 
nuanced multitudes of specific historical processes of colonialism (Spivak and 
Harasym 1990). 
With this shift, identity was considered as part of a broader notion of subjectivity. 
Identity (including gender) is unstable and multiple, constructed differently and 
given particular pre-eminence and meaning in different contexts by different forces 
(Butler 2003). The interest in the concept of subjectivity as a historically bound 
social construct rose with Foucault's seminal works such as the 'History of 
Sexuality' and 'Discipline and Punish'. These accounts provided insights about the 
process of people's self-awareness. They informed us on the ways individuals 
acquire norms and values and a sense of presence. For Foucault (2000), individuals 
are 'historical subjects' whose awareness is constructed by the interplay of power 
relations between the institutional discourses in society.31 
30 Despite Irrigaray's refutation of Freud, she was critiqued for operating within and maintaining the 
same 'sexual' bias. 
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Focusing on the womanhood category as basis for women's subjectivity is 
problematic because it assumes a fixed understanding and value of the 'sex' 
category. As Butler explains, the relevance of sex as a marker for difference between 
men and women is only validated when special attention is attributed to it and thus 
becomes relevant in different forms, in certain contexts and not others (Butler 2003). 
In other words if sex has not been identified and reinforced by several power 
dynamics as a valid category for distinction, it would not have been noticed in the 
first place. Unpacking sex and gender serves to re-evaluate the feminist unquestioned 
primacy of womanhood over other identities, in a sense not to consider gender and 
'women' as a container where other identities fit (Butler 1999). 
Butler (1998) built on this notion and considered that 'women' are not a given 
category. Rather, it emerged as set of juridical structures that have imposed it and 
then regulated it. She explains that "juridical subjects are invariably produced 
through certain exclusionary practices that do not 'show' once the juridical structure 
of politics has been established" (Butler 1998:274). In considering different contexts, 
women as a category need to be analytically and politically drawn within the 
multiplicity of cultural, social, and political intersections and other axes of power 
relations in which the concrete array of 'women' are constructed (Butler 1998). 
Here it is useful to relate the construction of subjectivity to a dynamic understanding 
of 'legal personhood'. The analysis of legal personhood inquires about the ways 
individuals are defined in law. Individuals are constructed into legal persons through 
their legal recognition as 'owners' or holders of specific characteristics such as 
religious background (Mundy 2002). Various forms of categorisations 
simultaneously grant individuals several a 'multiplicity' of legal personae in terms of 
various rights and obligations (Akarli 2004). At the same time individuals can 
become objects of property through commodified forms of social contracts (Pottage 
2004). Applied to family law, these dynamics are traced in the ways individuals are 
entitled to arrange their family relations, as well as the ways they relate to each other 
through various forms of entry and exit from marriage. In this sense, family law, like 
many other law frameworks, blur the boundaries between persons and things 
(Pottage 2004). 
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The process of subjectification occurs in two ways. First competing historically 
bound political and social institutions construct a moral order through a process of 
governmentality. Governmentality, as elaborated by Foucault (1980), is a system of 
governance that is aimed at managing populations through regulating their nonns and 
values and actions in the family and society. This order imposes a framework of 
nonns and values that penetrate the individuals' consciousness. Second, 
'technologies of subjectificationlpower' involve a process whereby individuals 
construct an ethical framework from the broader moral framework that these nonns 
and values propagated through governmentality. 
Saba Mahmood (2005) draws on Foucault's conception of ethics to analyse the 
construction of women's religious subjectivity. For Foucault ethics are a fonn of 
power that "pennits individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of 
others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, 
conduct, and way of being" (Foucault and Rabinow 1997:225). Subjectivity is "not 
[ ... ] a private space of self-cultivation, but [is] an effect of a modality of power 
operationalized through a set of moral codes that summon a subject to constitute 
herself in accord with its precepts" (Mahmood 2005:28). The argument here is that 
codes of ethics are constitutive of agency. 
Mahmood's Foucauldian-inspired ethics framework 32 is useful as it reveals the 
various ways women legitimise the numerous and conflicting discourses of gender 
equality in family law and accommodate them with local constructions of 
womanhood. It focuses on the 'technologies of power' used by various actors and 
institutions and construct women's subjectivity and agency. Mahmood's framework 
is composed of four components as follows (Mahmood 2005). First, the 'substance 
of ethics' pertains to the aspects of the self that matter most to the ethical evaluation. 
Second, the 'mode of subjectification' refers to the source of authority that incites 
people to adopt certain ethical obligations and follow a particular ethical conduct. In 
the case of this research, it is useful to analyse the basis for the arguments used to 
advocate for or against family law refonns. Third, the 'techniques of the self are 
32 Actor-oriented perspectives point to the fatalistic element of Foucault's view ofsubjectification that 
suggests that individuals are passive recipients. These criticisms and the Foucauldian response are 
highlighted in a discussion of agency in the following sections. 
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discursive considerations and practices used by the person to shape the ethical self. 
This aspect is reflected in the research through an inquiry of the constructions by 
women groups and other actors of notions of right and wrong, and what is 
permissible or not. Finally, the 'telos' constitutes the ideal conception of the self 
within a 'historically specific authoritative model'. This aspect relates to the 
constructions of ideal womanhood that are embedded within family law policy 
reforms. 
While Mahmood's framework is useful to analyse the process of subjectification, it 
does not account much for the fluidity and multiplicity of SUbjectivity. Nikolas 
Rose's (l999:xii) work on mental health explains the permutations of subjectivity 
formation and enactment. He explains how this process produces four manifestations 
of SUbjectivity. The ontological dimension refers to the way the self is understood as 
a being, as a person within a social setting- in the case of this research, understanding 
what it means to be a 'wife' engaged in a personal relationship. The epistemological 
dimension traces how the self is "knowable", manifested or detectable through 
processes of social validation, such as the normative dynamics dictating the social 
expectations of family law. The ethical dimension points to the "kinds of selves 
[people] should seek to be" or what a 'good wife' should be or do. Finally, the 
technical dimension refers to the practices people engage in to reach their ethical 
self. I adopt these four dimensions in explaining the process of subjectification. 
Rose also highlights two particularly useful components involved in the process of 
subjectification. Authorities are crucial to the construction and validation of the self. 
The analysis of authorities includes the identification of "particular personages or 
attributes of authority" that shape women's selving. It also explores the types, 
procedures and locales where authority is mediated. 
Of particular importance is Hacking's (2007:285) notion of 'making up people' into 
'kinds' which refers to "the ways in which a new scientific classification may bring 
into being a new kind of person, conceived of an experienced as a way to be a 
person". I expand the understanding of the process of 'kind making' to various legal 
and moral authorities that construct women into a dominant category of 'wife kind'. 
Hacking (2007:286) elaborates on this concept by suggesting a process of a 'looping 
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effect' that refers to "the way in which a classification may interact with the people 
classified". In this looping effect, the new 'kinds' of individuals alter the political 
meanings of these categories and redraw it to their advantage. The findings of my 
research, detailed in chapter 6, contest Hacking's (1995) view and reveal that kind 
making does not always result in a looping effect. 
2.3.3 Agency construction 
As women's own sense of their existence is arguably fluid and continuously shaped 
by normative constraints, their ability to take action and their direction of this action 
is more complex than fixed approaches suggest. Thus, this section builds on the 
notion of subjectivity discussed in the previous section and draws the link between 
women's subjectivity and agency. 
The construction of women's subjectivity reflects on the conditions in which women 
do, or do not, act to improve their conditions. The early notions of fixed womanhood 
implied that women's agency is manifested in three ways: as passive victimhood, as 
compliance in false consciousness, or as a feminist rebellion. However, this view of 
agency is short of accounting for the multidimensional nature of subjectivity argued 
above. It does not explain how women's agency is initiated, enacted, or directed. 
Agency is also conceptualised in relation to the social structure by Anthony Giddens 
(1984). This theory combines action and structure in a more dynamic way than 
Bourdieu did. In the theory of structuration, Giddens maintains that individuals 
display human agency as they shape society around them despite the social 
restrictions surrounding them. The relationship between agency and structure is thus 
circular and constantly shaping one another. This view however overlooks the 
process of agency formation and assumes it as fixed and influenced only by variable 
external structural constraints. By disconnecting external factors from the individual, 
it relies on a static understanding of subjectivity. 
However, classical fixed conceptions of collective agency are problematic. In the 
static approaches to gender, equality feminist collective action was justified in the 
54 
premise that women hold similar attributes and go through similar experiences.33 The 
agency of women groups was preset in a sense of common 'sisterhood' (Naghibi 
2007). Sisterhood solidarity informed feminist collective action through the liberal 
lobbying for legal or statutory reforms such as the women quota in electoral systems 
or the radical 'women for women' support groups. The idea extended globally and 
permeated various contexts. Women groups organised by and for women became the 
typical form of association around women's issues (Mohanty 2003). 
An earlier critique of 'sisterhood' assumed unidirectional agency came from within 
the feminist movement by exposing the conflictual intra-women group dynamics. 
Thus the fixed understanding of feminist agency was contested as homogenising and 
essentialising women (Tong 1998). Third world and multicultural feminists exposed 
the marginalisation of their issues by the mainstream western feminist groups. The 
'global' dimension of sisterhood masked a western-centric feminist hegemony in 
international women's forums (Basu 2003). In these forums, western women's issues 
were considered as global and those of third world women as local (McCann and 
Kim 2003). As a result and in response to this division, third world feminists 
gathered as separate interest groups within or in parallel to international women 
focused forums (Basu 2003). These developments created a divide between Northern 
and Southern women. While women's solidarity became more complex, such as 
geography and ethnicity, it remained within an essentialist framework of a 
womanhood-based collective action. These divisions resulted in seclusion and an 
'ossification of difference' (Reagon 1998). 
In order to explain the multidirectional aspect of women's agency, alternative 
explanations argued for the need to consider women as a 'social group' rather than 
an aggregate (Young 1998). In this sense, women are not bound by mechanical 
solidarity, but rather brought together by an internal affinity by which one identifies 
with one another, in addition to an external affinity by which one is identified by 
other people. Group identity is composed of multiple affinities that are mainly 
33 In this view, women are assumed to have common grievances and interests and by proxy would 
have a unity and willingness to work on common goals (Elshtain 1995) 
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relational rather than linked to an attribute or an essence.34 The reciprocal affinity 
shapes group identity and creates, at least partly, a particular sense of history, 
understanding of social relations, personal possibilities and other experiences. This 
relational aspect relies on one's self-perception or identification with the group. It 
implies that membership is not ascribed nor exclusive, for people can leave or enter 
several groups and experience multiple group identification. One aspect of the 
relational affinity of disadvantaged groups lies in the oppression that occurs to all or 
a large portion of its members. 35 
Young's notion of group agency is helpful to depart from understanding women as 
social aggregates. However, it does not account for the subjectification process in 
which individuals engage in. For instance, the subjectification process implies a 
normative exchange that affects the way individuals identify a 'problem' and the way 
they relate to other people. Young made a distinction between 'theoretical' and 
'realistic' social groups. 36 She recognises situated experience and particular 
perceptions of social relations. Feminist standpoint theorists also adopted this view 
and recognised differences in the discriminatory situations surrounding women in 
various contexts. This approach helped bridge the gap between margin and centre 
and recognised multiple conditions for shaping agency. It however retained the 
binaries of margin and centre without addressing the power relations shaping the 
construction of subjectivity and agency of the individuals and groups on either side. 
These gaps were addressed by the post-structural perspectives discussed in the 
previous section and relating to the construction of sUbjectivity. Pringle and Watson 
(1998) argue that women's interests are not fixed. They rely on the discursive 
practices that produce them as any difference among groups is constructed, 
34 Young (1998) bases her notion of social group affinity Heidegger's "thrownness", when one finds 
oneself a member of a group with one's existence, relations and experience as always already 
happening. 
35 Young (1998) drew conditions for oppression as follows: 1) Exploitation in work activity, 2) 
marginalisation from participation in the social scene, powerlessness and submission to others' 
authority, 3) cultural imperialism when the group is stereotyped while at the same time is prevented to 
voice its experience, and fmally subjugation to random violence or harassment. 
36 Bourdieu holds comparable views as he differentiates between 'theoretical classes' and 'real 
classes'. They are theoretically constituted of individuals with similar positions in the social field and 
similar perceptions of acquired capital. The potential for mobilisation is greater when individuals are 
located 'closer together in the social space and belong to a more restricted and thus more 
homogeneous constructed class'. His view does not explain the lack of mobilisation of groups from 
similar positions in the social field. (Bourdieu 1994: 114) 
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articulated and maintained. Groups make these connections using the discursive 
frameworks available to the time and culture.J7 Interests can be defined as (Pringle 
and Watson 1998:70, original emphasis): 
[P]recarious historical products which are always subjected to processes of dissolution 
and redefmition. They are not self-constituted identities but rather 'differences' in the 
Sassurian sense, whose only identity is established relationally. Subjects cannot be the 
origin of social relations, but rather, are subject positions in discursive structures. And 
every social practice is articulatory: it cannot simply be the expression of something 
already acquired but involves a continuous process of constructing new differences. 
As women's subjectivity and interests are discursively shaped, this thesis argues that 
women's agency is far from homogenous and contests some common assumptions. 
First, at the relational level, the sisterhood framework is not applicable. The 
dynamics of women's affinity and alliance around gender equality are complex. 
Second, as feminist interests are numerous and at times conflicting, the substance or 
the nature of the issues selected for action is manifold. The feminist agenda (if any) 
is not progressive and can take different directions. Third, the style of action is also 
discursively shaped. It reflects the interplay between the collective actors and the 
institutional setting. Fourth, since women do not necessarily hold common platforms, 
the issue of representation becomes problematic. These issues resonate with the 
claims of post-feminism and post-structural feminism. 
Post-structural theories of SUbjectivity, exemplified in the later works of Foucault, 
recognised the subjects' 'resistance' to the dominant discursive influences (Cosslett, 
Easton et al. 1996; Lilja 2005).38 Foucault's view of resistance falls within a 
structural binary of negative dominance- positive resistance that is uncharacteristic of 
his call for moving beyond dichotomies (Brown 1995). However, the concept of 
resistance escapes this binary trap if we go back to Foucault's conception of power 
that underpins discourses. Power is an enactment rather than a status, and an exercise 
of discursive influence that could go in either positive or negative directions, 
31 A notion of "situated knowledge" recognises the variety of women's experiences (Haraway 1988). 
38 An example of resistance is provided by Abu Lughod' s (1998) study of Bedouin women's poetic 
oral practices allows them to undertake certain subversive acts to express their identity suggests in the 
most restrictive settings. 
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depending on one's position on the nonnative divide. In that sense, resistance to 
dominant discourses does not necessarily contain a normative positive value.39 
Mahmood (2005) provides a compelling account of the elaboration of agency beyond 
the resistance-dominance dichotomy. She contends that formulations of agency in 
feminist accounts such as Abu-Lughod's (1998) earlier work on Bedouin women's 
poetry as subversion in the Middle East was useful in moving away from earlier 
explanations of women as passive or repressed actors. However, Mahmood argues 
for dissociating women's agency from resistance and subversion. She contends that 
common notions of agency revolve around western-centric individual autonomy and 
'desire of freedom'. Mahmood's (2005: 14) critique is expressed in the proposition 
that the "desire for freedom [ ... ] is not an innate desire that motivates all beings at all 
times, but is also profoundly mediated by cultural and historical conditions". In other 
words, motivations for people's actions can emerge from other considerations than 
subordination or subversion. Mahmood (2005:14) called for dispelling the 
"progressive nature" of agency and invites us to explore the different ways agency is 
manifested: 
[I]f the ability to effect change in the world and in oneself is historically and culturally 
specific (both in tenns of what constitutes change and the means by which it is 
effected), then the meaning and sense of agency cannot be fixed in advance, but must 
emerge through an analysis of the particular concepts that enable specific modes of 
being, responsibility, and effectivity. 
Mahmood stresses that her view is not that of cultural relativism. It rather allows for 
a more nuanced and open discussion of agency that moves beyond the teleological 
notion of resistance.40 However, her dismissal of Foucault's view of resistance is not 
convincing because she completely dissociates normative constructions of freedom 
from non-western contexts. It has been recognised that normative frameworks of 
governance and subjectification in non-western contexts form an amalgamation of 
39 Foucault's notion of dominance and resistance faces a double impasse because it assumes a 
rebellious starting point. This is problematic in two ways. First, discourses are evaluated not in terms 
of their content/values, but in the extent to which they are 'dominant'. Second, he faces the charge by 
Mahmood of esentialising agency into' a pursuit of freedom' . 
40 Mahmood builds on Foucault and Butler's notions of subjectivisation and perfonnativity to expose 
the modes of Islamic subjectivication in Cairo women. 
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normative frameworks that accommodate individuality (Chatterjee 2004). In this 
sense, Foucault's notion of resistance is useful because it opens up various avenues 
of the subjectification process beyond domination. While Mahmood elaborates on 
the various forms of agency found with her case study, she does not look at the 
processes of their construction. 
Building on this view, I approach the formation of agency as a process of 'social 
construction' and focus on the processes shaping this multi-directional, non-linear 
agency. Seckinelgin (2008) argues that this complex process of agency construction 
is based on the notion of 'intentionality'. The process of agency construction relies 
on rule-imbued meanings. These rules constitute the link between meaning and 
deciding on taking action. Following Wittgenstein, Seckinelgin argues that deciding 
relies on 'known' uses (Wittgenstein in Seckinelgin 2008: 131). In that sense, the 
capacity for action relies on the surrounding discursive categorisation of possibilities 
for action. This is in line with Starr's (in Seckinelgin 2008: 131) view that "categories 
adopted for institutional uses inform action and mark direction and the form of 
activity.,,41 Knowing about possibilities for action thus shapes the intentionality for 
action.42 
2.4 Developing the idea of 'gender governance' 
2.4.1 What is meant by 'order of gender governance'? 
In order to analyse the gendering impact of family law on women's subjectivity and 
agency, I propose to understand family law as an 'order of gender governance' that 
enrols individuals in particular gendered norms and practices related to personal 
relations. I use the concept of 'governance' as elaborated in the post-structural 
perspective derived from Foucault's work on governmentality (Foucault 2000). In his 
seminal essay, Foucault explains through a reading of the history of governance 
41 Mary Douglas establishes the link between the known uses or categories and deciding on action. 
She argues that categories extend to people or 'members of classes' (Douglas in Seckinelgin 2008). 
The categorisation of people (and their agency) results in 'kind making' (Hacking in Seckinelgin 
2008). Hacking's notion of kind making is a dynamic process of 'looping effect' whereby 
classification shapes groups and in tum groups shape classifications (Hacking in Seckinelgin 2008). 
42 This poses the problem of how to bridge the gap between 'knowing' and 'doing'. The link between 
intentionality and action can be drawn by interpreting 'knowing' as 'legitimising'. People tend to 
legitimate their actions based on their constructed perceptions of what is possible and what is 
desirable to them, and to the socio-cultural context they relate to. Individuals place a different value 
based on a set of social constructions of their perceived ability to act. 
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regimes in western contexts that the idea of government changed from a concern 
with sovereignty over the territory towards the 'management of popUlations' . 
This perspective is particularly useful for my research because it places the family at 
the heart of 'art of government' in two ways. First, governmentality relies on 
incorporating the rules of the 'economy' or proper management of the family or 
household into the management of the state. In this sense, the ruler/governor devises 
certain tools to care for the individuals' well-being in the family. This means that the 
state became concerned with managing issues of health, security, property, sexuality 
and so on. The art of government thus relies on drawing continuity between 
sovereignty and the management of the self. The state became concerned with 
drawing rules and regulations for the populations to manage themselves. 
Second, governmentality transcends the model of governance from the family to 
populations. With this shift came the concern of gathering statistical information 
about individuals in every aspect of their lives. This meant statistics elaborated an 
entirely new rationale of classifying populations into specific governance categories. 
With this shift, the family lost its centre place as the model of government to an 
instrument. Yet it remained a "privileged segment because whenever information is 
required concerning the population [ ... ] it must be obtained through the family" 
(Foucault 2000:216). The art of government became all about controlling populations 
and had the family at the heart of this purpose. 
From this perspective, controlling the family is the cornerstone in the state's 
management of populations. This formulation of the 'management of the family' is 
crucial to my research. Consequently, I consider family law as the key tool of 
governance that regulates personal relations and preserves of a certain type of family 
in order to 'manage populations'. Thus, I expand the analysis of family law to 
include the process of making and enacting family law policies, including the 
positioning and practices of policy actors. Examples of this control include 
registration of marriage within a central state authority as a gateway to imposing 
populations to further laws (Welchman 2004). 
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My argument is that this governance order relies on a logic of gender discrimination, 
defined here as a historically specific, dynamic institutional system of differentiation 
based on sex. As the following chapters reveal, gender discrimination is a constant in 
the various stages of family law policy making and enactment, going against 
statutory directives that suggest otherwise. In upholding this argument, I intend to 
invert the analytical lens away from considering religion as the underlying logic of 
this order. This goes against mainstream research on religious family law that 
exclusively focuses on religion as the organising principle of family law and consider 
gender discrimination as a bi-product. Inverting the focus serves to de-essentialise 
'religion' as an exceptional logic (Stack 2007). I consider religion as a dynamic and 
contextually specific framework of morality that produces gendered socio-cultural 
and political categories of classification. Thus, religion constitutes the modus 
operandi of this order and drives its discursive techniques. 
The order of gender governance manages populations through controlling and 
transforming the subjectivity and agency of populations. 43 It is animated by a 
dynamic conception of power as exercise. 44 Power is a net-like phenomenon that 
circulates through social relations and is exercised between individuals, groups, and 
institutional actors. Power is generated by rules and norms and "surmounts the rules 
of right which organise and delimit it and extends itself beyond them, invests itself in 
institutions, becomes embodied in techniques, and equips itself with instruments and 
eventually even violent means of material intervention" (Foucault 1980:96). 
The analytical framework of order of gender governance adopts Foucault's (1980) 
three modalities of power that mediate social relations, and in the case of this 
research, personal relations. The first modality of govemmentality is the 
establishment of 'regimes of truth' about populations. This includes generating 
information about populations and constructing them into specific dominant social 
categories that dictate and legitimate proper ways of behaving. The second modality 
is establishing a complex web of 'techniques of subjectification' that are aimed at 
43 Although Foucault did not explicitly use the term agency when discussing the power of 
govemmentality, his argument has been extended to include the construction of agency in relevant 
research. 
44 Classical conceptions of power include the one-dimensional and second dimensional views (Lukes 
2005). 
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controlling populations through disciplining them into particular patterns of 
behaviour and action. These relate to regulating, for example, their contractual 
arrangements such as family law contracts and their effects. In many western and 
non-western contexts, family law retains a gendering effect despite reform in 
legislation. Formalised and non-formalised sets of gendered rules and regulations 
arrange the populations' legality as subjects (Butler 1998). The third modality is the 
enactment of 'bio-power' that controls the bodies and movements of populations and 
organises their social spaces. In the case of the present research, this modality 
organises the spatial and social avenues and possibilities for women to negotiate their 
personal relations and advocate their gender equality claims. These three modalities 
are elaborated on in the following sections. 
Family law, policy, governance 
The role of actors is crucial in the order of gender governance. Social actors channel 
the three above-mentioned modalities of governance by enforcing various sets of 
institutional rules and regulations. Hence, the process of policy making and 
enactment of legal frameworks needs to be analysed from a broad perspective that 
accounts for their effects not only at the formal legal-procedural level. It is useful to 
assess the overarching effect of policies and laws at the level of shaping individuals' 
life views and actions. One way of bridging this gap lies in considering 'law' as part 
of the policy process. From a policy perspective, law reflects the formal elaboration 
of policy frameworks and thus subscribes to the same contextual and ideological 
premises. Hence, the early dichotomy between the 'policy process' and 'policy 
content' is rejected as more recent works consider the two to be intertwined by 
ideological and discursive linkages (Bartley 1995).45 
The governance approach to policy broadens the understanding of law -in this case 
family law- to include the set of gendered procedures, institutional frameworks, 
structures, and practices. Dynamic approaches to policy go beyond defining it as the 
set of strategies and directives aimed at organising people's lives. They consider 
policy as a set of discourses and discursive practices that impact the lived 
experiences of populations and shape their subjectivity (Coffey 2004; Shore and 
45 John (1998) grouped these policy schools into four categories: the institutional, group and network, 
socio-economic, rational choice45, and the study of ideas approaches. 
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Wright 1997). Dynamic approaches dissect the discursive practices of institutional 
actors that promote family law as a beneficial organising principle for populations. 
Here I am considering family law in a similar way to Foucault's concern with 
statistics as a tool for controlling the family (Foucault 2000). 
In order to assess the full impact of family law as an order of gender governance, 
there is a need to consider the making and enactment of policies as a dynamic non-
linear process. Thus, the design of policy content and outcomes is composed of 
complex procedures, and practices. 46 Non-linear theorisations of policy making 
recognise reality as 'messy' (John 1998). McGee (2004:7) refers to the linear 
conceptions of policy making as "necessary fiction" that needs to be deconstructed. 
Growing research in the policy discipline aims at breaking this 'fiction' by adopting 
a 'postempiricist' perspective that removes the policy making process from its 
technical frame (Fischer 2003) The political influences of policy relate to the 
recognition, depiction and formulation of social issues (Samson and South 1995). 
The dynamic notions of the policy process were expanded to include non-western 
contexts. They are conceptualised as 'a dynamic process' composed of actors, 
knowledge, and spaces (Brock, McGee et al. 2004). I formulate a working definition 
of policy as a collection of multidimensional and multi-tracked discursive 
interactions between various actors, producing policy knowledges, and steered by 
underlying power dynamics within a specific institutional context. 
Accordingly, the main components of the policy process are problematised from a 
Foucauldian conception of power as exercise (or enactment). Some perspectives on 
policy applied the three-dimensional conception of power 47 by recognising that 
institutional influences or actors' decisions leave some issues out of the policy 
stream. Policies were thus recognised not to be always sequential nor progressive and 
46 The 'stages' and 'problem solving' approaches of design, implementation, and outputs were popular 
among early works in the fields of public and social policy and are still widely used in instrumental 
approaches to policy making (Bartley 1995). The shortcomings of these views were widely exposed in 
later works as holding positivist normative and unsupported assumptions (Samson and South 1995). 
47 The role of power in shaping the social actors was elaborated in several definitions. The earlier 
conceptions of power were one-dimensional, defmed as "behaviour in the making of decisions on 
issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy 
preferences, revealed by political participation" «Lukes 2005) Page 15 discussing Dahl, original 
emphasis). 
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holding an excluding potential (Fischer and Forester 1993; Sabatier 2007). Policies 
were found not to always yield any visible outcomes and many were lost in the loop 
of forgotten initiatives ending up as 'non-policies' (Manning 1985 cited in Bartley 
1995).48 The construction of policy also affects the allocation of benefits and burden 
for target groups (March and Olsen 1997). 
Reconceptualising the role of the state and other policy actors 
One common critique to Foucault's concept of governmentality is that it does not 
elaborate much on the make-up of the state to accommodate the complexity of 
governance structures in non-western contexts (Burchell, Gordon et al. 1991). While 
Foucault did not elaborate much on the make-up of the state, he nonetheless argued 
for moving away from the fixation on the debate on "juridical sovereignty and state 
institutions" to the "study of techniques and tactics of domination" (Burchell, 
Gordon et al. 1991:102). Applied to this research, this view adds an analytical 
dimension to the procedural and legalistic analyses of the state and religious law 
regulations. The focus shifts to an analysis of informal relations within policies that 
discursively constructs the subjectivity and agency of women and legitimates certain 
actors within these spaces. 
Brown stresses the importance of redirecting attention to state power and its 
convoluted link with policy. Adopting a governmentality reading of state power, she 
conceptualises it as "sites of convergence" or "dense transfer points of relations of 
power" and "a vehicle, effect and legitimate administrators of power" (Brown 
1995:16). 
The colonial institutional context constructs these sites of power within historically 
bound political dynamics.49 Colonial powers established much of the current post-
colonial institutional legal and governance frameworks. Hence, they produced much 
48 An earlier two-dimensional view of power brings attention to non decision-making and "allows for 
consideration of the ways in which decisions are prevented from being taken on potential issues over 
which there is an observable conflict of (subjective interests, seen as embodied in express policy 
preferences and sub-political grievances" «Lukes 2005:20, original emphasis). 
49 Despite their different theoretical points of departure, Touraine's critique resonates with Foucault's 
cautious approach to institutionalism. He warned from a heavy institutional approach because it fixes 
power relations at this level. He considered that the focus of the analysis should be power relations 
and any institutional analysis needed to be provided when necessary (Brown 1995) 
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of today's 'culture' or 'mutant' interpretations and practices of religious texts 
entrenching women's subjugation.so Local political power structures were remodelled 
through dividing or favouring some groups over others, and creating a pro-colonial 
elite class to propagate colonial regulations (Spivak and Harasym 1990). Also, 
discriminatory laws and regulations were entrenched, such as issues of the veil, 
women's segregation, low access to education, and discriminatory religious family 
law (Hashim 1999). 
The question here is the extent to which it is possible to apply western perspectives 
of governance to non-western contexts. The reasoning behind this caution is that 
West European and American contexts have a particular historical trajectory of state 
formation, make up, and operations that is fundamentally different from non-western 
contexts. Non-western contexts are considered to have different notions of 
governance that are largely embedded in local customs and political structures. 
Often, critics warn of blanket applications of western-centred conceptual frameworks 
and claim that non-western contexts are constitutively different in terms of make-up 
and operation (Ferguson 1994). 
However, as Chatterjee (2004) and Mamdani (1996) reminds us, there is hardly any 
context that is not 'influenced to a certain degree by western frameworks of 
governance. Various societies operate within "dense and heterogeneous time of 
modernity in the post-colonial world" (Chatterjee 2004:7). Thus, Chatterjee contends 
that it is not useful to hold analytical distinctions because "[t]he post-colonial world 
outside of western Europe and north America constitutes most of the populated 
modem world [and] is organised around formal western styles of democracy through 
elections, colonial based government structures, globalised social practices as well as 
less formal areas" (Chatterjee 2004:8). Applied to this research, it is thus possible to 
analyse the governance of family law in Lebanon as combining western-style 
governance structures such as civil legal frameworks and family court systems and 
include actors, discourses and operations which operate within context-specific 
power dynamics. 
so Colonial powers have also reinforced their rule through repressing religious practice and outlawing 
it as in the case in Indonesia, where Islamic religious practice was forced to go underground and was 
thereby radicalised and insulated from moderate local social influences (Hann and Dunn 1996) 
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For this, the western and non-western dichotomy does not hold when analysing the 
effect of governance practices. This is not to say that Chatterjee advocates the use of 
a westernised analytical lens to non-western contexts. Rather his point, as his work, 
is an invitation to steer away from a simple indigenisation of non-western contexts 
and instead recognise the impact of various historical and contemporary processes of 
colonialism and orientalist exportation of western socio-political frameworks of 
governance. Non-western governance systems adapted and reworked these 
frameworks into intricate and dynamic styles of governance. They sustained many of 
the fonnal structures of western democracy yet accommodated various less fonnal 
fonns of institutional discrimination embedded in political and social practices. 
Colonialism constructed family law frameworks by codifying customary religious 
family law into 'western' texts (Rabo 2011). Post-colonial states in the Mashreq 
sustained these frameworks and use it as a fonn of controlling various communal 
groups. 
With these hybrid contexts, additional players are crucial to the order of gender 
governance of family law policies. Two main groups of policy actors are of 
particular interest to this research. The first set is civil society - and women groups51 
in particular - and its role in influencing the policy process. Liberal conceptions of 
these groups posit them as guardians of freedom, democratic values, and gender 
equity, a critic of the state, and a catalyst for change (Aubrey 1997; Molyneux 2000; 
Naples and Desai 2002; O'Neill and Gidengil 2006). However, the role of civil 
society in the policy process is increasingly recognised as far more complex than 
their assumed linear emancipatory impact. Another set is those actors commonly 
referred to as communal or less fonnal collectivities, such as the religious institution 
and the family. They need to be recognised as main policy actors who hold 
substantial influence over the policy making process. Both groups of actors need to 
be recognised as major players in the policy process, and specifically in relation to 
their crucial role of 'expertise' (King 1999; Petersen 1999). Expertise can be a claim 
for legitimation of the self and of particular discourses within policies. These 
institutional actors have an important role in the construction and translation of social 
categories (Petersen 1999) and generation of ideas (King 1999). 
51 Some groups fall within the broadly recognised category of women groups or women's movements 
(Molyneux, Razavi et al. 2002) while others have the more organised structure ofNGOs. 
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Foucault's concept of governmentality is often critiqued for endowing various 
institutional actors with the capacity to devise an overarching and premeditated plan 
(McKee 2009). Two arguments refute these claims. First, there is a need to 
differentiate between intention and effect. The critique mainly refers to an intention 
of planned strategy that Foucault does not uphold. The discourses generated within 
the order of governance do not stem from a unified body such as the 'state'. They 
circulate across a variety of institutional actors and spaces that have differentiated 
intentions, which can sometimes be even contradictory. Various actors might 
contradict and conflict at time, but they might share a 'temporary discursive affinity' 
or crossings. However, these varied and incoherent 'projects' by various actors can 
nonetheless contain some discursive intersections whereby they adopt or share 
similar institutional norms and values. These nodes of discursive intersections could 
lead to a compound effect that is dominant and pervasive at various levels. Second, 
the effect of these discourses is not fatalistic and immutable, but rather changeable 
and possibly counteracted. As Foucault argues, discourses are composed of building 
blocks of language to which dominant actors attach particular meanings. Resistant 
groups can appropriate these linguistic building blocks and endow them with 
counter-hegemonic meanings. They thus tum these discourses into forms of 
discursive resistance. 
2.4.2 Family law frameworks as policy techniques for 'managing' women 
The first modality of the order of governance relates to the political dynamics 
underlying the design and implementation of various policies. Conventional views of 
the policy process do not account for these political practices. Technical approaches 
considered the field of social policy as "a set of policies and practices concerned with 
promoting social welfare and well-being" (Coffey 2004:2). This early approach was 
"inherited by the 'social administration' studies of the 1970s and early 1980s, 
emphasised the study of various political processes that established the legislative 
framework, implementation and social impact of particular policies '" within the 
'classic' welfare state" (South and Samson 1995: 1). The problem with these linear 
approaches is that they consider social issues and contradictions as technical social 
facts, present 'out there' in society (John 1998). Emerging research argued for the 
need to move beyond these "conventional" approaches (Coffey 2004:2) that are 
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concerned with studying technical aspects of social issues towards new ways of 
thinking about social policy (Petersen 1999). 
Policy makers were considered as depoliticised technocratic 'experts' addressing 
these issues from an objective and disinterested perspective and operating in formal 
professional policy spheres (Bartley 1995).52 The 'mixed-scanning' model (Walt 
1994 cited in Stone and Maxwell 2005) took the analysis a step further by combining 
a broad scope of analysis including the macro and micro levels of policy decision 
making. However, while providing a comprehensive view of policy problems, it does 
not question the informal dynamics of policy making. This restrictive perspective 
also excludes non-expert social and institutional actors from the policy making 
process. In the case of this research, examples of these actors are the family or 
informal networks that women resort to through their individual action on their 
family law issues. Despite their important role in policies, these actors do not count 
in the over-formalised linear approaches to policy.s3 
This approach entrenched the distinction between expert and lay actors. It excludes 
'lay' actors in a way that resonates with some techniques of govemmentality. In a 
critique to this view, the interactive model for policy analysis considers policy 
making a process of "reform-mongering" by political elites who change, block, and 
modify issues. The policy process is seen as "a series of formal and informal stages, 
with numerous actors, not as a single point with a single decision maker" (Grindle 
and Thomas 1991: 16). These theories were important to highlight the political 
dimension of actors. However, they mostly focused on individuals and overlooked 
the importance of the institutional setting on policy making. 
Institutional frameworks of laws and policies drive social and political structures in a 
particular context. The importance of institutions in public policy is highlighted by 
52 These views tend to be sustained in policy making circles as a simplification of reality (John 1998) 
53 This non-progressive notion of policy is far from the incrementalist view proposed by (Lindblom 
1979». It draws the policy process as a series of small attempts containing feasible solutions that do 
not generally depart much from the current policies. This approach has been critiqued for still 
implying a rational approach and a positivist outcome, and providing a less ambitious depiction of the 
policy process. However, this approach has two major contributions. First, it proposed the notion of 
'muddling through' casting doubt on the rationality of policy actors. Second, it acknowledged the 
existing political context that affects the feasibility of policy recommendations. 
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Ostrom's (2007)54 'institutional analysis and development' approach that was later 
adopted by the New Institutional Economics proponents. A definition of institutions 
is "the rules, norms, and strategies adopted by individuals operating within or across 
organisations" (Ostrom 2007:23). Ostrom explains that rules are "shared 
prescriptions that are mutually understood and predictably enforced in particular 
situations by agents responsible for monitoring conduct and for imposing sanctions". 
Norms are "shared prescriptions that tend to be enforced by the participants 
themselves through internally and externally imposed costs and inducements". 
Strategies are "regularized plans that individuals make within the structure of 
incentives produced by rules, norms, and expectations of the likely behaviour of 
others in a situation affected by relevant physical and material conditions".5s 
This approach mainly focuses on three sets of internal mechanisms of policy 
analysis. The first is a behavioural take on the institutional context including the 
general rules and attributes of the community. The second is the 'action arena' 
involving actors and action situations. The third relates to outcomes and patterns of 
interactions and evaluation. The policy problem is seen to be at either the operational 
(outcome) or policy (collective choice) levels (Ostrom 2007:27). 
The institutional school developed into two streams. First, the classical 'Bureaucratic 
Politics Model' defines policy making as the formal procedures of political 
institutions (John 1998). Second, 'New Institutionalism' emerged in the 1980s and 
broadened the definition of the policy process. It considers that policy is influenced 
by both formal (bureaucratic) and informal (conventional values and norms) 
institutions. The main criticism is that this school tends to have an a-historical 
approach to institutions considering them as variables that are stable and resistant to 
change (John 1998:57-58). While this approach is useful in focusing on the 
construction of 'ideas' as discursive systems, it tends to reify institutions and 
disconnect them from the social context. 
54 The ftrst article dealing with the issue was Kiser and Ostrom (1982) 
55 A critique to this defmition is that institutions are largely disconnected from social process and are 
largely portrayed as owned by individuals on a mutual consensual basis. 
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Institutionalism also tends to reduce actors to mere bearers or implementers of the 
overarching institutional setting. Touraine proposes that institution "today must not 
mean that which has been instituted, but that which institutes, [and] is the mechanism 
through which cultural orientations are transformed into social practices. In this 
sense all institutions are political" (Touraine 1988:40). In this sense, Touraine's 
critique brought forward the crucial element of politics and power.S6 
The post-structural approach also contributed significantly in forming a dynamic 
understanding the policy process. It was developed by academics who adopted a 
Foucauldian understanding of discourses as part and parcel of the policy outcomes 
(Petersen 1999). This shift reflected on a broader and multilayered view of social 
policy at the levels of conceptualisation of policy actors, issues, settings, and 
processes. As Samson and South (1995:3) explain, "policies are not simply 
unambiguous mandates that lead to courses of action. They are also symbolic 
gestures, channelled through the legislative process and amplified in political 
rhetoric. " 
The conceptualisations of the policy process further developed into combining 
several theoretical strands of institutionalism and construction of ideas. Thus, 
institutions were considered to be constructed by social meanings: 
[L]ife is organised by a set of shared meanings and practices that come to be taken as 
given for practices which are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated and 
accepted. Actions of individuals and collectivities occur within these shared meanings 
and practices which can be called institutions and identities (March and Olsen 
1997:141) 
From this perspective, the enactment of policy becomes a continuous policy making 
process that builds on changing social norms and practices of family law. Fischer and 
Forester (1993:2) explain policy making in line with Foucault's governmentality 
discussed in the earlier part of the chapter: 
S6 Tourraine's critique however sustained a separation between the actors and the institutions. A point 
reconciled by Foucault through the concept of subjectification. 
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[P]olicy-making is a constant discursive struggle over the criteria of social 
classification, the boundaries of problem categories, the intersubjective interpretation of 
common experiences, the conceptual framing of problems, and the definitions of ideas 
that guide the ways people create the shared meanings which motivate them to act [ ... ]. 
The institutionally disciplined rhetorics of policy and planning influence problem 
selection as well as problem analysis, organizational identity as well as administrative 
strategy, and public access as well as public understanding. 
Hence, policy making also includes informal aspects of conceptualising and 
implementing policy issues. This reveals the 'lay', everyday, or informal policies that 
are developed and generalised in the informal arena through the repeated relations, 
and propagated norms of family law. 
As legal frameworks are conceptualised as part of policy, it is important to address 
how they shape the legal personhood of individuals. I adapt the view of Pottage and 
Mundy (2004) in understanding how Lebanese family law frameworks 'personify' 
women into legal persons and how they 'reify' family relations. As a lens to analyse 
the complexity of family law I adopted Griffith's (1986:39) definition of legal 
pluralism as 
[TJhe normative heterogeneity attendant upon the fact that social action always takes 
place in a context of multiple, overlapping, 'semi-autonomous social fields', which [ ... J 
is in practice a dynamic condition. [ ... J. Law and legal institutions are not subsumable 
within one 'system' but have their sources in the self-regulatory activities which may 
support, complement, ignore or frustrate one another, so that the 'law' which is actually 
effective on the 'ground floor' of society is the result of enormously complex and 
usually in practice unpredictable patterns of competition, interaction, negotiation, 
isolationism and the like. 
This definition expands the understanding of law to include the social rules and 
norms that do not fall within 'official' or even 'codified' regulations. This is 
particularly useful to analyse Lebanese family law frameworks that combine 
governmental and non-governmental codes. 
In order to analyse this complex legal context, there is a need to probe into a working 
definition of the state. One way is to decouple 'law' from 'state' and adopt a non-
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essentialist approach to legal pluralism that "recognizes forms of law that may have 
little or no connection to the state" (Tamanha 2000:318). To assert his point, 
Tamanha (2000) gives the example of religious law that can be identical to state law 
in some cases such as Iran, while being unrecognised in other situations such as 
Canon law hence providing "a competing source of legal authority for the populace". 
However, this perspective remains state-centric as it conceptualises the state as a 
unified legislative body that is opposed to other forms of legitimation. In this thesis, I 
push the argument beyond the state and non-state dichotomy by unpacking the state 
and drawing it as a web of ramifications of legal power nodes (Foucault 1980). In 
order to carry out my analysis within historically grounded processes, I understand 
add to the definition of legal pluralism that law is a 'dynamic condition' in both 
space and time. 
2.4.3 Family law norms as 'moralities of truth' 
Another component of the gender governance order is its effect on generating 
moralities of truth (Foucault 1980). The argument is that knowledge generated in and 
about family law constitutes a set of moralities about gender equality and personal 
relations. It is important to scrutinise how policies are constructed: what constitutes a 
policy problem, how it is mainstreamed, what effect it has, and what roles actors hold 
in the process. The process of knowledge production on family law affects gender 
equality at three levels. First, it shapes the framing of gender equality in family law 
as a 'social problem' and constructs its validity and urgency as a policy issue. 
Second, it constructs the rhetoric power of particular views of family law as more 
valid then others. Third, it shapes the subjectivity and agency of policy actors and in 
particular women. 
The construction of the 'social problem' is a dynamic political process that relies on 
broadening definitions of the 'social'. "[S]ocial policy has been reconceptualised -
both in terms of 'what counts as social policy', and in terms of the tools for social 
policy analysis" (Coffey 2004:3). A wide range of issues started to be considered as 
part of social policy, such as those relating to the environment and racism (South and 
Samson 1995) to bio-technology and genetics (Petersen 1999) and not least issues 
that were previously excluded to the 'private' domain, such as sexuality and the body 
(Twigg 2002). These accounts emphasised the ways in which research and policy 
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making 'think about' setting social policy (Petersen 1999). Policy content related to 
policy making in three ways.57 First it was considered a social construction of 'policy 
problems' (Fischer and Forester 1993). Second, it was analysed as 'ideas' composed 
of policy discourses and narratives (Clay and Schaffer 1984; Leach and Mearns 
1996; Roe 1991; 1995) or 'received wisdom' (Leach and Mearns 1996). Third, it was 
considered as arguments (Juma and Clark 1995). The discursive power of knowledge 
has language as its building blocks. Language strikes as constitutive in shaping 
meanings, and the positivist view that language is a passive vehicle of non-de script 
infonnation fonning 'truth' is outdated (Seckinelgin 2008). 
The legitimation of the social problem relies on the juxtaposition of seemingly 
contrasting knowledge claims that look disconnected and contradictory. Mosse 
(2005) argues that there is 'coherence within fragmentation' that results from various 
segregated claims which coexist. The process of constructing social issues was 
acknowledged to be constitutive of the policy process "most often in an unintended 
way" (March and Olsen 1997:141). 
King (1999) stresses the importance of scrutinizing the ideas and debates that 
policies seek to influence. In this process, ideas are central to the formation of the 
discursive make up of policies, and are considered as both legitimators and 
stimulants of policies (King 1999).58 Samson and South (1995:3) argue for 
examining "not only the substance of policies, but also their ideological intentions 
and linguistic presentation" (Samson and South 1995:3). 
Particular claims are legitimised by building 'compelling interpretations', sustaining 
them as 'key representations', and 'enrolling a wider network of supporters' (Lewis 
57 Rein and Schon (1993: 146) found that policy making goes through a process of framing which is "a 
way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to provide 
guideposts for knowing, analysis, persuading, and acting. [It ... ] is a perspective from which an 
amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made sense of and acted on." This is done 
through "generative metaphors which link causal accounts of policy problems to particular proposals 
for action. linking accounts of "is" and ought". Frame analysis is complex because it is difficult to 
distinguish between disagreements within a frame, and conflict and controversy across frames. 
58 Value-laden meanings are constitutive of social issues. For some, a distinction was drawn between 
the "discourse on the existence of the problem as 'fact claims-making'" that related to whether the 
issue exists. and "the moral discourse as 'values-claims-making'" that related to the desirability of the 
issue. (Bartley 1995: 18). Although this view reveals the importance of values and discourse, it is 
however underpinned by the objectivist premise that does not problematise the values around the 
existence of the problem. 
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and Mosse 2006: 158-9}. This alteration of knowledge production is circular. It is a 
'dynamic process of looping effect' whereby produced knowledge constructs actors 
who then produce new knowledge (Hacking 1995). For the legitimation process, 
a fonn of entrepreneurialism is required before findings become facts. First, findings 
must be promoted as 'knowledge-claims'. In order to become either 'scientific fact' or 
'policy-relevant' knowledge-claims must then attract the assent of a number of groups, 
a network, which will pick up and pass on the claims intact to a wider audience 
(Bartley 1995: 18). 
In terms of constructing the rhetoric power of the problem, Fischer and Forester 
(Fischer and Forester 1993:7) consider policy analysis and planning as 
"argumentative practices. [ ... ] always these arguments make claims that can be 
criticized by others or can subtly shape their attention to issues at hand". The 
symbolic interpretive perspective focuses on the construction of the problem as a 
legitimate and convincing plea (Fischer 2003). In this sense, social problems derived 
of social meanings. However, this perspective fails to address theoretically the make-
up of policy actors. It adopts an actor-oriented perspective that does not tell us how 
some actors at a particular moment in time manage to occupy the centre of the policy 
stage. 59 The interpretive view also does not elaborate on the informal power 
dynamics that drive these arguments. 
The normative component of argumentative practices remained unexplained. The 
discursive power inherent in ideas and language drew on the specific contextual 
linguistic and knowledge repertoire (Wittgenstein 1953 in Seckinelgin 2008). For 
instance, a particular image of the problem is constructed once it is accepted or 
'understood' in the context (Linder 1995 in Fischer 2003) . In addition to the 
construction of meaning and ideas, the narrative power is important in 'dramatising 
the problem in symbolic and visual terms' (Hannigan 1995 cited in Fischer 2003) . 
This involves the nature of argumentative appeals and warrants, in addition to how 
scientific claims are treated in the controversy (Linder 1995 cited in Fischer 2003). 
59 Some common public policy perspectives are critical of the view of policy analysis as 
argumentative exercise (called advocacy) and claim that it needs to be "held to a higher nonnative 
standard" that is related to ideals of democracy based on counsel and consensus (Jennings 1993:103). 
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One criticism directed to the interpretive perspective is that it places too much 
emphasis on rhetoric and ideas and therefore risks creating a rift between ideas and 
the historically grounded social construction of meaning. Hajer (1993 :45) considered 
that "social constructs do not arise from historical vacuum. They emerge in the 
context of historical discourses which contain knowledge of how similar phenomena 
were dealt with in the past". Language is channelled through narratives which 
"configure the particulars evoked by our literal and figural talk ... [and] establish the 
context within which tropes gain meaning and power" (Throgmorton 1993: 122). 
The concept of narratives is useful to ally action and context because "a flow of 
utterances, replies and counterreplies can be emplotted as a flow of action (as a 
narrative) which can be turned - through the use of particular tropes by particular 
characters at particular times and places - in a different direction" (Hajer 1993:47). 
However, this criticism created a false schism between rhetoric and ideas on one 
hand, and historical and social context on the other. As Derrida (Derrida and Caputo 
1997) pointed out, social practices are mediated through text, and it is not possible to 
escape it. Hence, social practices translate into linguistic categories and contribute to 
classifying individuals and issues (Hacking 1986). 
Applied to family law, (Dupret 1999) contends that norms draw on a pool of 
discursive resources that link to particular meanings in a particular contexts. In that 
sense, norms are linked to "authorized languages" and form normative repertoires 
that "disregard their own underlying muyltiplicity and rivalry and engage in holistic 
and exclusive self-affirmation" (Dupret 1999:34-35). 
Regimes of truths and the construction of subjectivity 
The role of actors in knowledge production is also crucial. Policy discourse is 
conceptualised as "the interactions of individuals, interest groups, social movements, 
and institutions through which problematic situations are converted to policy 
problems, agendas are set, decisions are made, and actions are taken" (Rein and Shon 
1993: 145). Action and power were reconciled as "all relations bring together unequal 
actors by the very fact that any relation, directly or indirectly, relates actors who is 
directing this intervention with one who is on the receiving end of it. All relations 
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include power relations. There is no purely horizontal social relation" (Touraine 
1988:49). 
Policy discourses shape the subjectivity of populations at two levels. First, "discourse 
structuration" occurs when a discourse starts to dominate the way a society 
conceptualizes the world (Hajer 1993 :46). Second, "discourse institutionalisation" is 
the process whereby a discourse is popularised and would "solidify into an 
institution, sometimes as organisational practices, sometimes as traditional ways of 
reasoning" (Hajer 1993:46). 
The power of ideas also lies in constructing a particular image of the public 
underlying the rhetoric (Linder 1995 cited in Fischer 2003), as well as the 
construction of social groups (Fischer 2003). The framing process of individuals 
involves turning them into 'target groups' or 'beneficiaries'. Recent analyses of 
construction of target groups combines actor-oriented (initially located in the interest 
group pluralist theory) and broad institutional theories (including cultural and 
knowledge constructions). Through social construction of target groups, policy 
design plots citizens into uneven political power positions in society which dictate 
them their perceived entitlements (March and Olsen 1997:141). Ingram et al. 
(2007:93) find that "public policymakers typically socially construct target 
populations in positive and negative terms and distribute benefits and burdens so as 
to reflect and perpetuate these constructions". These constructions are "important 
political attributes that often become embedded in political discourse and the 
elements of policy design" (Ingram, Schneider et al. 2007:94). This approach adopts 
a broader notion of power than that conventionally associated with material welfare. 
Policy constructs citizens four categories according to their positive or negative 
portrayal as citizens and their high or low power (Ingram, Schneider et al. 2007:101-
103). The four groups are: 1) advantaged (positive perception, high power), 2) 
contenders (negative perception, high power), 3) dependents (positive perception, 
low power), and 4) deviants (negative perception, low power). In this sense, target 
groups move across the power and favourability grid "in transit" or gain emerging 
power positions in the policy space. Hence, the position of women as social and 
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policy actors depends on the policy constructs generated by the interaction of 
institutional discourses and other policy actors in the policy space. 
In addition, language plays a crucial role in constituting subjectivity. Rather than 
seeing rhetoric as '"the use of seductive language to sway or manipulate others into 
embracing a speaker's preferred values, beliefs and behaviors", Throgmorton 
(1993: 11 ) finds that "[ r ]hetorical persuasion is fundamental to, and in deed 
constructive of, central features of our social life, in particular character, culture, and 
community". As rhetoric is central to meaning, it is important to "examine how some 
situation or condition is asserted to be a 'social problem', and how collective activity 
is organised around these definitions and assertions." (Bartley 1995: 18). Policy 
analysis is a "rhetorical trope" that has a constitutive role: 
[O]ur rhetoric has the potential to create new characters for ourselves and others as well. 
We could, for example, work with politicians and advocacy groups to construct models 
that explicitly account for their ability to influence [target groups'] behaviour. Any 
trope, any rhetoric, is constitutive: it can recognize or transfonn the characters that 
populate our world. (Throgmorton 1993: 122) 
Seckinelgin (Seckinelgin 2008) explains how language constructs meaning and 
action. Language produces the power of defining, categorising, and 'describing' 
leading to 'kind making'. Concepts are defined by drawing frames around particular 
attributes mirrored against their general uses (Hampshire 1960 and Wittgenstein 
1997 in Seckinelgin 2008). They are categorised according to their interpretation 
from the actors' point of view. They go through a process of 'description' that refers 
to ascription of meaning and 'putting a name to it'. The meanings generated through 
this process are legitimated into 'rule following' (Hare 1963 in Seckinelgin 2008). 
These rules become the basis for action on a "logic of appropriateness associated 
with roles, routines, rights, obligations, standard operating procedures and practices" 
(March and Olsen 1997:141). The constitutive power of language results in 
constructing the agency of actors. 
77 
2.4.4 Social spaces and the management of actors 
The third modality of the gender governance regime relates to the ways in which the 
order of gender governance positions women as social actors and 'manages' their 
agency within feminist policy spaces. I focus my inquiry on the intra-dynamics of 
feminist collective action because there is little critical research available in the area 
of family law. This inquiry is important to understand the full scope of the gendering 
effect of the order of gender governance. As legal frameworks and moralities are 
constitutive of fluid subjectivity, it is no longer possible to assume that women 
necessarily exercise a unified agency that is directed towards eliminating gender 
discrimination. In this third modality of govemmentality, Foucault (1980) explains 
that the power of norms, frameworks, and practices is embodied in populations. This 
power affects the ways people access and use social spaces. Thus, power dynamics 
affect the positioning and scope of participation of actors in the policy making 
process. 
The concept of social spaces was elaborated in relation to the nature of actors 
(whether individuals or groups), the arrangement of spaces (physical or social), and 
the positioning and agency of actors in relation to the institutional setting. In the 
early notions of social space, such as in Durkheim's notion, actors were considered 
as independent from their social space, which had a separate physical dimension 
(Claval 1984). Inhabitants in this space had to accommodate their lives to its 
demands.60 Recent notions recognised the role of power relations in constructing the 
social space. Hence, the social space was a social product valorised through the 
relations of (mainly economic) power between individuals, groups, and structures 
(Harvey 200 I; Lefebvre, Brenner et al. 2009; Soja 1989). Moving away from 
physicality, the space emerged from the social networks and relations generated 
between social actors in their capacity as individuals simultaneously belonging to 
different institutional groups. 6 1 The emphasis turned to the 'social architecture' of 
society and the heterogeneity of the relations between social actors. With the work of 
60 Such as in the work of Lauwe (1904-1905) on "the double morphologies of the Eskimos societies" 
cited in Claval (1984). 
61 Claval explains the difference between Anglophone and Francophone usage of the concept of social 
space as social networks. The Anglophone theorists use the tenn 'map of action space' to indicate 
networks and use social space to identifY the "area from which people get infonnation" 
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Etzioni and others social spaces were perceived to represent the social networks of 
struggles and power that social actors engage in (Claval 1984). 
Later conceptions of social space were developed through the disciplines of 
sociology (Bourdieu 1994; Foucault 2000) and human geography (Massey 2005), 
and queer theory (Bell and Valentine 1995). In these accounts, the early focus of 
human geography on physicaVmaterial spatiality has given way to more symbolic 
and metaphorical spaces that account for institutional and discursive influences. In 
complete dissociation from physicality, interactionist and phenomenologist theories 
conceptualised social space as an abstract system of meanings and values generated 
by individuals' performative roles. The focus here is on the individuals and the 
different social roles they play in various social settings. 
In his work, Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1994) integrates structural and interactionist views. 
His critiques the interactionist school for focusing on the subjects and neglecting of 
the structural elements underpinning their interactions. For Bourdieu, the social 
space was a "symbolic space, a space of lifestyles and status groups characterized by 
different lifestyles" (Bourdieu 1994:20). In this social space, the structural setting of 
social actors equips them with differential capitals, which spread them over 
hierarchical capacities.62 These differences are translated into 'social distances' that 
agglomerate "agents, groups, or institutions" closer or segregate them from others 
(Bourdieu 1994: 16). 
My concern here is to explain the conditions managing the ways actors act in policy 
spaces. Actor-Oriented approaches (Olivier de Sardan 2004) place actors at the core 
of social action.63 This formulation acknowledges the capacity of individuals (and 
groups) 'agency' to act on changing their social situations, and the lack of action 
results from a set of oppressive 'interactive' mechanisms depriving them from 
'voice' (Chambers 1997; Holland, Blackburn et al. 1998). This strand of actor-
oriented approaches was rather 'instrumental' or 'ideologically populist' because it 
undertheorised the position of the 'locals' (Olivier de Sardan 2004; Mosse 2005; 
Lewis 2008). Other elaborations of the actor-oriented approach were linked to 
62 The others are economic, cultural, social, and symbolic 
63 This is differentiated from a liberal understanding of 'individual' preferences or rational choice 
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Giddens' (1984) concept of 'agency' whereby action is the result of intentionality 
and knowledgeability of actors.64 
This approach has two sets of weaknesses. Olivier de Sardan (2004: 12) finds early 
advocates of this school to rely heavily on an interactionist tradition that is restricted 
to "a formal set of rules governing interactions, or [ ... ], restricted to situations of 
interaction".6S Touraine (Touraine 1988) considers that this approach (proposed by 
early works of Norman Long 2001) is tainted with "methodological individualism" 
that is another side of simple liberalism and proposes instead to focus on social 
relations. 
An opposing view of social action was proposed by post-structural or radical thinkers 
such as Ferguson (1994) and Escobar (Escobar 1995) who applied it to development 
theory. Dominant global development discourses produced dominant western 
knowledge claims, negated local non-western knowledge, and ultimately operated as 
governance regimes. Actors formed their agendas in a way that concords with the 
dominant regimes and distorted local social life. The critique of this view related 
mainly to it too deterministic trajectory. Actors were reduced to automated plots in a 
bigger machine-like discursive scheme, especially in the earlier works such as 
Ferguson (Mosse 2005). 
Recently actor-oriented and radical approaches were reconciled by acknowledging 
the importance of power relations and knowledge. Actor-oriented approaches 
recognised the importance of knowledge, power, and discourses. Olivier De Sardan 
(2004: 12) elaborated the 'entangled social logic' approach which is "centred on the 
analysis of the embeddedness of social logic, [and] studies the relationship between 
both universes ... ". Long (2001: 17) recognised that actors "engage in or are locked 
into struggles over the attribution of social meanings to particular events, actions and 
ideas". He considered that "agency (and power) depend crucially upon the 
64 This view is echoed in some public policy works. Fischer and Forester (1993 :6) consider that 
"policy analysts and planners do a great deal more than they have been given credit for doing" as they 
primarily engage in "argumentation" for their agendas. 
~5 Touraine also stresses the need to move from studying society or 'actors' to focusing instead on 
social relations. He warns from reducing social relations to 'social interactions' which "takes the 
actors as its point of departure before examining their conduct toward one another" (Touraine 
1988:49). The study of interactions should not be underestimated but it needs to be researched within 
"recognition of the field of relations", 
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emergence of a network of actors who become partially, through hardly ever 
completely, enrolled in the 'project' of some other person or persons. Agency then 
entails the generation and use or manipulation of networks of social relations and the 
channelling of specific items [ ... ] through certain nodal points of interpretation and 
interaction". 
Brock et al (Brock, McGee et al. 2004) drew closer links between policy actors and 
policy spaces. Policy spaces were considered sites that hold actors' relations and 
knowledge production (McGee 2004). This approach is derived from conceptions of 
citizens spaces of interactions produced through political processes, or within civil 
society or broader social spaces. McGee (2004) follows Cornwall's (2001) definition 
of policy spaces as "sites in which different [ ... ] discourses and policy actors 
interact, [ ... ] permeated with power relations and bounded by forms of discourses 
used within and about them, raising questions about who participates, with which 
views of poverty, and to what effect" (Brock et al 2001:7 cited in McGee 2004). In 
order to locate them in a historical context, policy spaces were further defined as 
"multiple points in time or space in a policy process and, as well as sometimes 
signifying transformative potential, are actual observable opportunities, behaviours, 
actions and interactions" (McGee 2004: 16). This definition goes in line with that of 
Grind13e and Thomas (1991 cited in McGee 2004:22) that considers policy spaces as 
"[ ... ] moments in which interventions or events throw up new opportunities, 
reconfiguring relationships between actors or bringing in new ones, and opening up 
the possibilities of a shift in direction.'t66 
The dynamics within policy spaces were elaborated by McGee (2004: 19-21) as 
spaces in a framework of six dimensions. The nature of the spaces draws spaces as 
closed (i.e. restricted to state actors); invited (Le. including non-state actors); and 
autonomous (i.e. entirely run by non-state actors).67 McGee's conception of policy 
spaces recognises the role of power relations but does not explicitly feature in her 
66 While McGee (2004) warns from the overreliance on the 'temporal' dimension of policy spaces that 
gives a floating and ungrounded conceptualisation, I argue that a temporal dimension through 
historicity is crucial to policy spaces. It reflects the dynamism of the construction, inhabitation and the 
disintegration of policy spaces. In addition, it connects it with a temporal rather than a fixed view of 
institutions. 
67 The other five dimensions include history, access, mechanics, dynamics and learning possibilities. 
McGee et AI recognised the limitations of this conception after their field research on poverty policies 
in Nigeria and Uganda. However, they did not provide alternative conceptions of policy spaces. 
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analytical framework. The framework fixes the relationships between spaces and 
actors as it compartmentalises them into clearly demarcated sub-spaces. It does not 
account for the institutional blurring between various policy spaces and actors or the 
'cross over' of actors across spaces, such as governments or NGOs (Lewis 2008). 
An institutional view of policy spaces bridges actors and discourses through the 
notion of "interpersonal discourse" raised by Rein and Schon (1993: 156). The 
concept of discourse was elaborated from its early meaning of "interpersonal 
conversation" to its recent academic meaning, as "dialogue within and across 
institutions is a metaphoric extension". The interpersonal discourses are located in an 
"institutional locus" that is located "within some larger social system". Different 
discourses run in parallel in different settings creating several discursive arenas, 
which contribute to a different framing of issues. The frames of discourses mean that 
"policy forums have their own rules" (Rein and Shon 1993: 157). Part of the rules is 
to determine the legitimacy of participants - or their "standing as participants in the 
policy conversation". 
Actors and discourses interweave to form "discourse coalitions" that consists of "a 
group of actors who share a social constructs [ ... ]. It is the ensemble of a set of 
storylines, the actors that utter these story lines, and the practices that conform to 
these story lines, all organised around a discourse" (Hajer 1993:47).68 The power of 
these coalitions to dominate the policy process relies on two premises. First, they 
dominate the discursive space, i.e. when "central actors are persuaded by, or forced 
to accept, the rhetorical power of a new discourse (condition of the discourse 
structuration). Second, their discourse is translated in the "institutional practices of 
that political domain; that is, the actual policy process is conducted according to the 
ideas of a given discourse (condition of discourse instituionalization)" (Hajer 
1993:47-48). 
Persistent discourses are structured and institutionalised through story lines that 
change but remain in the same discursive logic in what Hajer (1993:47) calls 
61 Hajer defines story lines as "the medium through which actors try to impose their view of reality on 
others, suggest certain social positions and practices, and criticize alternative social arrangements" 
(Hajer 1993). 
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"discursive affinity" as "arguments may vary in origin but still have a similar way of 
conceptualizing the world". An example of the power of discursive coalitions is 
provided in international policy contexts where "collision of knowledge" takes place 
where dominant expert "speculative" knowledge clashes with local knowledge and 
dismisses it as 'anomalic', 'problematic' and 'not fitting' with the 'right' dominant 
knowledge (Seckinelgin 2008). These discourse coalitions also form 'moral 
communities' who propagate particular policy moralities and in tum shape the 
agency of actors. 
Knowledge and agency are further linked as knowledge constructs a context-specific 
agency for policy actors that influences action (Seckinelgin 2008). The capacity for 
action depends on "values and meanings [that] allow this space to be created in 
particular social settings" of which knowledge production is a crucial component 
(Seckinelgin 2008:58). As policy actors experience socio-cultural institutionalisation, 
they develop a multiple agency in various policy spaces. The example of NOOs 
working on HIV I AIDS in Africa reveals that "rather than having a generic 
organisational agency NOOs have varied agency depending on the social contexts 
within which they are located" (Seckinelgin 2008:47). 
Actors are also dismissed based on the de-legitimation of their experiences in the 
policy spaces. Some forms of knowledge (such as local socio-cultural expressions in 
the case of African HIV/AIDS interventions) are disregarded as 'contextual 
obstacles' or 'externalities that need to be eliminated' from the broader knowledge 
framework (Seckinelgin 2008: 107). These findings indicate that policy actors are far 
from 'interfaces'. They sometimes construct an exclusionary framework of 
knowledge that negates existing local knowledge as a misfit to the mould of expert 
knowledge. 
This view is useful to apply to actors involved in family law policies, and 
problematize the role of women as social and policy actors. One way that women's 
social action was conceptualised in the gender-focused development and policy 
literature is through advocating empowerment both in its individual and collective 
forms. While empowerment is linked to action it still uses "undeconstructed 
subjectivity that risks establishing a wide chasm between the (experience of) 
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empowennent and an actual capacity to shape the tenns of political social or 
economic life" (Brown 1995:23). Empowennent also places the burden of 
emancipation on women, assumes a liberal notion of a 'decontextualised subject', 
and focuses on emotional self-perception which might mask domination (Brown 
1995:23). Thus, collective action needs to be questioned as it 
could harbour the same injustices or power relations than hegemonic institutions, it is 
important to question other claims of political solutions when they codify and entrench 
existing social relations, when do they mask them, and when do they directly contest of 
transfonn them (Brown (1995:9). 
This implies that women's collective action could take various directions, which are 
sometimes unfavourable for gender equality depending on the constructed discourses 
of its actors. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has selected and analysed key literature relating to gender equality in 
family law. It provided an inter-disciplinary approach by reviewing and linking 
various sub-disciplines of social sciences, mainly studies in gender, subjectivity, and 
agency; legal studies in family law in multi-religious settings; literature on collective 
action and activism; as well as social policy, and research on governance and power. 
The chapter presented in the first section the fixed approaches to analysing gender 
equality and argued that they were insufficient in providing a thorough analysis of 
the problem. Their main limitations included the fonnal level of analysis of family 
law and the fixed notions of women's subjectivity and agency. 
The second section addressed the gaps of the fixed approaches by drawing on notions 
of governance, power, subjectivity, and agency. It highlighted the usefulness of 
deconstructing gender equality in family law as a set of historically specific 
institutional legal practices. It also stressed the importance of expanding on the 
analysis of the role of various institutional actors in tenns of infonnal power 
dynamics, as well as revealing the broader institutionalised forms of gender 
inequality produced in the process. 
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The final section presented the theoretical framework of 'order of gender 
governance' proposed by this thesis and that is adopted from Foucault's (2000) 
concept of govemmentality. This conceptual framework is useful to understand how 
gender equality in family law persists at the three levels of disciplinary techniques of 
legal frameworks; moralities of truth, and the control over family law spaces. This 
framework allows for a thorough understanding of the implications of the enactment 
of family law frameworks on women's subjectivities and agency. The next chapter 
draws the methodological plan adopted for conducting the field research. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE Methodological approach to addressing the research 
project 
3.1 Introduction 
One always derives a sense of pride when things go according to plan. In my 
doctoral apprenticeship, the reverse was true. What started as a neatly drawn plan 
turned out to be a stimulating - if challenging - dynamic process of matching the 
evolving theoretical insights with methodological complexities. These complexities 
mainly related to researching a sensitive topic with vulnerable respondents in a 
volatile context. I endeavoured to balance my passion for the research topic with 
academic distance and ethical rigour and ensure the validity and manageability of the 
research plan within these constraints. In response to the learning curve that is the 
PhD process, the design of the methodology evolved dynamically across the three 
phases of pre-fieldwork, fieldwork, and post-fieldwork. 
Throughout this process, I engaged four methodological concerns discussed below. 
The first concern was to match the methodological approach and methods with the 
research problem and the conceptual framework adopted in chapter 2. The second 
concern is to adapt research methods and tools to the specific contextual needs of the 
fieldwork setting on one hand, and the politically volatile context of Lebanon on the 
other. The third concern is to devise and adapt a methodological strategy to 
accommodate my personal involvement with the topic and the research setting, and 
its sensitivity in relation to the negotiation of access and relationships with 
respondents and gatekeepers. The fourth concern is about tying these complex strings 
of field research into a coherent analysis and triangulation of findings. The chapter is 
structured accordingly and concludes by signposting the main sets of findings of the 
following chapters. 
3.2 Matching the methodological strategy with the research problem and 
conceptual framework 
The methodological approach of the thesis developed in close relation with the 
conceptual framework of the inquiry. It draws on the philosophical stand driving the 
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research. The selection of the methodological approach was subject to several 
epistemological considerations related to the research topic. 
The main drive for my inquiry into methodological approaches is to find one that 
accommodates the complexity of the theoretical layers of analysis. The type of 
knowledge that I am interested in gathering relates to the less visible side of social 
relations. My research interest lies in studying the styles of enactments or the 
'conduct of conduct' of family law frameworks and the underlying ways that they 
shape the way women think and act on their personal relations. Thus my concern was 
to detect discourses, power relations, institutional norms and values, informal 
processes, marginalised experiences that relate to the personal, gender, and religion. 
For this, I considered three options of methodological approaches. Grounded theory 
was a strong contender because it moves away from the straightjacketing of positivist 
approaches and allows for opening theoretical options and interpretations. I had to 
opt out of this approach because it presupposes an objectivist value free normative 
stand of the researcher when engaging with design and implementation of the field 
research (Creswell 1998). 
Another plausible option was the phenomenological approach because of its 
commitment to revealing the intricacies of the lived experiences of research 
subjects/respondents. This approach however was limited in the extent to which it 
questioned the accounts of respondents. It primarily recognised their responses as 
valid accounts of their own worldview. While this perspective is valuable for 
prioritising people's concerns and issues, it did not allow for much analysis of the 
discursive constructions of their views and experiences. 
Finally, I opted for the post-structural approach because it accommodated my 
theoretical concerns stated above. Of course, this approach is not without its 
limitations. While it provides a perspective for revealing the underlying tensions of 
communication, it can convey the illusion of distance and lack of theoretical bias. 
One way to remedy this is to clarify the theoretical positioning of the researcher and 
maintain a sense of reflexivity as to the process and findings of the fieldwork. A 
related issue is to account for the bias of my feminist political stand in the process of 
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academic knowledge generation. One way to counter this limitation is to adopt a 
post-structural feminist approach in research practices that acknowledges the 
multidimensionality of gendering processes and the fluidity of subjectivity and 
agency of women. 
Within this approach, my main concern was to select the suitable methods for my 
research questions. There was a need to go back to the basics of epistemology and 
understanding the 'use' of methods as an investigation tool that allows researchers to 
answer their conceptual queries. As the primary location of this thesis is within the 
social policy study area I had to problematise the prevailing methods used in social 
policy that hint at deep-seated traditions of formal inquiry. They tend to rely chiefly 
on surveys and quantitative methods, or more recently on formal interviews and 
focus groups. As my research aims and questions became more discernable, I opted 
for qualitative methods that are more suited for a post-structural methodological 
approach and the interdisciplinary nature of my research. These methods had to 
reconcile the interdisciplinary intersections of social policy, anthropology, 
development, and gender studies, which characterize this research. Thus, I moved 
away from a heavy emphasis on inquiry methods such as structured interviews- a 
popular research tool, and incorporated other methods to complement the research 
aims. 
The qualitative research framework adopted in the thesis draws on three methods. 
First, an ethnographic approach focusing on 'a description and interpretation of a 
cultural or social group or system' (Creswell 1998:85). The cultural context is 
explained as 'an amorphous term, not something 'lying about' (Wolcott 1990) but 
rather something the researcher attributes to a group as he or she looks for patterns of 
daily living' (Creswell 1998:59). A loose form of direct inquiry method 
complemented this approach and allowed for probing formal accounts and revealing 
underlying meanings. 
Second, to account for the post-structural approach, I used the lens of discursive 
pragmatism that 'acknowledges, given the plasticities of language, the multiplicities 
of meaning and complexities of social practices, but still aims to say something about 
broader patterns in the interface between language use and discourse-constituted 
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patterns of meaning" (Alvesson 2002:76). This choice is sought because "what 
(possibly) exists 'out there' (e.g. behaviours) or 'in there' (e.g. feelings or motives) is 
complex and ambiguous, and can never simply be captured, but given the 
perspective, the vocabulary and the chosen interpretation, 'reality' emerges in a 
particular way" (Alvesson 2002:3). In this way, my methodological perspective is 
language-conscious. It inquired into the meanings of language - in both written texts 
and talk, and was used appropriately when needed depending on my research goals. 
Ethnographic and discursive approaches are reconcilable because discourses 
construct the very social realities and patterns of relations that constitute the interest 
of the ethnographic approach (Miller 1997). 
In my research, I strived not to develop a tyrannical approach to research methods. A 
near obsession with the details of the method design, collection, and processing of 
information could lead to an emphasis on form over substance. One way of 
addressing this issue was to make sure to specify broad anticipated research 
guidelines of my investigation and carefully plan to identify information sources and 
informants who would relate to the theoretical premises of my research. 
3.3 The learning loop of the fieldwork: Adapting research methods and tools 
to theoretical and contextual shifts 
I encountered four significant theoretical and contextual shifts in planning, 
implementing, and analysing my field research that brought significant and 
substantive changes to the project. They reflect the intricate and continuous process 
of calibrating the theoretical framework and the odd twists of contextual 
circumstances. 
First, I adopted a broad take on field research that was not useful to the purpose of 
the research. Naively aiming to analyse the political dimensions of the gendering 
effect, I initially adopted a comparative thematic approach by comparing gender 
equality in the issues of women's political representation and in personal relations. I 
moved away from the first case due to two realisations. First, this comparison 
answered a different research question than the one with which I was concerned. 
Analysing the two issues of political representation and personal relations drove me 
away from studying the gendering effect that any of these issues have on women. 
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Another practical reason also related to the fact that the researched population would 
have been too large to manage single-handedly by an under-funded doctoral student. 
As this comparison did not add much value to the research problem, I dropped it 
early on in the fieldwork process. 
Second, my initial engagement with gender equality and family law was fixed. It 
primarily examined various religious family codes to trace and compare the various 
types of gender inequality rather than the different processes sustaining it. My initial 
understanding of religion was an essentialist and fixed one. I considered it as an 
exceptional social institution that operates in a unified and different logic both across 
other institutions and within the different religious doctrines. Following this bias, I 
designed my fieldwork to focus on the frameworks of two religious doctrines, the 
Maronite Catholic, and the Shica Muslim sects. My essentialist standpoint of 
comparing both doctrines crumbled halfway through my fieldwork. 
A twist of fieldwork fate changes this. As I could not find enough women 
respondents belonging to these two doctrines at one NGO support centre, I resorted 
to interview women from other doctrines. Two sets of findings were particularly 
striking. First, beyond their scriptural and structural differences, the gendering effect 
of various family codes displayed significantly comparable normative and 
operational logic across various denominations. Second, this logic shared many 
commonalities with secular gendering institutional processes. 
This realisation significantly influenced my understanding of religion and 
institutional gender relations. Thus, I came to problematise the fixed conceptions of 
religion, the secular-religious dichotomy, and the fixed nature of women's 
subjectivity. Thus, the difference between religious codes and frameworks did not 
add any substantive conceptual dimension to the analysis. My theoretical lens shifted 
instead to focus on the enacted aspects of religion as an institutional social construct. 
For manageability purposes, I retained my focus on Maronite and Shica legal codes 
and structures but repositioned them to represent snapshots or examples of the 
numerous codes present in Lebanon. The selection of my respondents followed this 
decision. Women respondents shared commonalities in their experiences beyond 
their ascribed sectarian affiliation. I realised that as I categorised women respondents 
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according to sectarian categories, I was confining them to a 'description' effect and 
fixing them under a particular sectarian identity. Thus, I removed religious affiliation 
from the selection criteria of women respondents.69 
A third shift relates to the spatial focus of the fieldwork. Drawing on the assumption 
of religious essentialism mentioned above, I initially limited my fieldwork 
geographically to two neighbourhoods in the Southern suburbs of Beirut, namely 
BouIj 8arajneh, and Ain Rummaneh, respectively populated by Shica and Maronite 
inhabitants. The assumption was that the women are restricted to their locality. This 
distinction soon became secondary to the research design. One reason was that 
women effectively had a broader mobility map when negotiating their personal 
relations with religious courts, their families, and support centres. Another reason 
was that the services provided for women in these areas were scarce and did not 
attract many women. The main pool of respondents had to be drawn from the main 
national women groups located in central Beirut and specialising in advocacy and 
support for women suffering from domestic violence. 
In a final shift, my analytical focus moved from national policy makers to front line 
encounters between women and service providers. Initially I was well positioned to 
conduct the research at a national policy making level. I was well acquainted with the 
country context and language of the research as I had lived and worked in Lebanon 
for most of my life. In addition, my political and social familiarity with the Lebanese 
macro and micro political social and cultural situation is well developed. My 
previous professional experience in gender and development secured my access to 
national policy makers. 
However, nothing prepared me for significant unforeseen political circumstances 
preceding the start of my fieldwork. One month before I travelled to Beirut to start 
my fieldwork, the then Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated on 14 February 
2005. This significant political incident induced a major political shock that deeply 
reverberated on the political, policy, and civil society scenes, as well as the general 
69 Carter and Green (1995) critique a similar 'race thinking' process in social research in the UK and 
the USA. The primacy of the 'sectarian' category in my research design was similar to the way 
research in the US focuses on 'race' as a primary analytical lens, hence fixing social issues under the 
foundational category of 'race thinking' or in my case 'religion thinking'. 
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national 'mood' for more than a year. With these changes, the importance and 
urgency of my topic, as with many other social and political issues, became 
marginal. Top-tiered policy makers such as parliamentarians and politicians become 
unavailable due to security concerns and a shift in their priorities. With such a 
volatile environment, a plan B materialised. I drafted two lists of participants - a 
main and a contingent one. The evolving political situation implied a change in my 
research themes and I prioritised the respondents on the two lists accordingly. This 
practice also helped locating several alternative respondents - and in many instances 
less vocal or visible. As I gradually identified contingency respondents, my 
theoretical and methodological frameworks adjusted accordingly. 
This shift turned out to be a blessing in disguise as it allowed me to focus on the 
enacted aspect of gender equality in personal relations, subjectivity, and agency. The 
lack of access to politicians and top NOO leaders allowed me to dedicate most of my 
fieldwork to observing the dynamics of women's lived experiences and their 
interactions with the legal system on the one hand, and front line workers at the 
support centres on the other. This shift brought me closer to prioritising the heavily 
under-researched dynamics at the level of 'ordinary' women rather than the high 
profile macro analyses of policy processes. 
3.4 The politics of positioning and representation 
My positioning as a researcher in the research context is drawn around the dynamics 
of three circles of research populations: 1) Policy makers and service providers 
including women groups, ministries, and religious leaders; 2) women who were 
experiencing personal relations problems, 3) my informal circle of family and 
friends. These dynamics can be summarised at the level of politics of positioning - or 
how various respondents perceived me; and that of the politics of representation - or 
how I perceived them. 
3.4.1 The politics of positioning 
My engagement in the fieldwork can be summed up as a tension between the 
insider/outsider dilemma. My interactions with various respondents brought with it 
the theoretical conundrums relating to multi-faceted and temporal subjectivity. A 
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clear-cut distinction between insider and outsider research collapsed. The challenges 
outsider researchers face are widely documented in relations to treading in 'foreign' 
field terrains and thus facing issues of access and building rapport. Being an insider 
researcher is increasingly problematic. It significantly reflects internalised biases 
resulting from too close a connection to the research subjects and topic, and the 
ethical issues about the challenge of weeding out data from informally disclosed 
information. In the fieldwork, I found these distinctions hard to maintain. The social 
setting and the research topic were more complex and sensitive than this dichotomy 
allows for. 
In many aspects, I qualify as an insider. I was an insider to the country of the 
fieldwork. As a national of the country and a resident of the area I was researching, I 
was well acquainted with the language and the local socio-cultural and political 
context. However, my insider position was especially complicated during my 
interviews with religious leaders at two levels. First, my ascribed sectarian 
categorisation was a prominent factor in negotiating and running interviews and it 
worked both ways. My religion of birth - although I am not adherent to it, located 
me at an advantage that can be described as a socially translated religious capital 
(Bourdieu 1994). I was more familiar with the details of the practices, terminologies, 
and meanings associated with Shica family law. In that respect, I was an insider to 
Shica religious leaders, but an outsider to Maronite ones. As I was negotiating access, 
both actors informally sought to check my affiliation. These checks are subtle and 
are not restricted to religious leaders as often assumed. They generally emerge in 
various aspects of any new daily encounters. They usually start with the inquiry 
about the family name, place of birth, and place of residence - in that order. In my 
case, while my family name was cross-sectarian, inquiry into my place of birth and 
place of residence, both in a predominantly Shica-inhabited part of the capital, 
provided respondents with the necessary framing tools. While both groups granted 
me interviews, they dealt with my questions differently. Maronite religious leaders 
tended to be careful not to disclose some 'inside' stories about family law practices 
and issues in their community. 
In their accounts, Maronite religious leaders were careful in disclosing any 
unfavourable information and often strived to come across as holding more 
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favourable religious views, norms and practices than those of Muslim communities. 
On the other hand, Shica religious leaders opened up in informal discussions, 
considering me 'one of them', for instance by referring to ill practices and to 
competition between various intra- Shica religious powers. However, in some aspects 
I was also an outsider to the Shica pool of religious leader respondents. They realised 
that I was not religiously adherent or affiliated to any Shica political or religious 
leadership. Some of them tried to bring me closer to the Shica community by trying 
to convince me to wear the veil for instance. 
My activist, researcher, expert positioning was also very complex. At many levels, I 
was an insider to women groups. I came from a practitioner/activist background and 
knew many of the respondents within women groups from that time. My personal 
views were also in concordance with broad feminist principles that made me 
generally accepted by the feminist circles. The social and professional familiarity 
with the context brought great advantages in terms of identifying respondents and 
gaining access to them. However, being an insider brings with it some disadvantages. 
First, as I broadly related to the women groups' circles, I found myself entangled in 
the underlying tensions of inter-NGO politics. In this sense, I was an insider for some 
activists and an outsider for others. I had to resist profiling by feminist activist 
respondents as being closer to one group of activists rather than the other. Second, 
half way through the fieldwork, two of my key persons had some disagreements and 
I was inevitably drawn into the internal politics within some women groups. 
Although I tried to distance myself from the tensions, I provided professional advice 
on the L WNGO's board's strategy, only one member to consider me as part of the 
'establishment'. Third, during my interviews several women respondents using the 
services of these groups considered me part of the organisation and asked me for 
services or advice on their issues. These examples raise the need to reflect on how to 
navigate the insider position in socially charged settings. 
Most respondents did not comment on my positioning as a western-trained academic. 
However, one Shica religious leader alluded to the role of western-based researchers 
as intelligence agents and requested to know the details of my research. He was 
concerned with any misrepresentation of the Shica doctrine that this project could 
hold. 
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3.4.2 Politics of Representation 
Qualitative research based on ethnographic methods will always be intrusive 
(Creswell 2003). In addition, the focus of the research topic is very sensitive. I had to 
be especially considerate when dealing with respondents who are experiencing 
family law issues. This task is most crucial because it rubs against the biases and 
assumptions that the researcher holds towards the research topic and the respondents. 
These biases and assumptions are ideological and relate to the researcher's 
worldview. While reaching objectivity is impossible, there is constant need to focus 
on clarifying one's own personal and academic assumptions and balancing them 
towards knowledge generation. In short, the purpose of interviews is not a love affair 
with, nor or a criminal investigation against, respondents. This issue also has 
repercussions on the interpretation and analysis of the findings. It is crucial to strive 
for faithful inferences, representations, and conclusions because a failure to do so can 
seriously reduce the quality of findings and the depth of the analysis. 
Some of the pitfalls in this area have to do with jumping to conclusions, labelling 
respondents and wrongly assuming root causes of behaviours or situations. From my 
field experience, it was easy for me to sympathise with women with family law 
problems during interviews. I was able to have several layers of questions and some 
careful interpretations of their actions. 
It was more difficult for me to get to the same level of understanding when 
researching and analysing women groups. Influenced by my political and practitioner 
background, I used an evaluative frame of analysis that revolved around outcomes 
classifying NOOs into either saviours or culprits. In this steep learning curve, my 
supervisors provided continuous support inviting me not to be 'angry with NOOs' 
but to focus instead on 'researching them'. Similar insights came during a 
methodology seminar with anthropologist James Scott at the LSE Centre for Civil 
Society. When I asked him about this issue, he explained faithful representations of 
respondents in the endeavour that "they don't have to agree with you, but they need 
to see themselves in what you say about them" (Scott 2008). In order to minimise the 
impact of these biases, I strived to undertake a systematic review and analysis of 
field notes in parallel with the theoretical framework. I kept a daily journal of 
activities and impressions. I also discussed issues with a multitude of third parties 
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such as my supervisors and fellow local and foreign researchers working in similar 
fields in Lebanon from different theoretical and ideological stands. 
The positioning of the researcher also depends on the extent to which their presence 
as an 'expert' is noticeable in the field. As my research draws on a broad 
ethnographic approach, I endeavoured to tone down my researcher profile by 
blending in as much as possible with the organisational setting, ensuring cultural 
sensitivity to the local setting and relying on non-obtrusive methods of inquiry such 
as participant-observation. While these methods do not completely erode the role of 
the researcher, they can however minimise its threat. Following this, much effort was 
put in clarifying my own biases and assumptions, and conveying a clear idea of my 
research to respondents. 
This issue is further complicated if the researcher constructs their research field 
within a myth of untapped resources and considers respondents as virgin research 
populations waiting to be discovered. In many research settings there are so many 
research initiatives taking place that respondents can experience research fatigue. 
This was the case of my research. My fieldwork revealed that several of my research 
subjects previously took part in various forms of research conducted mainly by non-
academic parties such as the media, multilaterals in partnership with ministries, 
international NGOs, consultancies and few academics. In most of these activities, 
they were not clearly informed of the purpose of the research and the outcomes. I 
made sure not to consume much of my respondents time and be as little invasive as I 
could, in addition to extensively sharing my research objectives. I did not have the 
chance to formally disseminate my research findings, but I am planning to do so at a 
later stage. 
Another level of managing relationships with respondents relates to the personal side 
of research interactions, mainly managing expectations and terms of personal 
relationships. Several ethical considerations relate to the blurred lines between 
formal research and informal interpersonal relationships. This is prominent in 
ethnographic research when the researcher tends to spend considerable time with 
respondents. Researcher-respondent relations develop into various personal forms of 
friendships. As professional and personal relations overlap, issues of privacy, 
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relationship framing, and uneven power relations inevitably arise. For instance, 
questions crop up as to the extent to which both parties are willing to open up about 
their personal lives, political views, and social practices. In the case of my research, I 
noticed that the power balance was inevitably skewed towards the researcher as I 
asked respondents to divulge the most intimate details of their personal lives. In 
return, I shared some details of my personal life and had to face the occasional 
comments about my marital status and the peculiarity of my childless marriage for 
instance, which is not common practice in the local context. Similarly, this type of 
research draws extensively on respondents' time and energy. The challenge was to 
frame them beyond their respondent role and account for their preoccupations and 
lives as individuals and social actors. This example and other instances led me to 
clarify the extent, depth and longevity of the relationship in order to mitigate any 
unmet expectations and minimise their consequences on the research while carefully 
considering entry and exit plans. 
Several steps were used to facilitate the process (Creswell 2003): 1) verbal consent 
was sought from respondents and verbatim transcriptions and written interpretations 
and reports were made available to the informants on demand; 2) their rights, needs, 
interests and wishes were considered first in relation with reporting; and 3) the final 
decision regarding informant anonymity rested with the informants. 
3.5 Validity ofthe research: Data collection, analysis, and triangulation 
3.5.1 Research Tools and Population 
Life histories, semi-structured and informal interviews 
The research tools selected to match my qualitative methodological framework went 
through a transformation throughout my fieldwork. My fieldwork consisted of a two-
week onsite planning phase in December 2004, followed by a six-month residence in 
Beirut between April and October 2005.1n the planning phase, I adopted life histories 
as a primary tool for data collection. This phase was aimed at collecting a large 
amount of topic-related information and probing into specific issues of relevance that 
develop during the research plan, while minimising the overflow of information to be 
processed. In the actual fieldwork phase, life histories proved hard to apply for two 
reasons. Mainly they were extremely time-consuming, as they usually require at least 
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three to four hours of flowing discussion. Usually women engaged in problems 
relating to personal relations juggled the various pressures of their family lives and 
had limited time to spend in support services. In addition, the traumatic nature of the 
topic made it hard for them to discuss at length. In a concern for their emotional 
wellbeing, I opted to switch to another tool of informal interviews that lasted for 
about one hour. 
The interviews were complemented with participant observations. While interviews 
gave me important insights into respondents 'formal' opinions, participant 
observation was very useful in watching the dynamics between various actors. The 
main advantage for observation is that it allowed me to observe the interaction of 
women respondents with secondary subjects without being intrusive on such 
sensitive encounters (Yin 1994). 
I also relied on other tools relating to content analysis of written documents. They 
proved to be crucial in revealing the underlying tensions in the institutionalisation of 
gendering practices and translations of meanings of family law frameworks. This 
included the review of policy, legal and historical documents, and newspaper clips. 
Primary Respondents 
As discussed earlier, the selection of my respondents diverted from my initial 
fieldwork plan In the span of six months of fieldwork. I broadened my geographic 
catchment area from the two neighbourhoods of the Southern suburbs of Beirut -
Bourj Barajneh and Ain Rummaneh - to include women residing m any 
neighbourhoods of Greater Beirut. Thus I opened up the selection to include 
respondents from all sectarian backgrounds with a single criterion of seeking the 
services of support centres. By doing this, I shifted the unit of analysis from a 
geographic-religious focus to an organisational-social one. This shift allowed for a 
consistent selection process that granted a more coherent research corpus. The group 
of respondents turned out to be also coherent in terms of socio-economic class, as it 
reflected mainly lower-middle class urban-resident women who had the opportunity 
to learn about and access support services. This provides some limitations to the 
research in that it does not document the situation involving lack of access, but as the 
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research did not relate to that issue, this limitation does not compromise the validity 
of the findings. 
The selection of respondents depended on their availability and consent, and an 
acceptable level of stable mental health. This raises issues of validity as I used my 
non-expert judgement of what 'acceptable' mental health levels were. Hence, I set it 
to a certain level of coherence in their narratives. The accounts of two respondents 
were excluded from the analysis because the content of their narratives was 
extensively incoherent and hard to follow. However, the observations of their 
interactions with frontline workers were included in the analysis as they provided 
valuable academic insights to the tensions between the two groups of respondents. 
In order to validate my findings, I relied on a small control group of respondents who 
did not seek any support outside of their informal networks. The numbers were 
limited due to the difficulty of gaining access to this group. The topic was considered 
a social taboo and women who have not 'come out' with their problems of personal 
relations to women groups were reluctant to discuss it. 
Secondary respondents 
Secondary respondents primarily constitute three groups: the local branches of 
women groups providing support services to women, policy makers, including 
members of the national offices of women groups, in addition to governmental actors 
at the local and national levels,70 and religious leaders - including judges and 
community leaders belonging to the Shica and Maronite denominations. Police forces 
and law enforcement bodies were also included at a minimal scale due to issues of 
access. However, since women hardly relied on them for support, their limited 
involvement in the study was justified. These subjects constitute the bulk of actors 
70 During my fieldwork, I conducted participant-observation in five centres providing support services 
to women affected by 'domestic violence'. Two of these centres were run by one leading women 
group on V A W and another radical feminist group The three others were run by the MOSA 
Community Development Centres in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Apart from the first organisation 
that provides only specialised services on VA W, the four others incorporated VA W support services 
within their comprehensive socio-economic, health and educational community services. I included 
the governmental centres because their teams of social workers were trained by the leading women 
group on V A W issues. While the governmental centres are technically not women groups, it was 
useful to compare the gender norms that are enacted across the social workers and their interaction 
with the concerned population. 
99 
present in the policy environment related to the primary subjects. Two significant 
groups were excluded from the study, namely the family members of the women, and 
their spouses. I decided to exclude these two groups from the study because there 
were serious issues of access. More importantly, it included the risk of jeopardising 
the safety of the women respondents. Insights about the roles of these two groups 
transpired through the experiences of the respondents instead. Since the study was 
concerned primarily with the discursive rather than the material impact of these 
actors on women ' s subjectivity and agency, the exclusion of these actors did not 
limit the related findings. Interviews reflected the changes in the fieldwork plan and 
were finalised in Table 1 below. 
Type of respondents Type of activity Number 
Primary subjects '. 
Women with personal relations Informal interviews, 25 
problems and who are using shadowing and observation of 
support services their encounters with front line 
support staff, lawyers, and 
religious courts 
Women with personal relations Focused life histories, group 3 
problems and who are not using discussions, observation 
sUPQort services 
Subtotal 28 
Secondary subjects - ,-
Board members of women groups Informal interviews, 7 
observation 
Religious community leaders Semi-structured interviews, 3 Shica 
observation 3 Maronite 
Religious courts judges Semi -structured interviews, 2 Shica, 
observation 1 Maronite 
National governmental bodies Semi -structured interviews 3 
related to women's issues 
Governmental support services Semi-structured interviews, 5 
front line support staff and lawyers observation 
Women groups front line support Semi-structured interviews, 7 
workers and lawyers observation 
Gender related conferences Participant observation 3 
Police forces training on gender Participant observation in a 20 officers 
issues training workshop 
Table 1: Distribution of respondents 
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3.5.2 Data Collection Procedures: Navigating through interviews 
The effectiveness of the fieldwork is particularly crucial when it comes to interviews. 
For an underfunded, novice doctoral researcher, good interviews can be hard to get, 
and they can be even harder to transcribe. A main challenge was to keep my research 
on track and harness the fieldwork zeal. The fieldwork experience was quite 
overwhelming and risked taking on a life of its own. In such an indulgent 
environment, theoretical blurring risked feeding into infomania, or an urge to gather 
the largest amount of information with the least critical assessment. With the early 
symptoms creeping in when I was in the field, I resorted to narrowing down the 
research topic and the initial excessive list of potential respondents. 
A phase of familiarisation was useful to acquaint myself with the broad setting and 
the various 'players' and issues involved. My main entry point was through a 
national women group specialising in providing advocacy and support against issues 
of violence against women. In this phase, I resorted to general participant 
observation, exploratory informal interviews, documenting, and analysing the map of 
influences, relationships, networks, and issues at risk. Document review covered 
legal, official, journalistic and organisational documents that dealt with issues around 
gender equality and personal relations and was particularly useful in analysing the 
relationships between different actors. 
One of the most important challenges faced in the process was to gain credibility 
within the research context in order to negotiate access. It relies mainly on the fine 
line of presenting oneself in a locally acceptable way while maintaining integrity. 
This implies translating one's research into simple, concise and inviting language 
that would sustain respondents' interest and invite them to cooperate without 
insulting their intelligence. A failure to do so results in losing them either due to a 
too dense, too plain, or too suspicious research topic. That is why the main challenge 
consisted of the one-sentence question posed by potential respondents: 'what is your 
research about?' The answer to this question can be a deal-breaker as it is crucial to 
secure access by raising interest in your topic, and showing the respondents' 
usefulness to your research without offending them. The only way to get to this 
confident stage of self-presentation was to practice with family and friends on clearly 
101 
articulating how I was to introduce myself as well as my research, clarify the purpose 
of the interview, and how it fits with my overall research. 
Negotiating access and managing relationships is an important keystone in the 
fieldwork that runs in parallel to 'getting the job [of the fieldwork] done'. It implies 
several practical and ethical issues relating to the role of the researcher and relations 
with respondents at the levels of the researcher's position in the research stream, and 
the management of personal relations. These two issues are important because they 
establish grounds for the 'working terms' and ensure sound and ethical 
communication and data collection. 
Identifying key respondents was followed by negotiating access, and holding detailed 
semi-structured interviews with them. These informants were carefully selected 
according to their positions in relation to the topic and context but also to their 
availability. I prepared various interview guides to use in each interview depending 
on the topic and the information gathered at the stage of the research. The main 
advantage of this technique is that it allowed me to cross-check issues and questions 
that might be overlooked or contradicted in the written statements of various policy 
actors (Maxwell 1996). 
A contextualisation phase mainly included participant observation of events and 
encounters where study subjects -primary and secondary- interacted in the context. 
This phase helped in situating the gathered information into the action process of the 
various actors, comparing and reflecting on the gathered data, and revising any 
unanswered issues. 
Another important aspect of navigating through interviews was a thorough planning 
of interviews by conducting background research on respondents. This issue seems 
obvious; however, under-preparation can lead to some serious practical hindrances 
and potentially block access. Conducting background research on the respondents 
and their organisations proved to be very helpful in giving credibility to the 
researcher and moved the discussion beyond the preliminaries. Background research, 
however, needs to be reflected delicately during interviews. Showing too much 
knowledge about the respondents and their organisations could backfire on the 
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profile of the researcher as intrusive and suspicious. A moderate amount of 
knowledge needs to be dew-dripped on need basis so that it shows familiarity and 
interest without too much snooping around. This tip was particularly useful when 
interviewing religious leaders where I had to be careful about showing enough 
familiarity in their views and their religious background without overtly pointing to 
sensitive views in relation to my topic. I rather opted for allowing them to come up 
with their views and interpretations of issues. 
Using culturally sensitive language proved necessary to fruitful encounters with 
respondents71 • This issue matters even for the minute details of phrasing questions 
and understanding local meanings and expressions for social practices72• Even with 
the most familiar research settings there are various constructions of micro-cultural 
contexts with specific codes of communication that tend to be different from the 
researcher's own 'informal' code. Socio-economic issues of class, religious 
affiliation, education and geographic location are important markers in this issue. 
My experience m conducting field research reflected this concern. Despite 
conducting most of the fieldwork in my hometown, I needed to delve into the micro-
cultural linguistic constructions of violence against women and NOO work, and 
adjust my expressions of research. For instance, I incorporated some local language 
codes such as using 'al-saliimu calaykum' as a greeting sentence with religious 
respondents instead of the usual 'marbabii' or 'sabiil;zlmasii' el-khayr' and related 
terms that link conversations. I also maintained conversations in Arabic yet with a 
local accent rather than the 'plain' accent that would be acceptable to the local 
context. In addition, I refrained from usual metropolitan mixing of English, Arabic, 
71 In this context I closely associate it to gaining intimate knowledge of the local constructions of 
meanings and language and making sure to use them appropriately. This skill is specifically important 
in ethnographic fieldwork as it could maximise difference and allows the researcher to stand out from 
the researched context. A lack of these skills could convey two sets of detrimental messages. The first 
is an amateur profile that undermines the seriousness of the research skills. The second message is a 
perceived patronising attitude towards respondents which can reinforce the image of the 'alien' 
researcher. 
72 Although these issues seem obviously relevant to a foreign researcher who might be prone to 
language misinterpretations, it however tends to be overlooked with native researchers. Native 
researchers tend to have several advantages relating to claims around familiarity with the context. 
However they still need to account for their own non-researcher codes of thinking and expression and 
their roles as researchers. 
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and French as usually parodied in the local metropolitan greeting' hi, kifak, fa vaT. 
Another example relates to adopting a locally acceptable way of asking questions. 
As the interviewing process also largely mixed with participant observation, it 
brought a certain degree of sensitivity to the encounter. This helped to soften the 
otherwise invasive topic of inquiry. Much effort was spent knowing about the overall 
context with its layered micropolitics, developing my interviewing skills to fit the 
local way of asking questions, and using appropriate language. Thus, this is the 
importance of questions sequencing. The most challenging task was to handpick 
questions and ask them in a way that reflects the research and allows for bonding 
with the respondent. 
The interviewing style can also influence the rapport with respondents in several 
ways. First, a decision needs to be taken on whether to have detailed question 
guidelines or instead have a rough guide memorised in mind. It is accuracy versus 
spontaneity. In my work, I adopted different techniques across respondents. For 
organisational and official respondents, I had a written guide of the questions that I 
handed to the respondents at the start of the interview. My interviews with women 
respondents were without written interview guide, and the discussion flowed more in 
a freestyle unstructured manner. For this it was also more sensible to take notes in 
the first set of respondents and tape interviews in the second set. Another strategic 
decision was how to manage the sensitivity factor. I resorted to carefully designing 
the order and sequence of questions by prioritising and categorising questions in 
terms of introductions, relevance, and sensitivity. After a warm up with several 
opening questions and general topics, important questions were discussed, leaving 
sensitive ones to the end. 
Information load and the researcher's mental health usually have an underrated 
influence on the success of the fieldwork. A less obvious issue is how to deal with 
the overwhelming amount of information that is generated everyday and maintain the 
researcher's mental health. My topic was exceptionally charged with a substantial 
amount of details on gender based injustice and violence, let alone the volatile 
environment that constitutes undergoing fieldwork in Lebanon with seven political 
assassinations and more than 20 car bombs in the city during the period of six 
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months. Information overload can either overstretch the researcher's composure 
leading to emotional breakdown, or lead to avoidance and withdrawal from the 
fieldwork process. During my fieldwork, I focused my energy at two levels. First, I 
ensured that I handled interviews effectively and completed my interview schedule. 
Second I processed the information as quickly as possible as a way to externalise the 
ensuing emotional sedimentation. This included taking notes, writing summaries, and 
impressions straight after the interviews, before talking to anyone. I also planned 
periodic relaxation/venting out sessions with close friends while maintaining the 
anonymity of my respondents. 
3.5.3 Managing the data, recording, analysis, triangulation, and validity 
My data recording procedures were devised in a way to ensure validity of data. For 
observations, I used an observation protocol to note down descriptive and reflexive 
notes. This consisted of drafting several criteria for observation and amending them 
as I went along. For interviews, I used an interview plan and an interview protocol 
detailing the questions and answers of the interviewee as suggested by Creswell 
(1998). The use of tape recorder depended on the situation and the sensitivity of the 
topic discussed. The ease of the interviewee was the primary criterion in deciding 
when to use them. If recording was not suitable, I made sure to record substantial 
notes and report on the discussion immediately after its end, in addition to keeping a 
detailed journal of notes and impressions. 
Data analysis was maximised by acknowledging that it is a continuous process 
involving continual reflection on the topic (Rossman and Rallis 2003). The main 
feature is the use of open-ended questions tailored to the qualitative approach 
methods. The interpretation relies on a description of the setting and individuals 
followed by analysis of the data for themes or issues (Stake 1995). The following 
steps were used for analysis: organising and preparing the data for analysis, getting 
the main sense from the data, coding, description, organisation of the data 
representation, and interpretation (Creswell 2003). At a rather later stage of my 
thesis, I relied on the Nvivo qualitative data analysis software as I found it 
exceptionally helpful in coding and extracting information. It particularly helped me 
keep a healthy distance from the findings and made easier to part with bits of 
information that were retained due to their sentimental rather than academic value. 
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In tenns of validating findings, generalisability and reliability tend to be blurred in 
qualitative research (Creswell 2003). As a way to effectively analyse my data and 
ensure validity of findings, I resorted to a continuous process of matching theories 
with methods during the analysis and writing up phase. The process was convoluted 
with a looping effect combining writing as an analysis process. The initial 
impressions made immediately after interviews were very useful in providing 
striking and emerging patterns of analysis. A later reflexive exercise categorised 
infonnation into themes, patterns, and key words. Triangulation was effectuated 
during the fieldwork where I crosschecked infonnation with various actors. Also, 
infonnation saturation was another indicator for validity both during fieldwork and in 
the later analysis phase. Other ways to ensure validity include prolonged and 
repetitive observation, peer review and debriefing. These tools helped to clarify my 
research bias by specifying my positioning, and producing a rich description and 
documentation (Creswell 1998). 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter described the research plan and reviewed key methodological issues. 
The first section discussed the challenges of matching the methodological approach 
and methods with the research problem and the conceptual framework detailed in 
chapter 2. The second section covered the concern for reconciling the research 
methods and tools to the specific contextual needs of the fieldwork setting with the 
politically volatile context of Lebanon at the time. The third section discussed the 
need to accommodate my involvement as a researcher with the topic and the research 
setting, taking into account the sensitivity of negotiating access and relationships 
with respondents and key persons. The fourth section covers the challenges of 
deriving a coherent analysis from field material and the process of triangulation of 
findings. The next chapter recounts the findings of these efforts. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR History of family law frameworks in Lebanon 
"In the name of God, we, Muslims and Christians, pledge that united we shall remain 
to the end of time to better defend our Lebanon". 
(Tueini 2005) 
4.1 Introduction 
This quote was delivered at a one million strong rally on 14 March 2005 denouncing 
the assassination of the then prime minister Rafik Hariri. It exemplifies the long-
standing anxieties about what it means to be a Lebanese. It reduces the population to 
two conflictual sectarian groups who rely on a unified religious authority to find 
common ground for co-existing on one territory. This quote is part of a meta-
narrative widely used to explain the make-up of the Lebanese society and the 
ongoing 'impasse' of the country. This chapter provides an alternative account of the 
historical developments of the Lebanese legal and socio-political context. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to explain how the order of gender governance 
extends from the period of Lebanese state formation. Historical - and competing-
colonial powers and local elites were crucial actors in installing this order. These 
actors installed religion as the primary technique of control over populations in 
Lebanon. They formalised the category of 'sectarian' affiliation at both levels of 
political representation and family law. The chapter thus posits that the interplay 
between legal, political and social categorisation of populations shaped feminist 
spaces for action and produced particular gendered norms of womanhood. 
Through an analysis of the available literature, I trace the evolvement of family law 
frameworks in the formative years preceding the establishment of the Lebanese state 
(1840-1943). This analysis is focused on the interplay between the colonial official 
discourse, and political, civil, and religious actors in shaping the legal structure of 
Modem Lebanon. It traces the ways in which these relations were continuously 
redrawn to include 'sectarianism' as the formal categorisation principle in Lebanese 
and family law. The next section reviews the classical explanations of the formation 
of the Lebanese sectarian system. The following section highlights the historical 
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developments leading to installing the religious category within the administrative 
and institutional framework of state formation. The penultimate section details the 
role of various actors in promoting specific policies entrenching this system. The 
final section reveals the impact of these policies on women's subjectification and 
collective agency in the period leading to the independence. 
4.2 Genealogy of the Lebanese system of governance 
4.2.1 Classical explanations of the Lebanese sectarian political system 
This historical review is important because gender equality in family law essentially 
relates to the way groups and individuals were regulated in the evolving legal-
political system of citizenship. In the books of liberal political analysis, Lebanon 
went from being the example of a consociational 'success story' to a notorious 
'failed case'. For example, in the 1960s Lijphart (quoted in Hudson 1988) included 
Lebanon within the list of typical 'consociational democracies' around the world. 
This section explores the various historical analyses explaining the complexity of the 
Lebanese political system from the establishment of the semi-autonomous entity of 
Mount Lebanon in 1860s until the breakout of the civil war in 1975 when the alleged 
myth collapsed. 
Four schools of thought elaborated on the construction of religion as an organising 
principle of the Lebanese state structure. First, a primordialist view of social groups 
acknowledges a fixed racial or ethnic difference between religious groups in the 
country. This perspective is reflected in the Syrianist/Lebanist73 political projects that 
were popular between 1912 and 1920. This project aimed to give platform to the 
Christian communities in Lebanon. It portrayed them as descending from historical 
Phoenicia74 and holding an altogether a culturally and racially distinctive heritage 
from Muslims who were attributed to the Semitic race (Firro 2003). The Lebanists' 
discourse strategically followed the geo-political changes occurring in the region at 
the tum of the century. They moved from advocating an independent historical Syria, 
73 Syrianist ideology was popular at the tum of the 19-20th centuries as a local alternative to Ottoman 
rule. It advocates a nationalist framework based on an ethno-political specificity to the populations in 
the territory comprising modem Lebanon and Syria. Later on Syrianist ideologists such as Michel 
Chiha modified their views and advocated a Lebanist ideology that focuses on the specificity of the 
Lebanese populations residing within the Lebanese territories that were part of the French Mandate 
over Lebanon and Syria (Firro 2003). 
74 Historical local civilisation of the region traced back to 4000 BC 
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writings started to claim a greater Lebanon limiting themselves to the historically 
independent governorate of Mount Lebanon and the annexed provinces of the coast 
and the Beqaa plains. This shift strategically allowed for a more even proportionality 
between Christians and Muslims. The sectarian legal and political system that carried 
on from the late 19th century aimed to guarantee the privileges of the Christian 
communities. 
This perspective relied on combining religious and geographic narratives such as the 
divine attribute of historical Lebanon in the Old Testament and the uniqueness of the 
plentiful land. Politicians and academics advocating this version of the Lebanese 
identity heavily used "ancient materials to construct invented traditions of a novel 
type for quite novel purposes" (Hobsbawm quoted in Firro 2003). 
With the formative years of modem Lebanon in 1920s, a milder primordialist reading 
of sectarian collective identity was elaborated by Michel Chiha, the architect of the 
Lebanese constitution and a major actor in the formation of the consociational 
political system. His views mapped sectarian groups as socially and culturally 
different, but able to form a patchwork country united by a mercantile culture (Firro 
2003f5. The Lebanese political and legal system is self-explanatory and beneficial to 
the communities as it provides equity and recognition of these entities. The later 
failure of the system is not attributed to the system itself, but to the inability of 
certain 'greedy' groups to enter modernity and engage civilly in the system (Khalaf 
2002). This view was later challenged by focusing on the similarities of cultural traits 
among different sectarian communities (Sayigh 1993). 
However, Arabist scholars contested consociationalism and promoted a common 
cultural Arab identity. They contended that Phoenicians and other ancient 
civilisations melted within the Arab expansion through Islamic conquest. Common 
language, cultural traits and traditions supported their arguments to construct this 
Arabist discourse. This view, was similar to Geertz (1993) cultural notion of 
75 Contemporary Lebanese scholars Antoine Masarra and Eliya Harik based their views on those of 
Chiha, viewing Lebanese religious groups as a collection of religious minorities - Christian and 
Muslim- who have distinct scriptural, historical and political trajectories and who ended up seeking 
refuge or settling in Lebanon under various circumstances. 
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ethnicity as the expression of cultural givens76• Thereby minorities were required to 
recognise their Arab heritage and the majority was invited to lead 'a democratic and 
rational arrangement' to reassure minorities (Firro 2003). However, religion has a 
more of an ambiguous explanation. For Arabists, Islam is perceived in its broader 
sense as having strong cultural manifestations that are integrated within Arabism to 
form an overwhelming Arabo-Islamic culture, while Christian groups are perceived 
as religious doctrines in the strictest sense. These views have been criticised as 
containing a primordial unquestioned view of an Arab civilisation (Firro 2003). 
Despite ideological differences, both Lebanist and Arabist discourses converged on 
annexing ethnicity to religion as a way to legitimise sate formation. Initially the early 
Lebanist discourse contested the perceived religious harshness of the Ottoman 
Empire as a hegemonic Muslim state that historically repressed Christian 
communities. Subsequently, it added the ethnic element by identifying with 
Phoenicism as a different ethnic origin. The discourse of Arabists focused on the 
ethnic dimension of pan-Arabism in their opposition to the Ottoman Empire linking 
it to the cultural dimension of Islam. Both views have perceived their identity as a 
combination of religious-ethnic components that created this irreconcilable breach. 
Structural political economy theorists rejected any inherent religious or ethnic 
difference between social groups. They blamed the feudal political elite for 
entrenching sectarian affiliation in order to dominate the working class and profit 
from the system and its failure 77. Similarly, a dependency approach explained 
sectarian differentiation as a result of the tension of modes of production and the 
hegemony between the centre or western forces and the periphery or the Arab world 
(Kawtharani 1976). Sectarian identity was thus considered to be historically 
constructed and attached to economic capitalist systems and the class divisions. 
However these views failed to explain why sectarian identity was chosen by this elite 
as a basis of their dominance (Firro 2003). 
76 Firro (2003) mentions that contemporary Lebanese scholars such as AI-Solh and Shalak have 
opposed consociationalis~ and have adv?cate~ an integratio?ist a~p~oach int? ~uilding an Arab s~te. 
71 Sectarianism was conSIdered as a stratificatIOn tool operatmg wlthm an ASIatIC mode of production. 
Authors suchas Masud Dahir considered it part of the means of production, while Mahdi 'Amil 
criticised sectarianism as a stand-alone concept away from the capitalist state structure and 
emphasised the responsibility of a bourgeois political elite (Firro 2003). 
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A fourth explanation emphasised colonialism as having a major role in constructing 
sectarianism as a divisive marker. Variants of this view trace sectarian primacy back 
to early Islamic expansion in the 10th and 12th centuries until the Ottomans Millet'S 
(communitarian) system (Oahir 1981). Western colonial powers in the 19th and 20th 
centuries used sectarian identity to polarise local elites into different sects and create 
cultural pockets within the Ottoman Empire. The primacy of sectarian identity and 
the ensuing political tensions in Lebanon did not result from differences in ethnicity 
or even socio-economic classes, but rather by the sole competition of external powers 
on Lebanese soil (Corm 1988: 261). Sectarian identity was imposed by colonial 
powers in order to fragment the Arab state in a divide and rule policy. 
These various readings of historical accounts and ideological points of departures 
have been used to prove and capitalise on each discourse and craft identity 
narratives. Despite their differences, most of these approaches used a religious lens 
in their analysis. As Firro (2003) mentions, despite many of them opposing sectarian 
affiliation, they still adopted a religious logic by including sectarian affiliation as the 
defining analytical category. Their conceptualisation of religion, ethnicity and 
identity held an essentialised and linear direction. In addition, many of the authors 
have been unable to outline concepts of state and state formation effectively. They 
used a unified abstract notion that was separate from the other blurred notions of 
sectarianism and political elite. Within these accounts, historical moments 
surrounding much of the developments around sectarian affiliation and state building 
were omitted. The historicity and genealogy of laws and structures were overlooked. 
Finally, the impact of colonial rule on the issue have been confined in related 
accounts to the physicality of colonial presence but not much in the discourse of 
these powers and their interrelated and conflicting power struggles and their 
participation in a general discourse of sectarianism. 
4.2.2 Historicising governance frameworks in Lebanon 
In order to present an alternative dynamic reading of the Lebanese governance 
framework, it is useful to contextualise the historical sequence on the formation of 
'8 This system was practiced by Ottoman governors and consists of delegating daily law order to 
different communities through recognising religious representatives and by their own personal status 
codes, and French mandate installed the political system on the basis of religious power sharing. 
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modem Lebanon. The power dynamics between various actors at different historical 
moments continuously set and rearranged laws and frameworks. 
The post-colonial Lebanese state emerged from a melange of geographically 
dispersed territories hosting a mix of populations belonging to various religious 
denominations with different historical identities. Before its independence in 1943, 
modem Lebanon was part of larger colonised territories including more than four 
hundred years of Ottoman rule (1516-1918) and around 25 years of French 
colonialism (1920-1946). During this period what became modem Lebanon belonged 
to four governorates. The north and the east belonged to the Aleppo and Damascus 
governorates in modem Syria respectively and the south was attached to the 
governorate of Akka (in Ottoman Palestine), and all parts consisted of Muslim 
majority. In the centre, Mount Lebanon enjoyed an autonomous status and special 
protection from both colonial powers, mainly because it hosted Christian and Druze 79 
religious minorities. Ottoman and subsequently French colonial rule operated 
through a double strategy. They reinforced one set of general codes regulating 
economic and security issues, but delegated personal status issues to the discretion of 
religious institutional leadership or Millet system (Salibi 1988). More importantly, 
they have reinforced segregation among different religious groups and entrenched 
their conceptions of group identity through the writings of orientalist travellers, and 
the coaching of implanted missionaries (Makdisi 2000; Salibi 1988). 
Three historical moments shaped the Lebanese political and legal system under the 
influence of multiple power conflicts between various actors. The first historical 
moment represents the period leading to the 1860 Christian-Druze war in Mount 
Lebanon. Mainstream accounts use this period to stress the primordial and 
conflicting nature of sectarian identity among the populations belonging to the 
various religious communities. It is also often referred to as a precursor to the 1975-
1990 civil war. Makdisi (2000) interprets these clashes as a result of the 
destabilisation of power vacuum and restoration politics that followed the occupation 
of Mount Lebanon by the anti-Ottoman Egyptian governor Mohammad Ali and the 
79 The Druze community is included under the overall Muslim community. However, it is a sectarian 
community formed five centuries after Islam and relies on a different set of religious scripts, rituals 
and family code. 
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fall of his ally and prince of Mount Lebanon Bashir al-Shahabi in 1940. Following 
this moment, Ottoman administration and European missionaries and powers 
competed over alliances with local notables and elites who also fought over 
resources and taxation benefits. 
These events marked a shift in the meaning of religion by adding the political 
dimension to the meaning of sectarian identity as the only viable marker' (Makdisi 
2000: 2). The meaning of religious affiliation shifted from a mundane identity that 
was subordinate to other identities based on socio-economic stratification such as 
family, social rank, property ownership. Religious affiliation was endowed with a 
new prominent political dimension. In this sense, this shift constituted a process of 
subjectification of populations towards religious identification. 
Colonial powers were concerned with insuring control over colonies. Far reaching 
pervasive interventions altered the self-perception and subjectivity of the colonised 
populations and impregnated the orientalist discourse in the written and oral history 
of the region (Said 1979). Colonial powers primarily viewed the inhabitants of the 
region as primordial ethno-religious groups, as documented in various accounts from 
travellers and missionaries to diplomatic reports that held religious labelling of the 
population (Makdisi 2000). 
The second historical moment occurred in the period following the colonial handover 
from Ottoman to French. Gender anxiety expressed in a crisis of paternalism took 
place at the wake of the First World War due to the power vacuum left by the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the weakening of men's role in the 
political and public sphere (Thompson 2000). This crisis festered due to the desertion 
of Ottoman state apparatuses during 1919-1920 and the massive losses that accrued 
to the local soldiers forcefully conscripted in the Ottoman army. As the French 
mandate took over the area, it held inconsistent internal politics and annexed Muslim 
parts to the new Christian numbered Lebanese state to make it more viable (Ziadeh 
2006). This power readjustment reinforced the political dimension of sectarian 
identity in Mount Lebanon, and led to a crisis of paternalism and repression of 
women's rights in Lebanon and Syria. 
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The third historical moment relates to independence struggle between the 1930s and 
1940s in the later mandate period until independence. During the quest for 
independence, various geographic, economic and political factors reordered the legal 
and political system according to the sectarian category. In an orientalist take on the 
region, the French mandate entrenched the sectarian element of the political sphere 
by ignoring rural-urban tensions and highlighting instead the religious primacy of 
local populations. 
4.3 The continuum of legal, political and social categorisation 
4.3.1 The colonial bargainings and the construction of 'sectarian' political 
groups 
These three historical moments repositioned local elites and religious leadership and 
altered their hierarchy in the local power map of the region. In this sense, the 
sectarian legal system was a fluid manifestation of this interaction rather than as an 
inevitable and invariable result of primordial 'historical communities' or a master 
plan by one party involved. The impact of colonial powers in shaping the Lebanese 
state's sectarian system of governance can be analysed following Mamdani's (1996) 
notions of direct and indirect rule. In his research in British colonialism in Africa, he 
noted two different types of strategies. Direct rule was applied in urban areas 
imposing modernity and civilisation on citizens, forcing them to conform to these 
nonns while at the same time excluding them from the decision-making. On the 
other hand, indirect rule was applied to the rural areas where the population was 
perceived as 'savage' and uncivilised and was subsequently left out from direct rule 
with the instalment of indirect customary local authority. It is possible to say that the 
colonial rule in Lebanon followed this division. The Ottoman rule sought direct 
relation with citizens, reducing the power of the tribal and religious leaders, while 
French rule acted indirectly and mediated through the existing elite (Takieddine 
1977). 
However, separating the ruling styles of the two colonial powers overlooks one main 
complexity in studying the Lebanese case. Throughout time, direct and indirect rule 
effectively existed within the strategies and practices of each of the two colonial 
powers. They organised governance in two layers, one of direct rule through colonial 
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structures, and another indirect one through the production of a class of local elites. 
From the second half of the nineteenth century and until the end of the mandate, 
urban Lebanese port cities were governed separately from Mount Lebanon and 
included a stronghold of urban Muslim and Christian merchants who were closely 
tied and incorporated within the structure of the administration. Many of this 
mercantile class held functionary positions, including women who held supporting 
administrative positions of secretaries and translators especially during the French 
mandate (Thompson 2000). On the other hand, the rural population of Mount 
Lebanon was subcontracted to the local notables and namely Princes of the Maan and 
Chahab families governing the area (Choueiri 1988). However, beyond the 
distinction of direct-indirect rule, colonial powers competed over controlling urban 
and rural areas through informal linkages with the local elite. Indirect rule included 
tight infiltration, control and re-engineering of the local political and socio-economic 
processes in colonial Lebanon by using the marker of sectarian identity. 
Power balance among local elite was adjusted by fragmenting the cohesion within 
the ruling families in Mount Lebanon. Ottomans decapitated the Emir of Mount 
Lebanon, Bashir al-Shahabi, after his rebellion and alliance with Mohammad Ali, the 
anti-Ottoman governor of Egypt, and instated his second cousin Bashir Qasim. As 
France increasingly backed the Maronite communities in the area, some branches of 
the Druze ruling principalities such as Chehabs and Abi Allamah converted to 
Christianity (Abou Nohra 1988). As a result, the political power and economic 
balance between the two population groups was altered adding a religious meaning 
to the political rivalry over the reign of Mount Lebanon. Colonial powers fuelled this 
rivalry further by holding promises of additional privileges to each group in return 
for allegiances. 
During Muhammad Ali's invasion of Mount Lebanon in 1830, Egyptian troops and 
French powers supported Maronite peasants promising to save them from the Druze 
landlords and Ottoman domination. On the other hand, the Ottomans allied with the 
Druze landlords and notables who have fled the region and were keen on preserving 
their privileges. The British colonial authorities strategically supported the Druze 
landlords in an effort to destabilise the French infiltration of the region. The result 
was a series of allegiances aimed at creating sectarian pockets into the Ottoman 
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Empire. The alliance map between the colonial powers and the local notables 
brought together the French and the Maronite, the British and the Druze, the 
Russians and the Greek Orthodox populations (Firro 2003). With the end of the 
Egyptian invasion and the restoration of the Ottoman reign over Mount Lebanon, 
grievances and frustrations resulted from these un-kept promises. Various colonial 
powers resorted to installing a sectarian legal structure as a way to settle these 
grievances and maintain special ties with the local leaders. 
Internal competition within colonial powers endowed the religious institution with 
political authority. During the French mandate, French governors from opposing 
political parties continuously altered the political legitimacy of local elites and 
religious leaders. Right-winged governors Gouraud and Jouvenel allied with feudal 
landlords and religious leaders, installing the official status of the Maronite Church 
(Ziadeh 2006). Leftist republican governors such as Weygand and Sarail 
endeavoured to crush religious and tribal leaderships through claims of secularist 
rule, appealing instead to the merchant and middle-class notables (Thompson 2000). 
In the process, the role of religious leaders drastically changed. They became 
undeniably prominent and autonomous actors able to tip the power balance. 
Previously their role was restricted to legitimising the notables through educating 
their children and mobilising the masses around them by acting as mediators between 
notables and the population. Prior to these changes, notables were primarily 
dependent not on their religious affiliation, but on local alliances and imperial 
patronage networks (Makdisi 2000: 35). Gradually religious leaders gained influence 
and reversed the power hierarchy. The Maronite Church gained influence with the 
Maronite community'S affiliation to Catholic Rome in 1584 and the establishment of 
the Lebanese Synodus in 1736. Subsequently, the leadership of Maronite populations 
developed into two competing strands. Traditional feudal lords controlled them, and 
religious leaders catered for them. 
The political power of the Maronite Church was also boosted by economic 
appropriation. The Maronite church prospered as it managed, together with European 
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missionaries,80 lucrative silk factories and gaining popular support by employing 
commoners (Choueiri 1988). It played a key role in introducing employment of 
women in their communities through long underpaid hours in their silk factories 
(Thompson 2000). The power of the notables over populations decreased as they lost 
their workforce to the Church's factories and their economic prosperity to the newly 
established class of urban traders. They were forced to sell their properties to pay 
taxes, and were further marginalised when the Maronite church bought their lands 
and further expanded its power. The Maronite Church increasingly gained influence 
later on during the French mandate (Ziadeh 2006). When the French governor 
Weygand planned to abolish sectarian quotas from the established administrative 
system, the Maronite Church refused and turned to Rome who offered to beatify 
eight Maronite priests (Thompson 2000). The propositions were subsequently 
withdrawn. 
In contrast, Muslim and Druze religious leaders did not benefit from such foreign 
support and were unable to form an autonomous formal political platform. They kept 
their traditional roles as mediators between notables and commoners until late 19th 
century. Furthermore, late Ottoman education policies introduced modern schooling 
reforms (Ru$hdiyye schools) that took over the traditional religious schools 
(medreses) led by mid-level Ulemas (the religious learned). Religious leaders were 
thus confined them to the management of religious endowments and a few religious 
laws (Somel 2001). The Islamic religious authority grew strength only after the 
abolishment of the Ottoman Empire, benefiting from the rise of the Arab nationalist 
movement under French nurturing. For example, the Muslim Council, the main 
platform for the Sunni religious leadership in Lebanon, was established in 1928 as a 
civil society organisation and was much later incorporated in the Lebanese state 
structure as an official consultative body including Dar Al Fatwa (Sunni Jurisdiction 
Council) in the 1950s.81 The Shica council was only formalised much later in 1967. 
80 Prior to the mandate, missionaries established their power in the region due to tension with the 
western governments of the time. French religious missionaries fled France to Lebanon awaiting the 
return of the 'ancien regime' and did not have any links with the official representatives of the 
'republique' (Makdisi 2000). With time, Western missionaries like the Lazarites became the backbone 
of social provision of the country and established themselves as vital religious institutions until 
present-day Lebanon. 
Q1 This highly contrasted with Egypt's experience of installing the Azhar as the official Muslim 
Council in the 1920s. 
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4.3.2 Formalising sectarian administrative governance structures 
The colonial power bargainings and secterianisation processes influenced the 
political governance structure of the modem Lebanese state. The seeds of this crucial 
tension appear in the 1840s between Ottoman secular reforms and the European 
sectarianisation policies of the region and local populations. In 1841, British 
diplomat Richard Wood suggested the formation of a council that would include 
"three members 'elected' by Maronite, orthodox, and Greek catholic patriarchs [ ... ] 
and one Druze, one Sunni, and one Shica to strike a communal balance.' (Makdisi 
2000: 61). Leaders of both religious communities refused this proposal and went into 
contentious positions eventually leading to the 1860s clashes. On the other hand, 
secular Ottoman reforms also known as Tanzimat (directives) or the Gulhane Edict 
were issued in 1839 and devised as efforts for modernisation facing Mohammad 
Ali's threat and the pressure of European powers after the Paris agreement. These 
reforms included equality of all citizens regardless of religion, insuring their security 
and property, and reorganising equitable taxation according to means. A series of 
policies were put in place to implement these reforms in Lebanon and the region. 
Most significantly one policy attempted at curbing the power of the religious elite 
and subjecting it to the control of the governor (Makdisi 2000). 
These comprehensive Ottoman secularisation processes did not reach Lebanon. 
Instead, in 1845 the Ottoman foreign minister Shakib Effendi issued what became 
known as the Reglement Organique (Firro 1992). This plan instated the Lebanese 
Mutasarrifiya (district), a semi-autonomous entity in Mount Lebanon based on a 
communitarian sectarian ruling system starting in 1861. In order to ensure a 
geographic repartition segregating Druze and Maronite populations, Article 5 clearly 
stipulated the creation of religiously homogenous administrative units. In order to 
carry out this division, Article 17 ordered a census "place by place, sect by sect" 
(Makdisi 2000:82)82. 
82 The secular Tanzimat and the sectarian Reglement marked a contradiction in the Ottomans 
strategies. This contradiction has been attributed to unclear implementation mechanisms, and the clash 
of modem concepts of citizenship with the reinforced status of the sultan as an equitable source of 
legitimacy (Makdisi 2000). However, these weaknesses might not have been enough to block an 
attempt to secularisation in Lebanon, as they constituted the foundations of the Young Turks 
revolution and the later establishment of modern Turkey. 
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As a result, the Ottoman secular reforms were not implemented in Lebanon. This 
crucial shift in the Ottoman's agenda from the Millet (communitarian) system to 
secular frameworks was overlooked by mainstream historical analyses of the 
formation of the Lebanese state. It however is crucial in understanding the power 
dynamics over reforms at the time because it constitutes a discontinuity in the 
mainstream narrative that attributes the later Lebanese system to a plain sectarian 
Ottoman legacy entrenching the sectarian Millet system.83 
Under the Reglement, the region was divided on a sectarian basis into six sections 
with the main two distinct northern Christian and southern Druze parts. A multi-
religious administrative council in each district was set to include one judge and one 
advisor from each of the Maronites, Druze, Sunnis, Greek orthodox, and Greek 
Catholics. Shicas were granted one advisor but were represented by the Sunni judge. 
The sectarian aspect of the administrative structure was defined in Article 11 and 
stipulated that 'all members of the court and administrative assemblies will be 
chosen and appointed by the leaders of their sect in agreement with the notables of 
the sect' (Makdisi 2000: 162). The Reglement Organique reaffirmed religious and 
sectarian identities at the expense of the traditional class structure. 
This new dimension was reaffirmed through a decree by the foreign minister 
merging the notion of race with sect and limiting the role of the notables through a 
set legal structure (Makdisi 2000:81): 
Each district of Mount Lebanon was to be governed by a qai'm maqilm or governor, and 
small regions were to be maintained by the traditional autonomy of notables as 
muqiltaCjls or local administrators responsible for maintaining law and order. Wherever 
the notables and the population were of different "race" and "sect" (hemcins ve 
hemmezheb), a wakIl, or representative of the same "race" of the population, would be 
appointed to oversee the administration of the notable. In case of a petty dispute 
83 This system was historically implemented under the successive Islamic empires, the latest being the 
Ottoman rule (Joseph 2000). This system adopted the Muslim doctrine as the official state religion to 
organise issues of public, penal and economic regulation while allowing religious minorities to apply 
their own religious directives for 'private' issues such as family law. This system clearly delineated 
the public and private spheres within religious and gender frames. However, colonial strategies 
modified and even overruled these laws at different stages under political and economic circumstances 
of the era. Most importantly, these strategies changed due to swinging internal power dynamics 
between different elements within each regime. 
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between two people of the same "race" and "sect", and of the same sect as the notable, 
then that notable would adjudicate. If they were of the wakTl's sect, then the wakTl 
would settle the dispute. However, if it were a mixed dispute, then the wakTl and the 
notable would work together, and if they couldn't agree, then they would submit it to 
their respective qai'm maqi!im or the same sect (hemmillet). If they still couldn't agree, 
then the Ottoman governor of the Saydon (Southern adjacent governorate) would have 
the final word. 
This structure also included a twist. For each district, a certain number of councillors 
from different sects were allocated. They were 'elected' by sheikhs who would be in 
tum directly elected by the communities in each village regardless of religion. In 
practice, the sheikhs were elected according to the most prominent religious sect in 
the village. Consequently the councillors -even if belonging to different sects -
needed the approval of these sheikhs and by proxy the religious community to be 
elected by them (Akarli 1988). This decree is an example of the importance that 
Foucault (2000) places in his work on govemmentality on the census as a technique 
for controlling populations. 
This decree specifically contributed in installing the sectarian dimension within the 
governance system. The newly fonned administrative council gained strength by 
acquiring new capacity to overrule the decisions of the Ottoman governor (Akarli 
1988). The aforementioned sectarian-based administrative council that was in place 
between 1861 and 1920 fonned the nucleus of the later representative council at the 
start of the French mandate between 1920 and 1926. It also extends to the present-
day Lebanese parliament. In order to be included within this new structure, notables 
strategically shifted their sense of religious group identity from a social to a political 
one. They re-aligned their stands within their own religious group and actively 
repressed intra-sectarian family and class rivalries in order to promote unity (Makdisi 
2000). With this transfonnation, the class of notables was not abolished. It was rather 
modernised and reshaped according to the sectarian logic of the Reglement. 84 
84 During the independence era, these laws were again modified according to different political 
considerations and alliances. The current Lebanese electoral law is crafted on similar power 
bargaining instated in the Reglement and the later French mandate. Nowadays, gerrymandering is 
practiced since Ottoman and French fluctuating repartition of Mount Lebanon. With the application of 
the election structure of the Reglement, electoral dynamics lack party politics and rely instead on 
volatile alliances. 
120 
Family law frameworks also followed these colonial bargainings. In 1917, the Young 
Turks briefly implemented two contentious Ottoman reforms strongly opposed by 
religious leaders. In the first, they granted themselves the power to approve the 
appointment of the Maronite patriarch. The second aimed at unifying various family 
law provisions into one Western-inspired civil code known as the Ottoman Law for 
the Rights of the Family (OLRF 25/1O/1917).8s In this code, two articles were of 
particular relevance. Article 130 gave the state direct power over the court system as 
it provided for state-appointed judges to regulate them. Article 4 set the marriage age 
for women to a minimum of seventeen, a provision that the French mandate later 
upheld but failed to implement. 
This reform was short lived. As the French mandate (1920-1943) took over the area, 
it cancelled the Ottoman Law of the Rights of the Family and absolved themselves 
from the right to appoint the Maronite patriarch (Thompson 2000). However, this 
entrenchment needs to be analysed according to multiple interactions from different 
parties. In the 1920s, the early French mandate cancelled state involvement in 
divorce for Christians and Jews after pressure from patriarchs while keeping it for 
Muslims with the backing of the Beirut Qadi and Mufti (Thompson 2000). This 
French policy was part of their larger effort to contain and formalise the growing 
independent power of religious leaders. 
The French colonial rule 'established' religious courts through instituting structures 
like the Muslim Council, the official body representing Sunni communities in 
Lebanon. As the Muslim Council started to claim representativeness over all 
Muslims in Lebanon, Shica clerics organised their separate religious courts in 1926 
(Shanahan 2005). Subsequently, the French mandate entrenched religious family law 
through a string of manoeuvres. In 1936, French officials proposed a religious-based 
family law that provoked complaints from Muslims who saw it as levelling their 
status with other religions by allowing Muslims to convert to Christianity through 
marriage (Decision 60, 13/3/1936). The French governor Puaux reiterated in 
8S Beyond the several refonns stated in the OLRF, the code is organised according to a communitarian 
logic granting clauses for Muslims (including polygamy in Art. 14 for example), Christians, and Jews. 
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proposing a civil family law in 1938 (Decision 146, 18/11/1938).86 As Muslim 
religious leaders went into huge popular demonstrations, Puaux withdrew the decree 
and kept the exceptional status of the Muslim religious family law (Decision 53 L.R, 
30/03/1939). 
This colonial strategy largely shaped the political and legal state structures of the 
post-colonial Lebanese state. French colonial powers imprinted this formula into the 
foundations of the modem Lebanese state, through basing the political system on an 
informal agreement of religious power sharing allocating presidential, executive and 
legislative authorities to Maronites,87 Sunnis, and Shicas respectively. In addition, 
they drafted the election law to represent religious communities by a proportion of 6 
to 5 between Christians and Muslims, privileging the urbanised Maronite slight 
majority.88 This arrangement carried on throughout the young statehood and the civil 
war (1975-1990). Politico-religious powers, taking the shape of multiple militias 
from every sectarian community have been the de-facto military, political, and 
organisational powers in the neighbourhoods or territories under their command. 
This power structure continued after the war where warlords accessed state structure 
and were granted total amnesty for their war crimes (Khalaf 2002). However, during 
the war and post-war times the effective balance of power shifted between these 
groups. Benefiting from a demographic boom of Shica populations, Muslim 
communities slightly outnumbered Christians. Shica communities gained wealth and 
political influence, while Christian communities noticed a sharp rise in immigration 
to western countries. This resulted in an amendment of the constitution curbing the 
powers of the Maronite president of the republic and bringing religious quota in the 
parliament and other state appointments to an equal ratio of one to one. 
4.3.3 Extending the legal sectarian category and gendering social spaces and 
issues 
The colonial competition further reordered the social space by extending the 
sectarian category to social policies. This resulted in further gendering of collective 
86 This governor also belonged to the right-winged government, so these changes were not much of an 
intra-colonial power struggle. 
87 Maronites constitute a Christian sectarian community specific to the Lebanon and Syria region 
(with a minority in Cyprus), It is affiliated to the Catholic Church. 
88 The last official Lebanese census was conducted in 1932 and is still relied upon until present day 
despite demographic changes and immigration outflows (Salibi 1988). 
122 
action in Lebanon, the fonnulation of the problem of family law, and the moralities 
of gender equality. 
Constructing sectarian differentials and the gender remodelling of social space 
Colonial powers implemented these strategies by competing over social services 
provision, primarily education and health. French and protestant missionaries 
targeted Christian communities of Mount Lebanon and used these particular social 
services as part of their 'civilising' mission to these groups in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries (Makdisi 2000). 89 This infiltration was facilitated by the 
Ottomans' indirect rule and the delegation of social issues in Mount Lebanon entirely 
to local notables (Ziadeh 2006). 
In urban areas, early Ottoman social policies remained minimal and under-budgeted 
due to financial constraints and war priorities. Education was left to local Ulemas 
who ran traditional religious schools. Later on, the Young Turks took to 
'modernising' the urban population -mainly inhabited by Sunni Muslims. They 
increased the number of state schools and introduced public education for women. 
Health was also addressed through modernising hospitals and establishing medical 
schools without investing much in Mount Lebanon. 
However, with the weakening of the Ottoman rule, missionary schools grew in 
numbers. The social policies of the newly established French mandate were skewed 
towards Maronite populations and favoured Lebanon over Syria. In 1935 it heavily 
subsidised private missionary or local Christian schools by one third of their costs 
reaching 25,000 LLS while limiting subsidies to Muslim foundations by only 1,900 
LLS (Thompson 2000). At the same time, the mandate reduced support to existing 
public schools inherent from the Ottoman rule and catering for urban Muslim areas 
and froze the establishment of new ones. This policy clearly favoured Christians who 
89 In the early phase of colonial competition, missionaries acted as an independent order from French 
and ottoman powers, facilitated by the Ottoman indirect rule. After the failed reinstatement of the 
French monarchy in 1876, missionaries stopped competing with the French government and became 
the main apparatus of official French infiltration during Ottoman rule and subcontractor of social 
services provision later on during the mandate. As a result, local religious leadership was strengthened 
in the social sphere, with its decision making power legitimised through the social services provided 
by the missionaries, and the ensuring admission ofreJigious leaders into citizens' daily circles. 
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constituted 54% of students while forming 23% of the entire population of Lebanon 
and Syria. 
On the health front, policies were also unevenly distributed. During the mandate, 
twenty five out of thirty hospitals were private in Lebanon, compared to around half 
of the twenty-seven in Syria although the Syrian population was more than twice the 
size (Thompson 2000). The French rule thus prepared a class of mediating agents 
that later constituted the basis of the clientelistic political elite, dramatically 
increasing the gap between Christian and Muslim populations. The impact on women 
was particularly relevant. In addition to women's economic activity in the silk 
industry, women's education in Lebanon rose to 41 % in private schooling and 29% 
in public schools, also implying a clear sectarian gap (Thompson 2000). 
Hence, the preferential access to social servlces created a sectarian power gap 
between various groups of the population. Colonial subjects were admitted into the 
'civil sphere' and were thereby distinguished from the rest of the 'wild' rural 
population (Makdisi 2000). This social screening added a new meaning to sectarian 
identity by coupling it with binary notions of civility and incivility of different 
sectarian groupS.9O 
The social space, which includes women groups, was remodelled according to the 
sectarian-elitist distribution. Historically, Lebanese civil society groups grew out of 
their earlier Ottoman charitable, leisure and professional character (Thompson 2000). 
With the French mandate, the number of organisations increased from thirty one 
prior to 1914 to reach 401 in Beirut and an additional 338 in Lebanon between 1920-
1942 (AI-Khatib 1984). These new civil society organisations were mainly 
concentrated within the urban middle class elite with more than half located 10 
Beirut. 
During that period, women organisations also proliferated due to the western and 
regional momentum of feminist, nationalist and independence movements of the era. 
Most women organisations that started in Lebanon and Syria were closely related to 
90 The collective narrative of civility shaped later discourses of uniqueness and worthiness of 
citizenship and group identity of Lebanists and most Maronite political discourses until present times. 
Discourses of uniqueness were used to bargain for the consociational system of governance based on 
deserved privileges. 
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the cross-sectarian Arab and Syrian nationalists elites. Al itti/:liid al-Nisii 'T fi Surya wa 
Lubniin (The Women Union in Syria and Lebanon), a cross-sectarian Arab 
nationalist umbrella gathered forty women groups with a broader mission to tackle 
social conditions and the reform of religious laws (Thompson 2000). It evolved from 
an informal union in 1921 to a formal one in 1924, established by a core group of 
women from upper class Beiruti families such as Thabet, Sayigh, Qaddura, Shahfa, 
Bustros, and Jazairi and aI-Hafiz from Damascus. Through funding and patronage 
from their family ties, private members and religious endowments, women groups 
were closely tied to bourgeoisie and religious institutions (Thompson 2000). Their 
activities started as charity during the war and then later on expanded to women 
magazines and literary salons. Between 1919 and 1930 eight women magazines were 
established in addition to the three earlier ones. 
The colonial policies actively rearranged the collective action sphere in a process of 
'collective social motherhood' consisting of appropriating its leadership and 
attaching it to the local elites (Thompson 2000). The French mandate started by 
shutting down local women groups such as Abid's school and red star societies. It 
then installed two charitable and cultural women's organisations headed by the wives 
of high commissioners as honorary presidents, namely the French-Lebanese Red 
Cross Commission and Goutte de Lait (Drop of Milk) (AI-Khatib 1984). The leaders 
of the banned women groups were also related to Arab and Syrian nationalists. First 
post-independence Prime Minister Riad al-Solh - an overt opponent of political rights 
- resorted to his wife to advocate economic rights. With her sister and other friends, 
the wife of the prime minister founded and chaired as honorary president the society 
for the advancement of Lebanese Industry -Artisanat (AI-Khatib 1984). Similarly, 
the first post-independence president Bishara aI-Khouri and his wife represented the 
epitome of this gendered joint venture, as they were known among public and 
women's activist circles as the father and the mother of the republic. The president's 
wife played an active role in diffusing women's groups frustration against her 
husband's constant deferral of women's suffrage by publicly supporting suffrage 
demands and promising to hold him accountable to them (Thompson 2000). She also 
'nationalised' the previous French-Lebanese Red Cross Commission by founding the 
Lebanese Red Cross Society and chairing as an honorary president, while the wife of 
the prime minister acted as honorary vice-chair (AI-Khatib 1984). 
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Setting family law as policy problem and gendered moralities 
At this period, women groups actively engaged with the broader political and social 
competing norms of the local elite. Between the start and end of the French mandate 
(1920-1943), women groups changed their priorities in three phases. They gradually 
moved away from national political issues towards less controversial social issues. 
They started with voting rights (1920-1923),91 then moved to unveiling (1923-
1928)92, and later to education and health, as well as family law (1928-1935) (AI-
Khatib 1984). 
Subsequently, priorities of gender equality were reformulated according to the 
broader political ideological debates on national identity and citizenship of the time. 
Women groups allied with various political parties in promoting their issues. These 
years were formative of the feminist movement in Lebanon. The discourses on 
gender equality and citizenship set precedent to that of the modem-day feminist 
movements in the country. In particular, the two issues of voting rights and unveiling 
set a historical trend in problem setting bearing serious implications on the 
construction of gendered moralities that are still relevant until present day. 
The basis for argumentation on issues of voting rights and unveiling was set in a 
dichotomy of modernity versus tradition. This dichotomy implied gendered 
moralities of women's worthiness versus ignorance.93 
Women groups argued for women's voting rights and later on unveiling by claiming 
women's worthiness to Lebanese society on two grounds. 94 Women had the right to 
claim full citizenship through their nationalist stands in the First W orld War and their 
91 Voting rights were initially raised by women groups one month before the official start of the 
French mandate in April 1920 in the Syrian congress (AI-Khatib 1984), and then again in 1923 at the 
Lebanese Representative Council before they were dropped. 
92 The shift from voting to unveiling was also influenced by political changes in surrounding 
countries. Mustafa Kamal's Turkey was highly praised for promoting women's ultimate modernist 
nationalist profile. Egypt's vocal progressive women's rights activism, led by icons such as Huda 
Shaarawi, was backed by a decree in favour of unveiling released by the official Al-Azhar religious 
authority in 1937 (Thompson 2000). 
93 Women's voting rights in Lebanon were established in 1963 
94 In the following years, women activists took every occasion to unveil during their participation in 
public meetings and demonstrations, such as at the King - Crane committee and political campaigns 
aiming at freeing nationalist prisoners. 
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continuous economic activity. 95 Unveiling was also justified to remove the 
hindrances of equal nation building duties for women and men. 
Modernity was also among the claims of gender equality in voting and unveiling. 
Both issues were branded as a sign of western-inspired modernity based on the need 
to identify and follow civilised countries (AI-Khatib 1984). At the same time women 
groups relied on religion to back feminist claims by highlighting the existence of 
women judges in Islam.96 
In contrast, politicians opposed gender equality in voting and unveiling by portraying 
women as ignorant and morally corrupt. Women's right to vote were opposed 
because women were perceived to hold inherently lower intellectual abilities that 
would corrupt politics. Furthermore, women were considered prone to moral 
corruption or degradation. Politicians opposed women's right to vote because it 
constituted a cascading risk leading to unveiling, the abolition of religious family 
law, and moral deterioration. They stressed the need to honour the veiling tradition as 
moral safeguard to society. They also drew on pro-veiling interpretations of religious 
scripts and attacked women groups on anti-colonialist and anti-modernist grounds. 
The discursive negotiations over women's rights constructed women's subjectivity in 
terms of ignorance and moral corruption. Opponents to the unveiling considered 
education as the prerequisite for unveiling, without which women's moral corruption 
would prevail (Thompson 2000). In the later debates, women groups aligned with the 
opponents' discourses and acknowledged women's shortfalls. Mechanisms to 
95 Women actively participated in independence demonstrations and acted as human shields to 
nationalist men activists driven by accompanying notions of patriotism and heroism (Thompson 
2000). Towards the end of the mandate women groups disagreed about the local popUlations national 
identity as in whether to have a unified Lebano-Syrian state or divide it into modem Lebanon and 
Syria. They had to narrow down their commonalities and agreed on a minimalist anti-colonial agenda. 
Once this compromise was reached, the Lebanese and Syrian women's union agreed on keeping away 
from politics and focus on social and cultural aspects (Thompson 2000). 
96 Women activists repeatedly drew on stories of famous women in Islam such as the prophet's wife 
Aisha and Christian icons such as Joan of Arc (Thompson 2000). Traditionalist opponents also 
constructed religious interpretations to their favour by including historical, national and ethnic (Arab) 
anti-women dimensions within religious interpretations. From this perspective, religion would be 
constructed, understood and propagated differently by various actors. Religion, as Bouhidiba (1998) 
pointed out in the case of Islam would be malleable and made of the particular contexts hosting it. 
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'educate' women were put in place by expanding the education of women and 
subsidising women's magazines (AI-Khatib 1984).97 
As women groups adopted these gendered discourses of women's subjectivity, they 
projected the solutions on women's agency. They considered veiling as a main 
contributor to women's ignorance and the under-fulfilment of their roles as mothers. 
As a compromise, they turned to social policies of education, economic 
enhancement, and health and dropped voting rights and unveiling.98 Interestingly, 
they prioritised family law reforms at this later stage. In their annual forums in 1928, 
they called for family law reforms fixing women's marriage age to a minimum of 17 
years, providing equal inheritance, repressing polygyny, and granting women greater 
power to initiate divorce (Thompson 2000). 
These findings resonate with the Egyptian experIence of women groups. Elitist 
women groups started by advocating reforms in family law in the early 1920, and 
later on these calls were dropped in favour of political participation in the 1930s 
(Khater and Nelson 1988). The case of Egypt reveals that a committee for family law 
reforms was appointed in 1926 and had on board the Sheikh al-Azhar and a host of 
other Ulamas. The proposed reforms installed popular uproar by conservative groups 
leading King Fuad to dismiss them in 1929 (Shaham 1999). 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the socio-political history of the formation of the Lebanese 
state and the production of the sectarian categorisation of social groups in the 
political system. It revealed the complexity at three levels. The first level argues for a 
contextual understanding of the consociational governance framework rather than an 
essentialist one. This specific form of governance evolved within three historical 
moments of colonial competition and produced various discourses placing religion 
97 Women groups overtly solicited the French Mandate's support through their magazines and were 
labelled anti-nationalists and modernists. A strong traditionalist pro-veiling movement was stirred by 
populist religious leaders. Working class men and women organised into moral squads attacking 
upper-class women with western clothing, especially in Damascus. The issue became linked to the 
cultural dimension of Arab national identity annexed to Islam, where Arab tradition was emphasised 
despite the Young Turks' refonns that regulated women's dress code and ultimately coded unveiling 
through a set of acceptable dress for women employees (Thompson 2000) 
98 Women groups put forward pragmatic arguments such as the bad influence of veiling on women's 
health mainly associated with difficulty in breathing. 
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and group identity at the centre of citizenship. The second level argues that these 
institutional structures are not a result of a timeless and fixed 'religious' order. 
Rather, these structures were produced through dynamic bargaining between various 
competing colonial and local actors. The third level detailed the formation of a 
sectarianized civil society space that is influenced by the political bargainings. In this 
space, women's collective action was part of the political fabric of society. The shifts 
in women groups' agenda was a result of political bargainings constructing a 
particular gendered subjectivity and agency. These bargainings formed part of the 
genealogy of an order of 'gender' governance where policy actors engaged with 
women's issues are contained within these gendered social spaces. 
The prominent role of religion in the politico-legal system and particularly family 
law was thus contextualised within the power dynamics of the socio-political 
historical context of the time. By shaking these primordial communitarian claims of 
religious group affiliation, it is possible to hold a discussion of the dynamic process 
of gendering effect of family law in the following chapters. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE Post-conflict family law policies and the making of an order 
of governance 
5.1 Introduction 
Civil family law [reforms] question the essential foundations of Lebanon. 
[They] target the Lebanese political structure. 
(BMl2005) 
This statement is part of a common narrative among policy and academic circles in 
Lebanon. At the risk of general ising, they frame the issue as follows: gender 
discrimination in family law lies, essentially, in a fixed sectarian order that confines 
the Lebanese political structure and blocks the secular potential of the state. This 
narrative implies a sectarian-secular structural dichotomy. It holds a narrow 
understanding of the law as dissociated from social and political processes and power 
dynamics (Mundy 2002). 
The aim of this chapter is to contest these claims by tracing the continuity of the 
dynamic process of policy making of personal citizenship from the formative years 
of the Lebanese state to the post-conflict period. It seeks to understand the dynamic 
process of policy making in terms of the influence of various discourses on 
citizenship and gender equality and the power relations between various actors. It 
analyses the creation of policy episodes, the formulation of the policy problem, the 
framing of concerned populations, and policy outcomes. The chapter argues that only 
when the 'enactment' of policies is taken into account is it possible to assess the full 
gendering impact of family law order of governance. 
The chapter starts by reviewing the configuration of citizenship in the pre-l990 
period. Then it carries forward by detailing the dynamics of the policy process 
relating to the renegotiation of citizenship and family law in the post-conflict period. 
The third section analyses the formulation of gender equality in family law as a 
policy problem. The final section revisits policy outcomes in the post-conflict period 
and their implications on personal citizenship. 
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5.2 The legacy of legal personhood prior to the post-conflict era 
As a start for understanding post-conflict family law policies, the historical 
development of legal personhood is examined. Crucial developments to citizens' 
legal personhood occurred in the early colonial era of the Ottoman Empire and 
continued through the French colonial mandate and the post-independence era. Five 
key changes compounded legal personhood of personal citizenship in its pre-1990 
form and are explained below. 
The historical basis for legal personhood evolved within a communitarian framework 
implemented by the Ottoman rule before 1860. Until that date legal personhood was 
organised under traditional Islamic rule in the geographic areas comprising post-
independence Lebanon (Mallat 2007).99 As mentioned in the previous chapter, this 
model of Muslim rule went by the concept of communitarianism (Millet) or the 
political governance of protection of minority groups (Dhimmf. ahl al-dhimmah) 
(Salibi 1988). This system allowed minorities to organise their own social, economic 
and family affairs according to their religious beliefs as long as they showed 
allegiance to the state and paid their taxes. 100 Thus, the legal framework of personal 
citizenship was included under an overarching Islamic framework, or was left to an 
informal sphere of governance for non-Muslim subjects. 
The first change occurred in 1860 when legal personhood in the reglon was 
formalised into a communitarian framework. Following the reglement organique in 
Mount Lebanon, subjects were classified according to sectarian categories at all 
levels. lol Religious leaders were appointed by the Ottoman governor to oversee the 
family affairs of populations (Makdisi 2000). This arrangement did not differ in 
substance from the earlier Islamic Millet communitarian framework. It just 
formalised it by legally classifying all inhabitants, including Muslims, under a 
99 These areas were part of four Ottoman governorates. Beirut and the coast followed the Ottoman 
governorate of Akka. The Eastern part belonged to the governorate of Damascus, or Bi/ad AI Sham. 
the North belonged to the governorate of Aleppo, and Mount Lebanon was a separate governorate. 
100 In practice, this system was not applied in full to inhabitants circumscribed to religious minorities. 
In the first half of the 19th century, Muslim inheritance law was applied to Maronite inhabitants in 
Mount Lebanon, which lead Muslims to protest in 1816 (Ziada 1996) 
101 The codification process was mainly at the levels registering populations according to sectarian 
categories, electing political representatives based on a sectarian distribution, and appointing a council 
of religious leaders onto a senate-like board. 
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religious category (Choueiri 1988). Hence Mount Lebanon became a model of a 
communitarian system of rule (Makdisi 2000). 
The second change in legal personhood was witnessed in 1917 as the Young Turks 
codified the Ottoman Law for the Rights of the Family (25/10/1917) as part of their 
effort to modernise the Ottoman Empire (Mall at 2007). This code is considered 
revolutionary because it is the first legal document in the region to codify family law 
(Sonbol 1996). It remodelled several Islamic provisions on marriage and divorce and 
added civil operational structures such as appointing judges (Tucker 1996). One 
example is that it curtailed the direct authority of community religious leaders over 
personal status by appointing the district judges to regulate it. It also raised the 
marriage age of both men and women to 17 years of age. While it retained polygyny, 
it codified women's right to reject polygynous arrangements (OLRF, 25/10/1917, 
A.38). In addition, the code kept the communitarian arrangement of the Muslim 
governance system of Dhimmis by codifying the regulations for non-Muslims under 
the guidance of their religious authorities (OLRF, 25/10/1917, A.40). 102 The 
subsequent French colonial rule is blamed for aborting it as part of their orientalist 
project of the region (Thompson 2000). 
The third significant shift to legal personhood followed the dismantling of the 
Ottoman Empire and the start of the French mandate in 1920. 103 The French mandate 
scrapped the 1917 family code and replaced it by a series of directives that 
formalised and compounded legal personhood. Decision 60 (13/03/1936) and its 
amendments (Decisions 146 L.R. 18/1111938, and 53 L.R. 30/03/1939) were the last 
in a process of codification still implemented until today. 
Decision 60 (13/03/1936) formalised legal personhood and included it under group 
affiliation in two types of communities: 'personal' or 'common' status. This law 
accommodated individuals who did not fit in any of these two categories by 
including them under a 'non-affiliated' category. 
102 Thompson (2000) confounds codification with secularisation as she contends that the Ottoman 
Law of the Rights of the Family followed the secularisation process implemented by the Young 
Turks, an elite movement who went into power between 1908 and 1918 with the aim of modernising 
it and bringing it closer to the western European style of governance at the time. 
103 The mandate established the state of Greater Lebanon by adding to Mount Lebanon the areas of 
Beirut and the coast, the North, the South and the East. 
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The first category of legal personhood included individuals who were affiliated to 
communities of 'Personal Status' defined as 
[T]raditional religious communities defined as historical [ ... ], endowed with some 
'specificities or some immunity by the colonial or local authorities [ ... ], or those 
constituting a reality resulting from more of one century-old traditions [ ... ]. 
(Decision 60, 13/03/1936, A.l and 3) 
The law required the 'communities' to submit a set of organisational bylaws to be 
approved by legislation (Decision 60, 13/03/1936, A.l, 2 &4). These provisions were 
significant in two ways. Individuals were recognised as legal persons by virtue of 
owning particular 'traditions' and simultaneously reduced to a commodity through 
their commodified contracts with their 'communities'. In this sense, communities 
became 'collective legal personae' reducing individuals to objects of legal ownership 
(Mundy 2002:xix). 
Another category of legal personhood included individuals affiliated to communities 
of 'Common Law' (Decision 60, 13/03/1936, A.1O). This category of communities 
was not defined anywhere in the text nor was it drawn in relation to any contextual 
historical or cultural references. They were officially recognised if their "religious 
teachings and their moral principles did not contradict public order or morality" 
(Decision 60, 13/03/1936, A.IS). Article 16 of the same code specified the condition 
for them to "present to the government their bylaws containing a summary of their 
religious or moral principles and their organisational plan". Most importantly, these 
'common law' communities could operate within either civil or religious family law. 
For instance, they were allowed to appoint "religious leaders", to whom individuals 
would resort for contracting marriages (Decision 60, 13/03/1936, A. 18, 19, & 20).104 
A third category of legal personhood recognised non-affiliated individuals who did 
not belong to any of the two types of communities with no explanation of this 
category. In these three categories, legal personhood was not fixed. Individuals could 
104 Thus contrary to common analyses, the category of 'community of common law' does not strictly 
refer to secular groups but rather to any communities that are 'untraditional', or that are outside of the 
historically prevalent monotheist ones in the region. 
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legally abandon their affiliation to these recognised communities at any time after 
adulthood (Decision 60, 13/03/1936, A. 10 & 11). Thus, they could follow civil 
family law as per articles 10, 11, and 17 (Decision 60, 13/03/1936). In this way, the 
commodified contract between individuals and communities was fluid. 
Decision 60 (13/03/1936) granted fluidity to the communitarian legal personhood. 
Subjects were entitled to rearrange the terms of their family relations by moving 
across sectarian categories. In the same code, Article 23 stated that the marriage 
contract of citizens was void if both parties convert to another sect or religion, and 
instead they are subjected to the family law rules of the new sect. 10' 
A fourth shift skewed legal personhood by differentiating between different 
categories of marital contracts. Under Article 25 (Decision 60, 13/03/1936), 
individuals registered under traditional communities of personal status could contract 
civil marriages abroad, register them locally and deal with them in civil courts. 
However, in 1938, Muslim religious leaders objected to the French colonial 
authorities and asked to exclude from this article any Muslim individuals who would 
contract civil marriages abroad (Thompson 2000).106 In 1939, French colonial rulers 
approved the request by issuing Decision 53 (30/03/1939).107 Provisions for civil 
contracts were thus only applied to couples ascribed to non-Muslim or mixed 
(Muslim and non-Muslim) communities. 108 Although legal personhood was 
formulated in communitarian terms, it was also commodified within a civil contract 
for some individuals. 109 
lOS In order to circumvent the restrictive laws of certain sectarian communities under which marriages 
are contracted, such as the Maronite Church, divorcing couples have been known to convert to other 
sects where they can get a divorce (LE2 2005). Of course, this practice is subject to financial means as 
it costs anything around 5000 to 10000 US Dollars to effectuate and requires a good deal of social 
networking. 
106 It is reported that Muslim leaders argued their case by referring to the Ottoman precedent of 
associating Islam with the religion of the state. They considered that they were not a 'minority' and 
that Islamic law could not be dissociated from the state. Sunni Muslim religious leaders claimed 
during their protests that they constituted the 'people of these lands' (at the time Lebanon and Syria) 
and that they were not in need for recognition (Khair 1996) 
107 This decision exempted Muslim subjects from all the clauses of the Decision 60 and the 
amendments to it in the Decision 146 in 1938. 
108 The Christian church made the same request but had to withdraw it after negotiations with the 
French rule. As the Maronite Catholic Church was institutionally independent from the state, French 
authorities asked the Maronite leaders to forego their independence in return for banning Christian 
subjects from the effects of civil marriage. The Maronite Church refused and withdrew the request. 
109 Legal personhood was later further differentiated across subjects ascribed to traditional 
communities through inheritance laws. Under the legal provisions of the post-colonial Lebanese state 
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A fifth shift in legal personhood took place in the drafting of the Lebanese 
Constitution (L.R. 23/0511926). Paradoxically, the constitution protected both secular 
and sectarian categories of legal personhood. Thus, the constitution contrasted 
universalist and communitarian principles of citizenship, and conflicted with the 
legal provisions on family law discussed above. 
Several Articles of the constitution defined individuals as autonomous legal persons 
with unifonn and undifferentiated entitlements. Article 7 (L.R. 23/05/1926) 
confinned that '[a]ll Lebanese shall be equal before the law. 110 They shall equally 
enjoy civil and political rights and shall equally be bound by public obligations and 
duties without any distinction'. 
Article 9 (L.R. 23/05/1926) of the constitution specified that 
[t]here shall be absolute freedom of conscience. The state, in rendering homage to the 
God Almighty shall respect all religions and creeds, and shall guarantee under its 
protection the free exercise of all religious rites provided that the public order is not 
disturbed, It shall also guarantee that the personal status and religious interests of the 
population, to whatever religious sect they belong, shall be respected. 
In this article, religion and belief were considered as commodities. This fonnulation 
of legal personhood contradicted the provisions allocating individuals under 
recognized communities. 
When the enactment of this law is analysed, we realise that entrenching a sectarian 
operational framework is part of the order of gender governance. As we are reminded 
by Pottage (2004:7), "law is construed as a discourse that consists only in 
actualisation [ ... ] rather than in substance". In practice, the only category of legal 
personhood to be enacted since independence is the one related to the traditional 
citizens ascribed to the Christian communities were granted a civil inheritance code (L.R, 
23/06/1959). 
1 \0 Because of the gendered nature of the Arabic language, various articles referring to the equality of 
all citizens use the masculine form such as 'muwalinin' or 'al-lubnaniyyin', In Arabic, the male 
gender is traditionally used as a general category that could equally refer to men or to both men and 
women. This ambiguity is not a main concern and was only raised by few women group who argued 
for the explicit inclusion of the female grammatical form such as 'muwalinin and muwalinal' and 'al-
lubnaniyyin wa al-Iubnaniyyat'. 
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communities of 'Personal Status'. This is despite the fact that the statutory provisions 
for establishing common status and non-affiliated legal personae are still in place in 
post-independence Lebanon. National civic records rely exclusively on sectarian 
legal personhood as default classification for citizens. As per the directives 
developed in both colonial and post-independence times between 1924 and 1951, the 
Lebanese Ministry of Interior keeps citizens' details in civic records organised 
according to sectarian classification (Fieldnotes 2005). The enactment of these 
provisions sealed the commodified contract between individuals and sectarian 
communities. In a recent ground breaking development, Ziad Baroud, the then 
minister of Interior, issued a ground-breaking Ministerial Directive (21110/2008) 
requesting the civic records directorate to 1) accept citizens' requests to opt out of 
the sectarian classification (shatb al-madhhab) in their civic records, and 2) allow 
citizens not to declare their sectarian affiliation when registering new civic records 
and replace it with a forward slash "I" in the civic records. However the directive did 
not link these changes to the national voting system that is based on sectarian 
affiliation. The power of enactment was once again prominent in stalling this 
directive. As W26 (August 2011) explained: 
In 2009, after we had our [civil] marriage in Cyprus, [the marriage certificate] was sent 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Then I went to [my hometown] and got myself de-
registered from there and moved my records to [my husband's] registry in Beirut. We 
then went to the ministry of interior. We told them, "these are our papers we want to 
remove our sect". [ ... ]. The employee behind the glass called in his colleague "listen 
these people want to remove their sectarian affiliation, come and deal with it, you know 
about this stuff'. The colleague came and said "each one of you needs to go to their 
respective Mukhtars because we are not handling these requests here anymore". My 
Mukhtar said that he could not do anything because I was de-registered from his district. 
We went to [my husband's] Mukhtar and he said that he said the same [ ... ]. We went 
back to the Ministry of Interior and said "we were sent back to you". The employee 
called a colleague again, and he said, "ok give me the papers" and he put them under a 
huge dusty pile of unrelated documents and said "there is this pile to process before 
your request [ ... ]. The other employees at the counter were hiding their grins and 
giggling while we were standing there like idiots. So we left very angry, having been 
made fun of, and extremely frustrated because they were not helpful. We did not follow 
it through because we had to travel [ ... ]. In Sept 2010 we asked our family to send us a 
copy of our civic records, I was still Maronite and [my husband was still Sunni. 
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5.3 Actors and dynamics of the post-conflict policy making process 
This section examines the dynamics of the policy refonn process of family law in the 
post-conflict period. It examines interplay between the 'triangle' of political, social, 
and religious actors reflected (and) the complexity of multiple sources of authorities 
on the making of policies of family law (Welchman 2002). The analysis focuses on 
the negotiating power of various actors in the 'initiation' and 'inhabitation' of 
various policy episodes (McGee 2004). III It combines both perspectives to 
understand the participation of policy actors in the policy process as a competition 
between actors over their repositioning in, and the fonnulation of, the post-conflict 
order. 
5.3.1 Gender-'blind' policy episodes 
The post-conflict National Reconciliation Pact constitutional amendment 
This section details the first bargaining episode that saw the repositioning of various 
actors and the renegotiation of family law policies. The negotiation of the Taif peace 
agreement and constitutional amendments is very significant because it provided the 
institutional and constitutional basis for the current Lebanese political system. 
The Taif initiative consisted of lengthy retreats held in the Saudi town of Taif on 22 
October 1989 and aimed at reaching an agreement to stop the conflict between 
warring parties. As a result, the National Reconciliation Peace Accord was drafted 
and incorporated into the constitution a year later. 112 
The peace negotiations and constitutional amendments were entirely drawn in an 
official and closed space. Surviving members of the 1972 parliament and other long-
tenn politicians ran the peace negotiations. \13 They mainly consisted of traditional 
leaders who were in practice overpowered by a new generation of heavily militarised 
III This framework analyses policy spaces in tenns of their access as closed -i.e. restricted to state 
actors; invited -i.e. including non-state actors; and autonomous -i.e. entirely run by non-state actors. 
They, however, recognised the limitations of this conception after their research on poverty policies in 
Nigeria and Uganda. They then hinted to spaces as layered into five components: history, access, 
mechanics, dynamics, and learning possibilities. 
112 Main Lebanese politicians were invited by French and Saudi mediators to meet in the Saudi town 
of Taif and agree on a peace settlement aimed at rearranging the power balance between Lebanese 
sectarian communities. 
I \3 The last pre-war parliamentary elections were held in 1972 and then resumed after 1992. During 
this period, the parliament's functions were practically inexistent. 
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political actors. These parliamentarians acted as representatives of warlords and 
leaders of religious communities and negotiated the agreement's terms on their 
behalf (Kerr 2006). The latter two sets of actors were physically absent. Yet, they 
were included in the discussions by proxy. Similarly, the session for constitutional 
amendments was closed. On 5 November 1989, the same parliamentarians met and 
approved the entire agreement, incorporated it in the constitution and elected the first 
post-conflict president. 114 
The statutory policy outcomes of this episode were promoted as ground-breaking 
reform of legal personhood by transforming the political representative system from 
the pre-1990 sectarian consociational power sharing model to a secular basis. 
Universal secular citizenship became the banner of post-conflict reconciliation. The 
amended constitution branded it as a national priority where "abolition of political 
confessionalism shall be a basic national goal and shall be achieved according to a 
staged plan" (L.R. 21109/1990). lIS Universalist human rights values featured 
prominently in the new peace era. 
The amended constitution (L.R. 21/09/1990) sustained this tension of personification 
and reification of individuals and communities. Legal personhood was redrawn 
simultaneously in relation to family law and political representation in two 
contradictory ways. On one side, it sustained individuals as uniform and 
undifferentiated legal persons, yet it entrenched the commodified contract with 
sectarian communities on the other. 
To that effect, a preamble was added to the constitution. It expressed legal 
personhood in terms of universalist human rights terms and confirmed the non-
communitarian nature of the Lebanese state. Four examples illustrate this point: 
114 President Rene Mouawad was assassinated on 22 November 1989 and Elias Hrawi was elected on 
24 November 1989. These developments took place amid post-conflict political fragility and violence. 
lIS This clause was particularly important because it was not included in the preamble of the original 
text of the Taif agreement, on which the constitution was amended. It even substituted another clause 
that related to "seeking the realisation of comprehensive social justice through financial, economic 
and social reforms" (L.R. 21109/1990). The latter clause exists in the preamble of the Taif agreement 
but was dropped in the Lebanese constitution. 
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Clause 2: Lebanon is also a founding and active member of the United Nations 
Organisation and abides by its covenants and by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The Government shall embody these principles in all fields and areas without 
exception. 
[ ... ] 
Clause 3: Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic republic based on respect for public 
liberties, especially the freedom of opinion and belief, and respect for social justice and 
equality of rights and duties among all citizens without discrimination. 
[ ... ] 
Clause 8: The abolition of political confessionalism shall be a basic national goal and 
shall be achieved according to a staged plan 
[ ... ] 
Clause 9: there shall be no segregation of the people on the basis of any type of 
belonging. 
(L.R. 21109/1990) 
However, in clear contradiction, this universalist configuration of legal personhood 
was written off. Clause 10 of the amended Lebanese Constitution's (L.R. 
21109/1990) preamble specified that "[t]here shall be no constitutional legitimacy for 
any authority which contradicts the pact of mutual existence". This pact refers to the 
historical verbal agreement between the politicians in the era of independence that 
guaranteed the protection of all religious communities in Lebanon (Salibi 1988). This 
clause reinforced the power of communities over individuals. 
This Taif policy episode produced some other less publicised policy outcomes. A set 
of constitutional Articles formulated legal personhood in a gender-blind form but 
with an inherent gender discriminatory effect. The post-conflict constitution 
reinstated the authority of the religious institution in two ways. First, at the level of 
national affairs, Article 23 (L.R. 21109/1990) condensed the authority of religious 
leaders to an advisory status within a 'Senate Council' where they would intervene in 
"major national issues [qadaya ma,vTriwa]" that were largely undefined. 116 This 
116 It was an old and forgotten arrangement initiated and cancelled under the French mandate in 1926 
and 1927. It was brought back mainly for the benefit ofthe Druze religious and political leaders who 
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council was to be established as soon as the secular parliament would be put in place. 
To this date, both the secular parliament and the sectarian Senate did not materialise 
and do not feature in the political agenda of any prominent actors. 
Second, another amendment of the constitution commodified individuals further 
under communitarian legal personhood. The amended Article 19 stated that '[t]he 
officially recognized heads of religious communities have the right to refer to this 
[constitutional] Council laws relating to personal status, the freedom of belief and 
religious practice, and the freedom of religious education' (L.R. 21109/1990). 
Individuals thus were commodified under the authoritative role granted to religious 
leaders. 117 
Here, agam, examining the enactment of these legal provisions explains the 
configuration of legal personhood. More than fifteen years into the post-conflict 
period, none of these provisions were officially applied to legal personhood both in 
family law and political representation. The promise to abolish communitarian 
political representation was never enacted. Legal personhood at this level is still 
enacted under communitarian terms through the consociational legal provisions of 
general elections. Conversely, despite the implications of Article 19 of the amended 
constitution, religious heads of communities did not officially extend their authority 
over Decision 60 (13/03/1936) recognising civil marriage contracts of Christian and 
mixed couples. 
Both stages of this policy episode were entirely secretive. Details of the negotiations 
of the agreement and ratification were undisclosed. 118 Meetings ran under 
confidential terms, and only the final voting session of the peace talks was broadcast 
live on national television. Similarly, the minutes for the constitutional amendments 
asked to preside it in a similar way that other larger religious communities headed other key positions. 
(Maila 1991) 
117 The categorisation of sectarian personhood was drawn as a social and personal one, as it was 
narrowed down to authority over family law and education. Article 10 of the amended constitution 
states that "[ e ]ducation shall be free in so far as it is not contrary to public order and morals, and does 
not affect the dignity of any of the religions or sects. There shall be no violation of the right of 
religious communities to have their own schools, provided they follow the general rules issued by the 
state regulating public instruction" (L.R. 21/0911990) 
118 To this date, minutes of closed meetings are undisclosed and withheld by the then Speaker of 
Parliament Hussein AI-Husseini. 
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sessions were classified. Other policy actors such as civil society organisations, 
intellectuals, and the media were entirely excluded from any representation (except 
for the media's basic coverage of meetings). None of the women groups' leaders 
commented on the constitutional discrimination in any of the several conferences 
held or reports issued by them during my fieldwork. On the contrary, many feminist 
forums highlighted the positive role of the constitution in promoting women's rights. 
Optional civil marriage law reform campaign 
Four years after the constitutional redrawing of citizenship, the Taif promise wore off 
as plans to 'desectarianise' the political system were dropped from the national 
political agenda. State actors initiated another policy episode to renegotiate 
consociational citizenship. 
On 21 November 1996, the President of the Republic Elias Hrawi launched an 
advocacy campaign for an optional family law reform during his annual address on 
Independence Day. His announcement took the country by surprise, due to his 
previous role in halting the desectarianisation of the political system stated in the 
amended constitution. The reform initiative specifically called for an optional civil 
personal status code. With this prospective reform, consenting citizens would 
contract civil marriage in Lebanon and organise all related personal status matters 
accordingly. It reiterated the longest standing debate on family law in Lebanon since 
1950. 119 
The proposed reform had three direct implications on the position of the religious 
institution. First, religious courts would lose their exclusive status as judiciaries on 
the matter. Second, Muslim citizens would be entitled for civil marriage provisions 
after being excluded from them since 1939 due to the opposition of Muslim religious 
leaders (Thompson 2000). 120 Third, personal citizenship would move from an 
exclusively religious categorisation to an optional secular one. The reform was 
formally gender-blind. Yet, it was inherently gendered as it considered women as 
119 In 1950, the Democratic Party, a small secular political group, drafted an optional secular personal 
status proposal and submitted it to parliament, but the proposal did not make it to the parliamentary 
sessions. 
120 According to decision 60/1926 organising family law in Lebanon, civil marriages contracted 
abroad are valid in Lebanon only if one or both partners belong to non-Muslim communities. 
Otherwise, civil contracts by Muslim citizens are automatically subject to Muslim rules. 
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rational actors and exclusively targeted women (and men) who officially identify 
themselves as 'secular' and/or are willing to contract civil marriages. Thus, this type 
of reform fails sustains gender inequality in family law for a large proportion of 
women who, for various reasons, uphold a religious identity and/or contract religious 
marriages. The implications of this approach on the enactment of gender equality in 
family law are discussed in chapter 7. 
The dynamics in this policy episode dispelled the myth of the unified 'state'. While a 
state actor initiated this policy episode, other actors within the state apparatus did not 
endorse it. Prominent politicians refrained from making any comments or endorsing 
it, with only a handful of politicians belonging to small secular parties openly 
supporting it. Thus, the initiative was positioned on the blurred boundaries between 
state and non-state policy spaces. 
This initiative sparked one of the most heated public debates in the recent history of 
family law policies in Lebanon. The initiative enjoyed the support of a vibrant civic 
movement that characterised the 1990s and which held varied advocacy campaigns 
ranging from calling for municipal elections to environmental reforms. This policy 
episode was of an 'inviting' nature as proposed by (McGee 2004). The president 
invited civil society actors, human rights groups, and lawyers in particular to draft 
proposals and submit them to a legal committee. They supported the initiative and 
backed the president for 'shaking off the sectarian system'. A massive number of 
support letters reportedly flooded the presidential palace during this period. 
In other aspects, this space was less transparent. For instance, the process of the 
appointment of the legal committee and the review process of submitted proposals 
was undisclosed. The president's own proposal was finally selected to be put forward 
to parliament. 
Despite its inviting nature, this space excluded two major policy actors. First, 
religious actors were excluded completely from any consultations or debates. Yet, its 
actors managed to force their way into the space and form a spiralling vocal 
opposing force. At the early stages, their response was fragmented. Muslim and 
Christian religious leaders mainly competed against each other and promoted the 
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merits of their own religious family frameworks in comparison to other religious 
ones and secular civil marriages (Zaarab and Aqil 1997). Their stance from the 
initiative differed too. Muslim religious leaders categorically opposed civil marriage, 
while Maronite religious leaders expressed milder reservations. This difference stems 
from Muslims' special religious personal status that legally supersedes any other 
legislation, whereas some aspects of Christian family law, such as inheritance, 
already incorporate secular civil jurisdiction. 121 As the president insisted on going 
ahead with the reform campaign, religious leaders united their stance and denounced 
the 'secular threat' implied by the proposed reforms (EI-Cheikh 1998-9). 
Politicians, the second group of excluded actors, stepped in at a later phase to back 
religious actors. Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the Speaker of Parliament Nabih 
Bern were among the prominent opponents who condemned the initiative. On 11 
March 1998, the president chaired the cabinet's weekly meeting with the presence of 
the prime minister and all ministers affiliated with his coalition. After discussing all 
other items on the agenda, the prime minister and his affiliated ministers withdrew 
from the meeting before reviewing the proposal. The remaining ministers voted the 
proposal into parliament. Until date, Nabih Bern, long serving and influential 
speaker of parliament blocked the law proposal by consistently removing it from the 
working agenda of parliamentary sessions. As the president's term ended six months 
later, the issue was dropped. 
After this defeat, secular civil society groups took the lead in reviving this reform 
attempt. In 1999, around 70 major human rights and democracy groups formed the 
Coalition for an Optional Secular Civil Marriage Law. The coalition built on the 
existing momentum to the now former president's optional civil family code. For 
three years, civil society organisations launched an advocacy campaign mainly 
constituted of signing petitions and holding community meetings and cultural and 
public events. However, as the earlier public and political support waned, the 
momentum of the campaign also plummeted. 
121 The legal personhood of Christians citizens is organised under two secular family codes: the 1951 
'Civic Inheritance Law for Non-Mohamadeans', and the law of 1926 recognising civil marriages 
contracted abroad. 
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The failure of this reform attempt was not the only policy outcome. It contributed to 
overwrite the official 'desectarianisation' discourse of the Taif agreement. It 
repositioned consociational personal citizenship and the secular-sectarian dichotomy 
as a dominant public discourse and thus contributed to erasing the secular promise of 
the post-conflict era. As a result, policy actors expressed their conflicting post-
conflict national identities through the negotiations of family law reforms in a way 
that accommodated gender discrimination (Welchman 2009). 
5.3.2 Gender-'focused' policy episodes 
Global 'Engendering' and Local Gendering of State Institutions 
In parallel to the above-mentioned policy episodes, the discourse of gender equality 
was fast-tracked through the global gender equality agenda of the CEDA W 
convention and its follow up mechanisms. Accordingly, this policy episode emerged 
in the first half of the 1990s. 
An overlap between global and national events led to the emergence of state actors in 
the gender policy space. State actors regained political prominence as part of the 
renewal of Lebanese state institutions at the end of the conflict in the early 1990s.122 
In the same period, global gender equality actors, namely the CEDA W committee, 
promoted the role of state actors as prominent forces in the Beijing Fourth Summit 
on Women in 1995. They encouraged the formalisation of representation of gender 
issues and broadened its scope to include state actors by pushing for the 
establishment of gender-centred governmental structures. 
The focus on the CEDA W convention created new official institutional entities that 
remodelled the gender equality space. As with the pre-war bargaining discussed in 
chapter 4, various actors reworked these institutions in a gendered version of the 
122 In the early 1990s and with the start of the post-contlict period, the landscape of Lebanese civil 
society changed. The legalistic human rights approach was gradually enmeshed with a good 
governance framework. A number of human rights and democracy groups were established in 
response to the specific post-contlict governance challenges and partly due to western donors' 
promotion of the good governance agenda. Substantial funding by USAID and other European donors 
was provided to new groups working on democracy promotion and anti-corruption activities. As this 
new generation of actors emerged and connected with emerging global discourses, human rights 
issues were reformulated in broader governance activism. Women groups also engaged with the in-
flowing stream of gender equality discourses through a multitude of donors in preparation for the 
Beijing conference. These new relations with international donors distanced the stream of women and 
human rights groups and compartmentalised them into two sub-civil society spaces. 
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current political system In order to assert the power of dominant political and 
religious actors. 
This formalisation of official gender institutions took shape in 1993 over two phases. 
It was induced by international actors with support from local women groups and 
official actors as part of the momentum around Lebanon's participation in the Fourth 
Annual Beijing Summit on Women in 1995. In the first phase, the UN CEDAW 
committee, in cooperation with UNIFEM and UNDP local offices, invited local 
actors to form a national delegation and establish a national committee to promote 
women's rights and mainstream gender issues in national policies. The delegation 
was established as a first step towards the institutionalisation of gender-focused 
official bodies. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action prompted countries 
to establish or strengthen official bodies dedicated to advancing women's rights. 
These recommendations provided general guidelines but left it to various countries to 
devise their own frameworks: 
a strong political commitment, [to] create a national machinery, where it does not exist, 
and strengthen, as appropriate, existing national machineries, for the advancement of 
women at the highest possible level of government; it should have clearly defined 
mandates and authority; critical elements would be adequate resources and the ability 
and competence to influence policy and formulate and review legislation; among other 
things, it should perform policy analysis, undertake advocacy, communication, 
coordination and monitoring of implementation. (CEDA W Committee undated) 
Subsequently, the committee converted into the National Commission for Lebanese 
Women (NCL W) in 1996, and was officially mandated by a ministerial decree in 
1998. It held a three-pronged mandate as follows: 1) to conduct "consultative" tasks 
on "women's affairs and conditions [ ... J and to assure them equal opportunities to 
men"; 2) to hold "correlative and coordinating" tasks "in affairs regarding women's 
status" with official national and international bodies; and 3) to undertake 
"executive" tasks such as drafting national strategies "regarding the affairs of 
Lebanese women" and planning and executing programmes that "benefit Lebanese 
women in particular" (NCL W undated). This new structure constituted the first direct 
and formal involvement of the post-conflict state in women's rights issues. It was 
attached to the Office of the Prime Minister rather than any official body or ministry. 
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At the initial stages, the commission positioned itself as an independent body 
benefiting from a "strategic position that separates it from governmental institutions 
on one hand and civil and private entities, particularly those concerned with women's 
affairs, on the other hand" (NCL W undated). It further distanced itself by 
establishing some rules for cooperation where it supported "governmental, civil, and 
private institutions in as much as they conform with the policy set by [NCL W] in the 
national Plan for action" (NCL W undated). 
The commission's organisational structure was to include "members known for their 
active and effective participation regarding women's issues and affairs" (NCL W 
constitution). The selection process of the governing body was not detailed in the by-
laws. It was only summed up as "women delegated by the President of the Republic" 
(NCL W undated). 
The enactment of the policy outcomes reiterated the pre-independence gendered 
spaces discussed in chapter 4. Through customary practices, the NCL W's 
organisational structure mirrored the formal hierarchy of the political system and 
expanded the power of state actors over women's issues. The NCLW was presided 
over by the wife of the president of the republic, had the wife of the speaker as a 
vice-president, and included the prime minister's wife as a board member. 
NCL W also acted as a gatekeeper to women groups' participation in the gender 
institutionalisation process. Despite the regulations of the CEDA W committee about 
the advisory role of non-governmental actors, there was no mention of Lebanese 
women groups in the NCLW's by-laws. Similarly, throughout this episode, gender 
equality in family law was largely ignored. The official speech of the delegation to 
the Beijing summit avoided referring to personal rights. Later on, NCLW's mission 
statement was carefully worded to avoid any specific reference to this area of 
discrimination against women. 
These findings discussed above inform research on gender equality processes and 
post-conflict state building, such as the cases of Latin America and Palestine 
(Johnson 2004). Women's spaces for social action increase during war time, yet they 
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are restricted in post-conflict settings. This trend particularly affects gender equality 
in family law as political actors, mainly male politicians and religious leaders, hold 
on to discriminatory provisions through a 'masculanisation' process. However, in the 
case of Lebanon, the masculanisation of space was enacted within supposedly gender 
enhancing structures. These findings assert the post-structural concern over the 
'sisterhood' concept discussed in chapter 2 and the tokenistic approach adopted by 
global and local gender equality mechanisms (Cornwall, Harrison et al. 2007). 
'Lebanising' CEDA W: The ratification and follow up mechanisms 
This policy episode reinforced Lebanon's official commitment to universal gender 
equality mechanisms including Lebanon's accession to the CEDAW convention and 
the follow up mechanisms. The episode was entirely of a closed and legislative 
nature, completely occupied by state actors. None of the women groups or other civil 
society actors was included in the process. The ratification process was also entirely 
secretive. It passed on 24 July 1996 with a few reservations that went largely 
unnoticed and without any public debate accompanying it in the press or by women 
groups. Women groups considered it a victory in the history of women's rights in 
Lebanon. 
The follow-up phase started after Lebanon's accession to the CEDAW convention. It 
focused on mainstreaming universal gender equality in Lebanon and eliminating 
reservations placed by Lebanon on the convention. The follow-up procedures follow 
the directives of Article 18 of the CEDA W convention requiring state parties to 
present periodic reports on the progress of implementing the convention (UNO 
AlRes.34/180 18/1211979). 123 The CEDA W committee places comments on the 
national reports and holds meetings with the official delegation to discuss them. In 
the case of Lebanon, this process is one of the most closed and least transparent ones. 
Global actors largely drove the construction of this phase. It involved the CEDA W 
committee, the NCL W, a few experts drafting the reports, and a restricted number of 
civil society actors who occasionally participated in the delegation in the UN 
headquarters in New York. This core circle does not disseminate any of the results 
123 State parties are required to submit one report within one year of joining the convention and four 
years thereafter, or as frequently as the CEDA W committee requires them to. 
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and updates, leaving many women groups and other civil society organisations, the 
media and the public out of the loop. The content and outcomes of this process are 
removed from the knowledge base and practice of women groups. It was not 
mentioned in any conferences or forums that I attended on the subject during my 
fieldwork, or any women groups' websites or database, not least the NCL W's. 
The follow-up mechanisms included women groups only at a nominal level. For 
instance, the CEDA W committee did not inquire into participation mechanisms of 
non-official actors in NCLW, such as the non-governmental committee sitting on the 
NCL W board. Similarly, their subsequent dispute and separation from the 
commission did not feature in the national reports and the CEDAW committee's 
comments on them. Furthermore, the review process does not require the official and 
non-governmental reports to be synchronised in terms of issues and themes to be 
discussed, and thus does not receive a comprehensive view of the situation from both 
parties. Hence, the NCL W and the L WNG05 jointly drafted a National Lebanese 
Strategy in 1997. Since then, the NCLW submitted three official reports between 
2002 and 2006, while CFL WI submitted two shadow reports in 1996 and 2005. The 
CEDA W committee met with the Lebanese delegations on three occasions. 
Summaries of comments, responses, and concluding remarks are published, but 
minutes of the meetings were not made public. 
The gendering effect of family law as a governance order was most pronounced in 
this episode. On 24 July 1996, the Lebanese government ratified the CEDA W 
convention and framed legal personhood under the religious category. The 
parliament placed reservations only on subsections of Article 16 illustrated in the box 
below and which specifically related to several aspects of gender equity in marriage 
and family relations (UNO 26/06/1998). Reservations were placed on those clauses 
that contradicted religious family law, such as gender equality in marriage and 
dissolution, parenthood, and legal right of care. They also preserved patriarchal 
traditional norms of acquiring a family name by placing reservation on an Article to 
that effect. 
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Box 1: Article 16 of the CEDA W convention and the reservations placed by the Lebanese 
Government (source: UNO A/Res.34/180. (18/12/1979): 
I. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in 
particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: 
(a) The same right to enter into marriage; 
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with 
their free and full consent; 
Ccl The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution: 
Cd) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital 
status, in matters relating to their children: in all cases the interests of the children 
shall be paramount: 
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of 
their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable 
them to exercise these rights; 
(Q The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, 
trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these concepts 
exist in national legislation: in al1 cases the interests of the children shal1 be 
paramount: 
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a 
family name, a profession and an occupation; 
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, 
management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of 
charge or for a valuable consideration. 
2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all 
necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for 
marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an official registry 
compUlsory. 
In addition to these specific reservations relating to women's personal rights, state 
actors used the legal provisions of the CEDA W convention to steer away from 
international scrutiny. Lebanon went by the subsection 2 of Article 29 allowing states 
to absolve from complying with inter-state arbitration or recourse to the international 
Court of Justice as follows (UNO NRes,34/180 18/1211979): 
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of the present Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the 
request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of 
the request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the 
arbitration, anyone of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of 
Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court. 
2. Each State Party may at the time of signature or ratification of the present Convention 
or accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph I of this 
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article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by that paragraph with respect to any 
State Party which has made such a reservation. 
3. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 of this 
article may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. 
With these provisions, the Lebanese state could ignore the Danish state's objection 
made on 26 June 1998. The Danish government asked Lebanon to lift its 
reservations, as they were "incompatible with the object and purpose of the present 
Convention [and therefore] shall not be permitted" (UNO 26/06/1998). This example 
shows that the CEDA W harmonisation process accommodates some contradictions 
that affect the possibilities of sustaining activist pressure on states' discrimination 
against women's rights. However despite these contradictions, the CEDAW 
harmonisation process provides a room for activists with some room for manoeuver 
as they can install pressure from within the national frameworks. In her analysis of 
Arab states, Mayer (1995) explains how the harmonisation process in various 
contexts has taken different trajectories, with some countries such as Tunisia taking 
favourable steps despite the reservations initially placed. 
Injecting V A W into Personal Rights 
A final episode defined post-conflict gender equality in family law policies when 
Lebanese women groups adopted the Violence Against Women (VA W) approach 
initiated by the UN global gender agenda after the Copenhagen meeting in 1992. 
They warmed to this untapped new angle to women's personal rights. They promoted 
this approach simultaneously with the initiation of the optional civil status law 
campaign. The two episodes ran in parallel to each other without much intersection. 
However, this discourse expanded significantly after the optional secular reforms 
were dropped. 
This space was mainly initiated by global actors and catalysed by local civil society. 
As early as 1993, the UN General Assembly issued the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women (Res. 48/104 of 20 December 1993). The 
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V A W focus of this declaration did not trickle down to Lebanese women groups until 
two years later through international donors as part of a regional initiative. 
The VA W track diverted from a strict focus on religious family law. For example, 
L WNG07 suspended any advocacy on reforming current family law provisions until 
"the climate would be ready for it". It shifted instead to reforming the civil law such 
as 'honour killings' and lack of matrilineal nationality transfer (BMI 2005).124 Their 
US donors disapproved this agenda shuffle, due to the larger scope of gender 
discrimination in family law (BM9 2005). This example reveals the complexity of 
global-local negotiations of agenda setting. 
The V A W approach became a dominant discourse used in personal rights debates. It 
succeeded in steering policy away from the secular/religious dichotomy of legal 
personal status reforms provided through the presidential initiative in favour of the 
new V A W paradigm. With this new approach, gender inequality in religious family 
law was merged with 'violence'. The fusion of the two discourses ultimately led to 
diluting the element of religious legal discrimination and focusing instead on 
'cultural' issues, such as reforming domestic violence in civil law. For instance, 
L WNGOI turned to tackling legislative reform of domestic violence through drafting 
of a civil law against domestic violence with the aim to "unify women from all 
different sectarian affiliation around a unified law against domestic violence" (BM6 
2005). The implications for this new direction are discussed further in chapter 8. 
5.4 Post-conflict formulation of the policy problem and the framing of 
concerned populations 
This section focuses on the way the gender-focused and gender-'blind' policy 
episodes formulated the problem of gender equality in family law and constructed 
the legal personhood of women with family law problems. Following Lewis and 
Mosse (2006), I examine how gender-focused actors l2S 'translate' gender knowledge 
124 L WNG07 launched a campaign to challenge clauses granting males acquittal from 'honour' 
crimes they commit against their female relatives. The campaign also calls for equal sentences 
between men and women in adultery provisions. 
125 I am using the term 'gender-focused actors' to refer to governmental and non-governmental actors 
who were involved in gender-focused policy making, such as official governmental organisations 
linked to the CEDA W mechanisms and leading women groups. Here, I am extending Lewis and 
Mosse's (2006) notion of 'translation' of (gender) policy discourses from NGOs to also include 
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by way of 'arranging' their understandings of social phenomena related to the 
problem. Lewis and Mosse refer to Latour (2005: 194-5) view that the 'translation' 
roles of NGOs are about "proving themselves by transforming the world in 
conformity with their perspective on the world". I trace how state and non-state 
actors formulated the 'problem' of gender equality in family law through several 
interrelated, though seemingly distinct, discourses that closely followed gender-blind 
governmental discourses. In order to illustrate the power of translation, I will explore 
this process through a reading of the official and shadow reports submitted by the 
Lebanese government and L WNG05 as part of the CEDA W harmonisation 
mechanisms. 
In the transition to the post-conflict period, dominant feminist discourses on gender 
equality in family law were in line with the secularist stands of prominent women 
groups. These discourses explained gender inequality in family law as a statutory 
problem related to the political structure of 'sectarianism' in Lebanon. For example, 
in 1980, leftist women group L WNG03 called for "the elimination of any existing 
discrimination against women in personal status laws and penal codes" as part of its 
initiative to draft a 'Declaration for Lebanese Women's Rights' (8M2 2005).126 
Human rights activists working on women's issues also relied on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to claim gender equality in personal rights. 
Laure Moghaizel, a prominent human and women's rights activist saw "the need for 
a secular marriage [code] that brings equality to different Lebanese [groups] and 
between individual citizens" (Annahar 1995). She proposed "a unified secular code 
[ ... ] that applies to all citizens with the possibility for citizens who want to abide by 
their religious doctrines to contract religious marriages too like they do in other 
countries like France for example" (Annahar 1995).127 
governmental actors in order to show how both actors contribute to mainstreaming gendered 
discourses on family law. 
126 Although the quote didn't specify 'secular', it was generally understood as implied, as specified by 
one member of the group. It remains, however, important to note that it was not as easily publicly 
expressed. 
127 This framework fitted within the overall gender equality claims of women groups of that era. It 
however remained low on women groups' list of priority issues which focused on 'putting the nation 
first' during the war period (LL WR 1997) 
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The first set of Lebanese CEDA W reports mainstreamed the abovementioned 
discourse. In terms of identifying the problem, the first official report was more vocal 
in pointing to religion than the shadow report. The official report associated religious 
family law with a political-religious order of 'confessionalism' seen as "the main 
cause of fanaticism and war" (CEDA W IC/LBN/I 2109/2004: 12). The shadow report 
concurred, considering religious family law as 'detrimental' and imposed on the 
population (The Non-Governmental Committee for Following up on Women's Issues 
and Lebanese Council of Women 1999). The official report explicitly identified the 
religious institution as a hindrance or "uncontested authority [ ... ] that is well 
established. [ ... ] Religion acts sometimes as a brake on the socio-cultural 
expressions that are in harmony with the changing reality" (CEDAW/C/LBN/I 
2/09/2004:33). The shadow report steered clear from mentioning religion and only 
referred to an undefined order of 'patriarchy' responsible for gender equality. 
In terms of policy solutions, the official stance was more ambivalent than the non-
governmental one. The first official report did not call for the abolition of 
confessionalism and adopted instead a primordialist view of a "denominationally-
structured society [ ... ] made of 18 confessional groups" (CEDA W/C/LBN/I 
2/09/2004:33). It proposed the solution of an optional family law reform. The 
shadow report called for a universal secular family law and suggested an optional 
reform as a temporary measure (The Non-Governmental Committee for Following 
up on Women's Issues and Lebanese Council of Women 1999:96). 
In the late 1990s, as the optional civil marriage reform campaign was launched, 
women groups shifted their stance from a universal statutory conception to an 
optional communitarian model. Gender inequality in family law was still considered 
a policy problem, but it was reformulated into a gender-blind lens of absolute 
communitarianism. The shift was noted among leftist women groups, such as 
L WNG03, who used to be early advocates of universal gender equality. They 
justified their support for optional reform because it 'brought equality without 
coercion'. As mentioned in the earlier section, the optional reforms were dropped 
from the dominant discourses on family law as various women groups disagreed on 
them. 
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The shift towards consociational reform is traced in the second round of CEDAW 
follow up reporting. The second official report restricted the problem to the 
constitutional changes granting religious leaders power over family law 
(CEDAW/CILBN/2 11102/2005:11). 128 It thus completely omitted discussing gender 
inequality in religious family law at any legal, structural, or institutional levels. It 
only pointed to discriminatory civil legislation in the section on 'legal equality before 
the law', such as issues of honour killing, rape and physical violence. 
The second official report included concerned popUlations within an absolutist 
communitarian order where "Lebanese society is distinct in that its members belong 
to different religions and in that each religious community has its own interpretations 
of religion and its own customs" (CEDAW/CILBN/2 11102/2005:36). Subsequently, 
the report (CEDAW/CILBN/2 11/0212005:38) shifted the problem of gender 
inequality in family law from the statutory to the structural and cultural levels 
[T]his position of men as head of household is specifically enshrined in the personal 
status laws. The authority of men over the family is set against the requirement for 
obedience on the part of the wife. Until recently, women from the various religious 
communities were complicit in this requirement. Most Christian communities, however, 
recently abandoned the principle of obedience in favour of that of partnership between 
the married couple. In other religious communities, disobedience by the wife grants the 
husband the right to discipline her, although it is a principle that is disputed in recent 
interpretations by religious officials. 
The second shadow report followed the official line. It moved from a political 
analysis of religious laws, towards cultural explanations of 'confessional 
communities' emphasising its impact on norms and values and crosscutting with 
YAW (The Non-Governmental Committee for Following up on Women's Issues and 
Collective for Research and Training on Development Action 2005). With this newly 
introduced cultural understanding of religion, it proposed optional civil reforms 
alongside reforms of religious courtS. 129 
128 In this sense, the CEDA W reports were lagging behind policy momentum and reported earlier 
foliey episodes than the ones discussed. 
29 Rania Maktabi (2009) argues that 'individual-based' civil family law reforms favour more equality 
than 'group-based' ones. However, the Lebanese case indicates that individual approaches can also be 
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Cultural explanations soon gained popularity among women groups. They supported 
it as a concept and added it to the earlier statutory action on gender equality in family 
law. As L WNGOI was formed, it assumed a specialist status by exclusively dealing 
with women's personal rights. Most women groups adopted a supportive stand. 
However, of the seven studied women groups, only L WNG02 added YAW-based 
legal and psychological counselling to its array of other rights-based activities (BM 1 
2005). The five other women groups added VA W as part of their overall goals or 
mission in addition to the earlier legal optional reform demands. 
The formulation of the 'problem' of gender equality in family law completed a U-
turn in the third CEDA W follow up round of 2008. The third official report 
(CEDAW/CILBN/3 7/07/2006:11-13) justified the cultural dimension of sectarian 
identity by locating it at the heart of the political and social system: 
The legislative and judicial pluralism in the area of personal status has a constitutional 
framework and roots associated with the establishment and stability of Lebanon as a 
political entity. Accordingly, it is extremely sensitive and linked to the broader political 
and social situation in the country [ ... ]. The social structure on which the Lebanese 
political, administrative and legislative system is built is a composite, based upon a 
sectarian foundation." 
Here, the religious institution was re-constructed as the foundation of Lebanese 
society, and thus gender equality in family law was discussed only within the 
existing legislation. Secular family law reforms were entirely ruled out as "currently 
outside the framework of discussion" (CEDAW/C/LBN/3 7/07/2006:12). The report 
justified this omission from a pragmatic perspective since "the attempt to place all 
legislation in one basket may hinder the possibility of amending any at all, 
considering that, based on the experience of previous attempts, certain laws arouse 
latent sectarian sensitivities within the Lebanese context that cannot be ignored" 
(CEDAW/CILBN/37/07/2006:13). 
problematic if they are 'optional' as they exclude women who are not able to voice their preference 
for this type of reform and thus continue to operate under 'group-based' family law arrangements. 
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The third shadow report closely followed suit. It largely acknowledged the loss of the 
battle of optional family law reforms to religious leaders (The Committee for 
Following up on Women's Issues 2007). It also adopted a similar U-turn by dropping 
suggestions for optional secular reforms and calling for reforms within religious 
courts (The Committee for Following up on Women's Issues 2007). This 
understanding of the problem was echoed in some women groups' actions. The 
L WNG04 was the only secular women group to uphold this later approach. It 
actively engaged with religious leaders to reform discriminatory jurisprudence within 
religious law. The approach was based on a pragmatic view of the Lebanese system 
as a fait accompli and "very hard to change" (BM3 2005). Taking an incremental 
approach to various aspects of discrimination, the group started by launching a 
campaign calling for greater women's rights over their children's custody. It 
networked with religious leaders and was about to reach an agreement among most 
religious leaders on the matter at the time of my fieldwork. However, the president of 
the group recognised the limitations of such an approach. For instance, mUltiple 
jurisprudence in Shica jurisdiction offers more selectivity in the rulings of religious 
judges. Similarly, BW3 acknowledged that there are certain issues that cannot be 
addressed, such as unequal inheritance within Muslim directives and divorce within 
Catholic directives. 
Through this process of reformulation of the policy problem, women groups also 
constructed particular assumptions about the concerned populations, women with 
family law problems. The first set of assumptions relates to the understanding of 
gender inequality in family law as a statutory problem. In this understanding, women 
are assumed to have equal access power to legal justice. This assumption also 
contains a secularist bias as it ignores the institutional gendered influences that can 
inform the agency of various actors, such as women with family law problems, 
women groups activists, civil judges and lawyers. 
The optional reform approach considers women as autonomous individuals and 
rational choice agents who decide on their actions in isolation of the institutional 
influences that shape their sUbjectivity. These formulations of subjectivity fall within 
the secular-religious dichotomy where individuals- including women- are assumed 
to step in or out of clearly delineated secular or sectarian categories. As discussed in 
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chapter 6, the process of subjectification is multi-layered and fluid where categories 
are continuously blurred. Similarly, this approach creates a hierarchy of women. A 
large proportion of 'sectarian' women are excluded from the gender equality 
concerns of women groups who assume that they are content with the religious laws 
to which they subscribed. 
In contrast, the V A W approach steered the fonnulation of the policy problem away 
from the secular-religious dichotomy of family law refonns. It refonnulated religious 
affiliation and linked more closely with the lived experiences of women. While the 
V A W approach is merited for dealing with a taboo social issue and reaching out to a 
new target group of battered women (Beydoun 2002), this approach fixes agency as 
passive victimhood. Women were required to 'break the cycle of violence' in order 
to move away from their passive state (LWNGOI 2005). This was done by providing 
professionalised support networks that women can seek for protection, psychological 
support, and legal backup through the counselling and support services provided to 
them by women groups. 
In this way, the YAW approach also denoted a hierarchy between civil society and 
communal spaces. It assumes that on one hand women's agency is hindered in 
communal spaces ruled by cultural biases. On the other hand, women get 
'empowered' within civil society spaces with access to professionalised services of 
women groups. These assumptions are framed within liberal understandings of the 
associational space as void of institutional gendered influences. 
Through my interviews with women group leaders, proponents of both approaches 
specified that women suffered from 'legal ignorance' and were in need of 'legal 
education' on their rights (BM2 2005). Whether through legal refonns or service 
delivery, women groups assume that knowledge is readily available 'out there' for 
women to grab. In practice, it is far from being accessible, either to women with 
family law problems or to lawyers who represent them, as discussed later in chapter 
8. In this narrative, women with family law problems were assumed to be in a state 
of 'false consciousness' where they are not aware of their rights and thus accept 
gender inequality. This approach thus depoliticises the issue into a linear problem-
solution or awareness-action continuum, which disconnect women's subjectivity 
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from their social environment and ignore the influences that affect their ability and 
willingness to take action and seek support. These issues constitute the core of the 
following chapters. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter explained how the order of gender governance of family law policies 
was underpinned by a concern for gender discrimination rather than the optimisation 
of communitarian legal personhood. Gender bias was the common denominator that 
threads through the inconsistencies of the negotiation of policies of post-conflict 
citizenship. 
The post-conflict policy process on gender equality in family law is composed of 
disconnected policy episodes constructed by an amalgamation of local and global 
regimes of rights and citizenship. Each of these episodes consisted of nodes of policy 
tension that simultaneously facilitated and resisted reform of gender equality in 
family law. Major chords of gender-sensitive family law policies were resisted by 
minor chords of gender-biased policies. Together they drove these reforms to a 
standstill. This tension between major and minor policy chords was driven by an 
interplay between global and local discursive regimes rather than an opposition 
between them. 
The initiation of policy episodes relied largely on favourable 'policy moments' 
prompted by broader political-historical circumstances. For instance, the 
inconclusive outcome of the civil war facilitated the constitutional amendment and 
the Taif post-war order. Similarly, the Beijing summit and the UN promotion of the 
V A W approach speeded up the creation of women-specific policy spaces. 
The boundaries of actors' participation in these policy episodes were often blurred, 
overlapping, and constantly redrawn. McGee's (2004) categorisation of 'closed, 
invited, and autonomous' was limited as it confounded the type of boundaries with 
the nature of institutional actors involved and not accounting much for flexible 
boundaries within the space. The analysis suggests that more than one type of actor 
participated either directly or indirectly in various policy episodes. In some cases, 
various actors were 'formally invited', such as the participation of women groups in 
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the CEDA W institutionalisation and the V A W initiative. In other cases, actors 
'forced' their entry into policy spaces with various degrees of negotiation power. The 
'forced' participation provides more nuanced understanding of actors' participation 
than the 'co-opted' concept used. Similarly, some actors 'delegated' their 
participation to other actors who acted on their behalf. So their physical absence 
from the space does not mean that their institutional power is negated. Rather than 
exclusion, it was an indication of their overarching power over these policies. 
The enactment of law further supports the inconsistency of the sectarian analysis of 
gender equality and family law and suggests that the 'sectarian' parameter is not the 
defining factor for legal personhood. These inconsistencies were noted in two policy 
reform attempts in the post-conflict period. The process of these two policies 
indicates that the common barrier for reforms lies in an anxiety at altering the 
gendered order of family relations that is in place. 
This exploration draws on two areas of analysis. First, legal personhood related to 
family law is not as fixed as often assumed. Legal provisions and enactment of laws 
since pre-independence to the post-conflict period show that legal personhood is not 
entirely circumscribed under sectarian terms, nor are the provisions for religious 
marriage fixed. Second, the various inconsistencies that spread legal personhood 
over individual and communitarian realms cast doubt over the usefulness of the 
sectarian lens of analysis of gender equality in family law. The following chapters 
explain how the order of gender governance is exercised through the enactment of 
post-conflict family law policies. 
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6 CHAPTER SIX Legal frameworks as techniques for blurring women's legal 
subjectivity 
6.1 Introduction 
In Lebanon, family law is the problem of problems. [ ... T]he essential 
mentality and make-up of the Lebanese fabric [ ... ] is basically centered 
around religion. Religion is a problem because once they mention 
religion, it means that it is with God's hands and cannot be changed. 
(BM32005) 
This quote adopts a fixed understanding of religion as an overarching legal system 
that exercises ultimate power and cannot be challenged. This quote assumes that law 
is fixed and unified in one authority in the sense that "law is and should be the law 
of the state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and administered by a 
single set of state institutions" (Griffiths 1986:3). This view also contains a 
problematic policy implication on solutions for gender discrimination in family law. 
It is summed up in this account from BM2 (2005), a board member of L WNG02, a 
leftist women group, as she explained their work on family law: 
Our main activity is working with women on raising their awareness to their rights 
because the woman sometimes doesn't know her rights, or doesn't know how to benefit 
from them or how to deal with them. This is very much present in our society. 
BM2 adopted a common rationale for the policy problem and solution. Women's 
legal personhood was clearly defined in law. Women's legal entitlements were also 
deemed to exist in family codes, but women were failing to locate them. Apart from 
the broader issues of blaming the victim, this perspective assumes that women as 
legal persons were distinguished from the power of law making. Furthermore, this 
statement reveals that policy makers consider the 'right' of gender equality in family 
law, as a 'commodity' (Brown 1995), or a 'thing' (Pottage 2004) that is to be 
appropriated by women. 
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Coming from the same activist and practitioner background, I started my research 
within the same lens trying to 'locate' legal rights of women in current legislation. 
However, this task was increasingly elusive as I started my interviews with women 
respondents. As I conducted my fieldwork, it was not possible to trace a unified 
coherent thread stating 'God made' directives. Also it was hard to pin down one legal 
administrative authority that manages family law in Lebanon. This meant that as the 
legal sources and authorities were multiple and blurred, women could not possibly 
'know' their rights. I thus dropped the task of 'locating' these rights as if they were a 
consumers good (Brown 1995), and moved towards considering them as a process of 
enactment through understanding how the family law framework actually 'works' 
instead. 
The chapter explains how the gender governance is enacted in the legal frameworks 
and legal authorities. The judiciary system constitutes techniques of governance that 
are aimed at generating gendered and restrictive notions of legal personhood. These 
techniques are expressed in terms of legal plurality at two levels. The first level is the 
multiple layers of horizontal and vertical sovereignties over family law. Second, 
these multiple realms of authority produce multiple, overlapping, and competing 
legalities. Thus, legal personhood is blurred and stretched between these various 
layers and authorities. The disciplinary effect of the order of gender governance lies 
in this blurring of legal personhood that reduces possibilities for pinning down 
gender discrimination and contesting it. 
This argument is laid out in three steps. In the first section, legal authority over 
family law is found to be multiple and competing between state and non-state actors. 
In the second section, the substance of legal directives largely relies on unscripted 
religious directives that blur legal personhood. The fourth section discusses the 
disciplining effect resulting from multiple legal authorities and unscripted directives. 
Finally, the concluding section summarises and reflects on the main argument. 
6.2 Multiple authorities and legalities 
In this section I explore the various institutional realms of legal authority that 
'manage' legal personhood in the sense used by Foucault (1980) to describe how 
state institutions control populations. These authorities act as multiple overlapping 
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and conflicting sovereignties that establish particular 'regimes of truth' about 
populations (discussed in detail below in chapter 7). In the case of Lebanon, several 
institutions intersect, compete, or run in parallel to legislate legal personhood in 
family law. These dynamics fonn a web of 'plurality of legal orders' (Santos 2002). 
Santos proposes to analyse the various authorities constituting legal plurality in terms 
of infrastate or suprastate legal orders. This framework is useful to analyse the 
dynamic layers of legal orders that are formed by various authorities. However, it is 
limited in the sense that it adopts a western-centred view of the state and places it at 
the centre of the legal orders. In order to account for this bias, I adapt this framework 
by using the suffix 'state' in its broadest sense to refer to 'official' institutions, 
whether civil or religious as stated in my definitions section 1.5. 
The main question driving this section is to ask who has what power over shaping 
legal personhood in family relations. It aims at dispelling the state-religious 
institutional dichotomy in two ways. It unpacks the state by showing that it is 
composed of multiple bureaucracies with different interests drawn against an 
imaginary state (Gupta 2006).130 It also traces the overlap between civil and religious 
institutions in various post-colonial contexts and their amalgamation into governance 
frameworks (Mamdani 1996) that construct the legality of women rights in family 
law. The analysis mainly relies on the institutional actors that make up the 
governmental and non-governmental authorities on legislation of family law. 
6.2.1 The Lebanese family law judicial system 
The starting point is to explore at two levels: i) who actually constitutes the 'heads of 
recognised religious communities' who hold ultimate authority over family law as 
per the Article 23 (L.R. 21/09/1990) of the post-conflict amended constitution; and 
ii) how is their power channelled through governance practices. The officially 
recognised heads of religious communities are organised in two types of bodies: a 
130 In their joint work, Gupta and Ferguson (1997) mention that research contains a significant bias 
when analysing social processes through a 'vertical slice'. Much research places primacy on the 
macro structures or institutions at the expense of the bottom end of the slice where populations or 
research subjects are perceived to be located. In this section, I approach the vertical slice of authority 
in an onion-like analysis, from the governmental to the non-governmental entities, the non-
governmental being the normative-legal authorities that women also engage with in their daily lives. I 
make the argument that all levels of authority are interrelated and draw a web of legality across which 
women's legal personhood is fragmented. 
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collection of Religious Councils for Muslim communities and Patriarchies for 
Christian ones.131 At the same time, they oversee the religious courts system. In both 
these structures, the boundaries between governmental and non-governmental 
institutions are blurred. 
Religious councils 
When the organisational make up of Islamic Councils is traced, they are found to 
combine both governmental and non-governmental structures. On one side, they are 
directly linked to the state as they are organisationally attached to the Prime 
Minister's Office and financially included in the state budget (L.G. 13/01/1955; L.R. 
19/12/1967). Islamic councils act as a representative and oversight body due to its 
elected structure while Islamic courts have the legal specialty of implementing 
family law. J32 These councils benefit from state budgetary allocation for an 
administrative pool of civil servants while having an independent representative and 
oversight role. The Sunni Muslim community in particular holds a special status in 
relation to the state. Unlike other Islamic communities, it was never 'officially 
recognised' by the state through any laws, which implies that Sunni Islam is 
considered the default official religion of the state following the Ottoman legacy 
(Lebanese Republic 1955). 
Islamic Councils are also structured as elected bodies formed by 'notable citizens' 
subscribed under the religious community. Members include current and former 
MPs, ministers, and professionals who elect a board and a president. There are two 
main Islamic Religious Councils.133 The Higher Islamic Judicial Council (Majlis al-
Qa{iii' al-Sharcz ai-ACta) is the entity governing the Sunni popUlations in Lebanon. It 
was officially established in 1955,134 after historically being the official council of the 
131 The Israelite community is not currently represented by any religious leader. Its members are not 
openly practicing in Lebanon. Many have either migrated or converted to Christianity after the 
establishment of the Israeli state. 
J32 This also applies to the Druze, Alawi, and Ismaili Muslim authorities in Lebanon. 
133 The Sectarian council for the Druze Community oversees the affairs of the Druze community in 
Lebanon and is headed by the Sheikh Al e Aql. The Higher Alawi Council, which represents the Alawi 
community in Lebanon that is a branch of Shiea Islam, was officially established in 1998 shortly after 
the community was officially recognised by the state. It includes current and former Alawi MPs and 
ministers. 
134 Sunni Institutions were organised through Decree number 18 issued on 13 January 1955 entitled 
"Jurisprudence and Islamic Waqfs". This decree confirmed the Mufti as the head of Muslim 
Communities in Lebanon. 
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Ottoman empire in Beirut (Spagnolo 1977). The council includes all living prime 
ministers (who customarily belong to the Sunni Muslim sect since independence with 
the exception of the first post-independence prime minister), Sunni MPs and 
Ministers, and other officials in the Islamic Council's organisational structure. 13S This 
council elects the Mufti of the Republic who presides over it. The Mufti has the title 
of 'religious head and representative of Muslims' and enjoys an overarching status 
over all Islamic Affairs and an oversight status over all Muslim communities (L.G. 
13/01l1955). 
The Higher Shica Islamic Council was established later in 1967 and includes on its 
board the living current and former speakers of the parliament (who are customarily 
elected among the Shica community) as well as Shica MPs and Ministers (L.R. 
19/12/1967). This council was formed after the Shica community was officially 
recognised in 1926 by a French mandate law as "an independent religious 
community that is subject to the Jaafari Sect family law in matters of personal status" 
(Decision 3503, 27/111926). On 19 December 1967, a law relating to organising the 
structure of the Shica Islamic Sect in Lebanon was issued (L.R. 19/12/1967). The 
1967 law established the Higher Islamic Shica Council as an official body, composed 
of an elected president and board by members of the Shica community, and 
administratively and financially affiliated to the state and overseeing Shica religious 
courts (L.R. 19/12/1967. A. 27). 
Based on the above explanation, Islamic Councils can be likened to quasI 
autonomous non-governmental organisations (quangos). Quangos are "organisations 
which were in no way officially part of government, such as not-for-profit 
corporations, but which were effectively used by government to deliver public 
policy" (Hogwood 1995:207). Carsten Greve (1999) found that quangos are diverse 
and hold variable levels of 'practical autonomy' (rather than formal or legal) from 
state actors. Thus, religious councils hold a shifting discursive position that bridges 
between notions of communitarian and universalist citizenship. They act as both as 
legitimate insider 'community' representatives of citizens ascribed to this sectarian 
13S Prime Ministers in Lebanon are customarily appointed from the Sunni community 
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category, while they enforce legally binding rules of family law on behalf of the 
state. 
The legal bodies organising the Christian and Israelite communities are completely 
dissociated from state structures. As these communities are historically considered by 
the state as religious minorities (Dhimmis), their structures were completely 
autonomous from the state and there are no legal directives organising their councils. 
According to Thompson (2000) the heads of these communities sought to maintain 
their independence from the state after negotiations with French colonial rulers. 
Religiously affiliated civil structures are also in place. Leagues such as the Maronite 
League comprise Maronite MPs and politicians who are closely affiliated to the 
religious heads of communities and the Patriarchates (LE3 2011). Even if they do not 
have a direct structural influence over family law issues, they are major actors in 
disseminating the religious authorities' discourses of the issue and supporting them 
in the parliament. 
Religious courts system 
The judicial framework for religious family law in Lebanon is organised through 
'exceptional' religious courts established exclusively for this purpose. They 
constitute the only judicial structure that is based on religious law. They are 
institutionally and administratively fully independent from the civil judicial system 
and the Ministry of Justice. Here also there is a distinction between the status of 
Christian and Muslim courts. Muslim courts were established in 1962 as part of 
public administration composed of religious judges and administrative staff who are 
employed as civil servants. Islamic Judicial Courts (Maf)iikem SharCiyya), including 
Sunni, Shica, Druze, and Alawi courts are administratively affiliated to the Prime 
Minister's Office. They are subject to formal inspection by the Council of Civil 
Service only in relation to administrative performance rather than in relation to the 
religious content of their practice. They all fall under the legal and administrative 
authority of the Higher Religious Judicial Council. 
Christian religious courts are completely independent from the government's 
authority and most of them have supranational linkages with the primary religious 
bodies that represent these communities outside of Lebanon. The structures of the 
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courts and the mechanisms of appointing religious judges is completely independent 
and left entirely to the directives of each Church (Takieddine 1996). For instance, the 
Maronite courts follow the Catholic Church and take up appeals or annulment 
requests to the Rota Court in the Vatican. Similarly, the Appeal court of the Greek 
Orthodox Church is based in Aleppo or Antioch and their verdicts for appeal are 
applicable in Lebanon. Hence these courts operate as a suprastate authority that 
enforces directives on Lebanese territory (Santos 2002). 
The blurring between civil and religious authorities is exemplified in the procedures 
for implementing legal directives issued by these courts. Two types of civil 
governmental actors are closely associated with the role of religious courts and 
directly influence legal personhood. The Attorney General at the Ministry of Justice 
and the Police Forces affiliated to the Ministry of Interior are responsible for 
enforcing the decision of religious courts and reinforcing the legality of family 
relations through the civil penal system, mainly within three areas (Zalzal 2000). 
First in the case of domestic violence,136 individuals need to file a complaint at the 
police stations. The police refer to the attorney general of the district to issue arrest 
warrants against the perpetrators. 
Second, in Muslim family law applied in Lebanon, the wife has the duty of being 
domiciled (musiikana) at her husband's designated accommodation. 137 In case the 
wife deserts the 'marital home', the husband files a case at the religious courts to 
force her to go back (usually with a very high rate of success) or otherwise she is 
considered 'nushu (niishez) and is not entitled to any rights. In case of positive 
ruling, and until recently, police forces were entitled to physically dragging women 
back to their marital homes to apply the domiciliation ruling. While this practice was 
abolished in the post-conflict period, women subjected to such rulings are banned 
from leaving the country on the basis that they are outlaws. Police forces apply this 
order in a way similar to a restraining order. Third, the police are also in charge of 
enforcing religious courts' decisions in relation to child custody disputes or payment 
of alimony. The executive authority of the civil system indicates while the religious 
136 Domestic violence is criminalised in the Lebanese civil penal code (L.R. 18/09/1948) in terms of 
bodily harm, and excludes marital rape because it contradicts religious family laws operating in 
Lebanon. 
137Shehadeh (1998) asserts that this also applies to Christian family codes. 
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courts are considered as 'exceptional' and largely independent, their legal mandate is 
recognised at a national level. However, it is important not to overemphasise the 
structural role of these councils. As in other conflict-affected contexts, the 
representative power of legal structures is undermined by the failure of the state to 
cater for its citizens (Welchman 2002). 
6.2.2 Unofficial religious 'normative' authorities 
In addition to these official religious authorities, legal personhood is also shaped by 
various non-governmental religious organisations. Their role as authorities 
contributes to installing a parallel order of legality that intersects with, but does not 
always coincide with the official circumscription of legal personhood. During my 
fieldwork, I came across these forms of authorities that rely on a specific form of 
arbitration recognised by Shiea jurisprudence. From discussions with women 
respondents, I gathered other religious communities have comparable institutional 
mechanisms that provide various forms of religious arbitration expertise. 
These Shiea organisations are known as 'Religious Arbitration Bureaus' (maktab al-
/:liikem al-sharcT) CRABs hereafter). They are a specific type of Shiea community 
organisations registered as charitable/non-profit organisations, and sometimes 
operate as small branches of larger Shiea charities. They are concerned with 
providing arbitration on daily religious issues ranging from disputes over commercial 
and land tenure to family law. They provide their arbitration services on a voluntary 
basis to willing individuals. They were established gradually in the 1980s following 
the post-revolutionary Iranian model of family law court system, or 'Special Civil 
Courts' that are headed by religious judges also referred to as '/:liikem sharcr and are 
part of the official legal system (Mir-Hosseini 2000). 
RABs constitute an alternative legal system that can be referred to as 'informal 
Sharica' (Berger 1999). Their authority over legal personhood is related to the Shiea 
Islamic tradition of emulation 138 Ctaqlid) (Esposito and Bas 2001). In concordance 
138 As the Shica tradition of jurisprudence (ijtihad) accommodates difference in interpretation, 
religious references are not formalised into any official structure. This means that Shica adherents, 
including court judges, are not bound by one religious reference/authority (marja ') who acts as a 
source of religious jurisprudence on various matters expanding from religious rituals to mundane 
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with Shica scholarly religious tradition, individuals follow the directives of selected 
religious 'references' (marlijeC) or publicly learned religious scholars (u/emas), who, 
alive or departed, have practiced and documented extensive legal opinions on various 
aspects of social, political and economic life surrounding Shica Muslims (Kusha 
2002). In this sense, their authority is not restricted to family law but encompass any 
other religious advice they require. They build popularity by the increasing numbers 
of followers who emulate them and seek their advice. Most religious leaders and 
judges also emulate religious 'references' to issue their court rulings as they do not 
enjoy this specific learned capacity. 
Although there are 'hundreds' of RABs as one Shica court judge mentioned (RJI 
2005), there are three most popular ones in Lebanon, each closely affiliated to 
political streams within the Shica political groups in Lebanon. These RABs are 
legally and administratively separate from the state and the Shica religious courts 
system. They are thus independent religious organisations that provide religious legal 
advice on all religious matters ranging from questions about proper application of 
religious directives, personal quarrels, financial disputes, and most importantly, 
personal status issues. Their main role is ultimately that of arbitrators, which relies 
on important mediation and counselling abilities. They use a non-official religious 
judicial framework that is adopted by individuals who seek their services, yet it is not 
necessarily officially enforced in the Shica court system. 
The 'expertise' of these religious references intersects with Shica political actors and 
spreads into a supra national web of legal authority from Lebanon, to Iraq and Iran, 
who would themselves emulate particular religious references and encourage their 
followers to do so. Political and religious authorities are intricately linked further as 
Shica political parties link with Shica RABs who dictate their religious legal 
framework for their followers. For instance, the Imam Khamene'i RAB was 
established in the mid-1980s. It draws its legitimacy from Iranian religious 
references and acts as the judiciary branch for Hezbollah. Another prominent RAB 
was established in 1987 and follows the prominent Lebanese scholar Imam 
Fadlallah. After being the religious leader of Hezbollah in the 1980s, he branched 
dealings. They can instead choose to emulate (taqlic/) any of the various existing Shica authorities they 
most identify with. This creates a multiplicity in legal authority and legal subjectivity. 
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out, established himself as a moderate religious reference, and enJoys broad 
following among many observant and moderate Shicas. 
Similarly, the Imam Sastani RAB, established in 2001 , draws its legitimacy from 
Iraqi religious references and is closely affiliated to the Amal Movement. 139 This 
movement is the main Shica political party that competes with Hezbollah on 
patronage. It is established for a longer period and thus is well institutionalised 
within state structures. It is headed by the influential speaker of parliament Nabih 
Berri , who has been in power since 1992 and reinforced his authority by channelling 
state funds to his Shica constituencies by establishing the Council of the South in the 
early 1990s. Despite the strong alliance of the two political parties, they compete 
over popular support. These intersections have strong implications on the selection of 
religious judges. Due to the official political power of the Amal movement and its 
influence on civil service appointments, it succeeded in appointing most Shica court 
judges among its sympathisers. 
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139 The RAB of the Sastani Office. It is the most recent one, established in 200 I by Sheikh 
Mohammad Mehdi Shamseddine, the former head of the Highest Muslim Shica Council. 
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RABs constitute an authority that is both suprastatal as it could derive its legitimacy 
from transnational religious judicial networks. 140 It is also an infrastatal authority in 
the sense that its directives are not recognised by official religious legal structures. 
However, as Rabo (2005) reminds us, non-legal religious authorities do not construct 
legal personhood in complete separation from the national legal order. They 
contribute to an intertwined composite of legal personhood that is mainly framed by 
state techniques such as civic records and a multi-levelled court system. 
This section explained how the order of gender governance is constructed through a 
web of mUltiple legal authorities of family law judiciary. The implications of this 
multiplicity in legality are discussed in the next section. 
6.3 Family law jurisprudence and women's subjectivity 
This section discusses the way the order of gender governance is enacted through the 
blurring of legal content of family law directives. Most debates on religious 
jurisprudence, and especially Islamic one, are excessively legal-centric in terms of 
considering family law as fixed and holding well-defined statutory directives. While 
family law legislation in several Arab countries has been effectively codified 
(Welchman 2007), the Lebanese case tends to be erroneously included in the same 
vein (on such example is Moghadam, Karshenas et al. 2006). Hence, a religious-
secular dichotomy is sustained. Some of these analyses adopt a secularist approach 
and trace gender bias inherent in the religious provisions (Kusha 2002). 
Alternatively, they adopt a revisionist approach that assess gender equality in the 
'true' precepts of religious doctrine (Esposito and Bas 2001; Hashim 1999). This 
latter approach further emphasises the dichotomy between 'high' and 'low' religion. 
Depending on the perspective such analyses either denounce the 'spirit' of religion as 
a rigid set of mostly non-modern or anti-democratic religious provision, or discounts 
interpretation as distorting an otherwise equitable framework (Mir-Hosseini 2000). 
140 This supra-legal personhood was noted also in other religious groups. The example of WI 0 
illustrates the point. WlO is a Druze woman respondent whose battle for divorce and child custody 
was bitterly co-opted by her powerful husband. After years of stalled court processes, she sought the 
arbitration of a highly esteemed and popular Druze religious reference. After assessing her situation, 
he granted her a divorce ruling on the basis of her grievances. The Druze court rejected it as legally 
unbinding because the religious judge did not recognise the reference as a valid authority. 
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Both dichotomies represent one main weakness of the legal centric approach. They 
take various legal directives, whether secular, religious, in their high or low form as 
legal 'facts'. The weakness of such perspectives are detailed elsewhere (such as in 
Santos 2002). In this section, I intend to dispel legal centrism in family law in order 
to make way to the broader gendering effect of family law that is found in the 
enactment of legislation (Le. the substance of religious jurisprudence). I therefore 
focus on the process of 'fact making' or in this case the process by which legal 
authorities 'fabricate' the rules of legal directives of family law (Pottage 2004). In 
short, it explores how various legal authorities selectively legitimate various sources 
of legislation and regulate the personal relations of individuals. 
A starting point is to explore the realm of institutional power of legislation that 
various authorities have within the Lebanese legal setting. As discussed in chapter 5, 
the code of religious communities (Decision 60, 13/03/1936) allowed 'recognised 
communities' to hold full authority over family law jurisprudence and to establish 
their own religious courts with an 'exceptional' status. As mentioned in the previous 
section, there is variation between the structural affiliation of Islamic and Christian 
religious courts to the Lebanese state. Christian courts are completely autonomous 
and are not subject to any administrative scrutiny by the Lebanese state. In contrast 
Islamic courts are structurally included part of the state administrative apparatus, in 
the sense that the Islamic judicial body Gudges and clerks) are civil servants. They 
are subject only to administrative regulation by the Lebanese civil judicial system 
through the National Audit Bureau (Takieddine 1996). 
Here some mainstream analyses consider that as Islamic courts are governmental 
structures, they are subjected to close governmental scrutiny (Traboulsi 1996). In 
contrast, Christian courts are often singled out as having full control over the legal 
personhood of Christian citizens due to their completely autonomous status 
(Traboulsi 1996). 
However, emphasising structural affiliation misses the point. In both cases, the 
'state' - or more specifically the civil legal system, does not have any control over 
the substance of jurisprudence operating in family law courts. The exceptional status 
of courts grants them free hand in terms of the substance of legislation. Both Islamic 
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and Christian courts enjoy complete autonomy in relation to the content of the legal 
provisions they adopt. In fact, the Lebanese state has limited monitoring authority 
over religious courts restricted only to the form and process of court sessions. The 
state does not have any jurisdiction power over the substance and content of religious 
codes which are solely monitored by religious authorities. Articles 95 and 738 of the 
Guidelines for Civil Trials allow citizens to turn to the civil courts in order to contest 
the validity of any verdicts made by Sharic courts (L.R. 16/07/1962). However, in 
contrast to Traboulsi's (1996) analysisThis authority is limited to the form and the 
processing of the court case rather than in the content of the dispute. Furthermore, 
this civil authority is acknowledged in cases where religious courts do not provide 
any directives on family law issues, which is very rare (L.R. 16/07/1962). 
A closer look at the codes that these religious courts rely on reveals the extent of 
their exceptional status. Within Christian denominations, the Maronite courts follow 
the Law on Marriage for Eastern Catholic denominations (L.R. 22/2/1949).141 The 
autonomy of the courts is confirmed by (Mallat 1997:31) as follows: 
For non-Muslims, personal status jurisdiction is split: the law of inheritance and wills 
falls under national civil jurisdiction, while Christian and Jewish religious courts are 
competent for marriage, divorce, and custody. All these courts have more than one 
degree, and Catholic communities enjoy a special and unusual extra-territorial right of 
appeal before the Vatican Rota court. 
) 
In contrast, Sunni and Shi'a courts follow the Law of Shar'i Courts issued on 
16/7/1962. This code organises in details the court procedures and rulings for both 
courts while specifying any differences within individual articles. 
Several studies on Islamic law in Lebanon erroneously mistook this law for a specific 
codification of Islamic family law (some examples are: EI Alami and Hinchcliffe 
1996 ; Shehadeh 1998). However, nowhere in the text of the law of 1962 is there any 
141 The Eastern Catholic code also applies to Melkite, Armenian, Syrian, Latin, and Chaldanean, Other 
denominations have their own codes such as Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, 
Assyrian Orthodox, and Anglican communities. 
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indication to the specific directives for marriage contracts and their effects. In fact 
Article 242 of the Law of Shar' i Courts (L.R. 161711962) specifies that: 142 
The Sunni Judge issues his ruling in concordance to the most influential dictations of 
Madhhab Abi Hanifa except in cases indicated in Law of Family Rights issued on 8 
Muharram 1336 and 25 October 1933, so the Sunni Judge applies that law. And the 
Jaafari Judge issues his ruling according to the Jaafari denomination and in any 
compatible directives from the Law of the Family. 
This article is significant in that it concentrates judicial power within religious judges 
and does not specify any detailed jurisprudence but opens it instead to a myriad of 
religious sources. 
The multiplicity of Islamic jurisprudence within family law deserves special 
attention. Contrary to some narrow interpretations, religious judges are entitled to 
extend their rulings on a vast realm of jurisdiction (fiqh) beyond the scriptural 
dictations of the Quran (examples of these interpretations include Lerner 2000; 
Shachar 2009; Zahraa 1996). For example, an array of detailed religious opinions 
relies on the Prophet's attributed accounts (hadith). 
Specifically, within Shica jurisprudence, religious narratives are important sources. 
As RJ2 (2005) explained in an interview about Shica jurisprudence, "Our source 
[basis for judgment] is the prophet's hadiths (accounts) as well as his companions 
(suhaba). And these are transmitted through different 'recollections' (riwayot)". 
The power of the religious authorities lies in selecting and interpreting these 
narratives, hence emphasizing specific techniques marking them as 'experts' in the 
field. Rather than making up a linear theological hierarchy,143 this expertise relies on 
"competing values, norms and commands" (Bowen 2003: 1 0). As explained by a 
Shica religious judge (RJ2 2005), judges in Sunni courts mainly rely on two 
jurisprudential practices, the judge's 'preference' (isti/:lson) that involves a process of 
142 In this article, reference is made to the Ottoman Law of the Rights of the Family only under the 
condition that it does not contradict Sunni and Jaafari Shar' 
143 Zubaida (2003) elaborates a hierarchy of sources with the Quran at the top and (reasoning) at the 
bottom. However, my fieldwork showed that this hierarchy is not used when making legal decisions in 
Shica courts. Moreover, it is not upheld by judges because of the contradictions inherent in various 
directives. 
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rationalisation, and 'analogy' (qiyiis) that involves weighing different issues and 
judgements against each other. In contrast, Shica judges take it a step further due the 
open nature of jurisprudence (ijtihiid). 1jtihiid is a process allowing learned religious 
references to build on the narratives and come up with new precedents for rulings 
(Zubaida 2003). Religious judges are entitled to emulate (taqlfd) different religious 
sources and rely on their jurisprudential interpretation. The practice of ijtihiid is 
reserved for the exclusive expertise of learned scholars who gain credibility and 
reputation for their endeavours: 
Shica rulings are [ ... ] based on ijtiMd or jurisprudence on scientific basis, by specifying 
the source and the source that referred to the source in order to make sure that the ijtiMd 
would not be against al-duca al-~aleb (righteous call). An ijtihiid should be towards a 
'rightful' path/cause/purpose and not a 'wrong' one. 
(RJI2005) 
These law making practices imply that Islamic legislation is mUltiple within Shica 
and Sunni Islamic jurisprudence despite the differences in the details of the process 
(An-Nairn 2002). Following from this point, religious judges can rely on various 
Islamic sources for their rulings. Hence, family law judgements are not based on 
common legal basis; they are located in a myriad of intertwined religious knowledge: 
[For example] [t]here are different stories specifying that in the Shica tradition, the 
custody [for boys] is set at the age 2 or 7. So some judges would apply either versions 
and here where it gets confusing. (RJ2 2005) 
Thus, jurisprudence is fluid and based on competing rationalisation and interpretation 
of clerics rather than on a detailed codification of Islamic jurisprudence. The 
information on jurisprudence and rulings is dispersed over a plethora of religious 
books that are not published centrally or systemically, and thus none are legally 
binding in Islamic courts. 
In this sense there is no unified legal 'code' with detailed legal content. It depends on 
the judge's own validation of particular religious sources over others. 
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These practices posit religious judges as single nodes of decision making and hence 
validators of 'legal facts'. As religious authorities produce, use and validate mUltiple 
jurisprudence, they assert their position as experts and monopolise legal knowledge 
as an elusive currency. Judges are at double advantage over lawyers defending their 
clients. It poses a problem for them as they have no recourse to any unified legal text 
that explicitly states the rights and duties of the marital couple. Hence, with multiple 
and competing sources, it is not possible for individuals to 'locate' favourable 
interpretations of their rights in these codes. Lawyers are trained in civil law and are 
not usually well versed in such a multiple form of religious jurisprudence. They also 
have no formal influence over the validation of legal knowledge that the judges 
might adopt. Lawyers can appeal the decisions of judges, but the same problem 
arises at the higher levels as rulings are made in concordance to the judges' own 
interpretations of Fiqh. 
The selective validation of legal knowledge also reinforces the status of religious 
authorities as legal personae and the commodified position of individuals. This is 
exemplified in the relationship of religious courts and the RABs. The RABs rulings 
are not automatically validated by religious judges in Shica family law courts. For 
various reasons religious judges might not emulate the same religious references that 
have issued the rulings and could consider them void. 144 As discussed in the previous 
section, the political linkages between judges and RABs are also an important factor. 
It has been noted that as the religious judges in the Shica courts were mostly by one 
party (the Amal Movement) they tend not to validate religious judgements issued by 
their rival Hezbollah affiliated Imam Khamine'i RAB or Imam Fadlallah's RAB. Ifa 
woman is granted a divorce ruling by any of these RABs,145 this divorce might not 
take official status. Religious Shica court judges might not accept to officially 
register it if they do not follow the same political and jurisprudence affiliation. 
144 The RABs verdicts have religious validity for the party who seeks the ruling of the arbitrator. For 
instance, let us take the case of a woman who puts a request for the arbitrator to divorce her from her 
husband without his consent (which is something that is not allowed in Shica courts). If the arbitrator 
approves and grants her divorce, then the husband does not need to agree to the verdict, because the 
arbitrator has got a higher authority over him. However this divorce has got only a religious capacity 
and not an official one. In order for the divorce to be validated officially, it needs to be approved by 
the Shica court and this is where the tension lies. 
145 Some RABs are known to be more lenient towards granting women divorce, which in Shica law is 
very difficult to obtain. 
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This situation poses a problem of gendered legal personhood. For example, in the 
case of divorce, the woman in question would be divorced in the religious-normative 
(Shar'i) non-official realm, but would still be officially married to her husband in the 
official realm of the religious courts and civic records. As (RCL5 2005) explained, 
there are many cases of such legal blurring. Here is where an inclusive definition of 
legal pluralism is needed to accommodate the fragmented legal personhood of 
women over the official and non-official religious-legal realms. Women usually 
identify with the non-official categorisation as it presents an avenue for resisting 
gender discrimination in the official realm. In such cases, women would contract an 
unofficial religious marriage contract that remains unregistered, mostly under the 
fonn of 'pleasure' or temporary marriage (mu{a). However, if they have children 
from their unofficial marriages, they would not able to register them in national civic 
records because of the issues around official paternity rights. 146 Thus, women may 
resort to exercise their legal subjectivity within the unofficial realm. However, they 
cannot fully escape the official framework as their fonner husbands might accuse 
them adultery or bigamy. The multiplicity of jurisprudence reflects an interlegality 
that reinforces the commodification of individuals to be discussed in the next section 
(Santos 2002). 
6.4 The disciplinary effect of legal frameworks and the 'imagined' legal 
personhood 
In this section, the disciplining effect of the two techniques of gender governance is 
discussed. Through the two previous sections, legal frameworks were shown to draw 
multiple legal personhood in family law through multiple authorities, and blurred 
jurisprudence. Santos (2002:97) refers to a state of 'interlegality' to explain the 
"impact of this legal plurality on the legal experiences, perceptions and 
consciousness of the individuals and social groups living under conditions of legal 
plurality, above all the fact that their everyday life crosses or is interpenetrated by 
different and often contrasting legal order as and cultures." This section explains how 
interlegality is underpinned by a gendered logic that affects women's legal 
146 In Lebanon women are entitled to legally register their children under their own names. However, 
it is scarcely practiced because of social stigma. 
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personhood and engulfs women's legal personhood within the patriarchal and 
communitarian authority as indicated in figure 2.147 
The gendered logic of legal frameworks is reflected in the ways legal personhood of 
men and women are commodified differently as 'property' of the collective persona 
of the 'community'. Women tend to be the weakest link in the 'legal 
personhood/property chain' as they are deprived of a basic legal capacity (ahliyya) in 
matters relating to family law (Zalzal 2000). All Lebanese religious legal 
frameworks recognise men as the 'heads of the family' and hence reinforce their 
authority over women. Women's legal capacity is relegated to their husbands, 
fathers, or any other male legal guardians. Women have to resort to those guardians 
to insure entry to marriage, or securing divorce (in denominations that allow it)148 
(Shehadeh 2004). The lack of legal capacity also extends to children's custody. 
Religious legislation allows women to have custody of their children for a certain 
time, but she cannot have guardianship of them. In case of the husband's death, some 
religious regulations transfer guardianship to the paternal grandparents (Shehadeh 
2004). This reinforces women's shift from legal personhood to legal property 
(Pottage 2004). 
147 Parolin (2008) describes similar three realms of citizenship in Arab countries (affiliation to kin, 
religious community, and nation state) but these realms are discussed in relation to various social 
f,roups rather than to an overlap of various layers. Also no impact on legal personhood is discussed. 
48 As an example, when contracting Shica and Sunni marriages, women need to delegate a man -
usually their fathers or religious registrar- to contract the marriage on her behalf. In the case of 
dominant Shica jurisprudence, obtaining divorce is the prerogative of men. Women are not entitled to 
obtain divorce in Jaafari courts without their husbands' approval. Women need to submit a divorce 
application to a Religious Arbitrator who would look at the case and is entitled to grant them divorce 
without their husbands' approval. However, in this process, women need to delegate the Religious 
Arbitrator as their legal guardian who is also religiously entitled to authorise the divorce. In that sense 
women's legal capacity is mediated as they are not technically entitled to 'divorce themselves', but 
delegate their legal personhood to the authority of the religious arbitrator (RCL5 2005). 
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Figure 2: The configuration of women' s legal personhood in relation to legal authorities. 
Women' s legal capacity is also compromised in civil codes through two layers of 
institutional webs of disciplining. In addition to family law, women' s individual legal 
personhood is confined within the two collective legal categories of the family and 
the religious communities. As a first layer, civic records classify women 's legal 
personhood under the collective legal category of the patrilineal family (Fieldnotes 
2005). By birth, women are registered under the category of their fathers ' family 
civic records alongside their mothers and other siblings. If they get married, women 
move to their husbands' family records, and in case of divorce, back to their fathers ' . 
In this way the argument of Pateman (1988) on the ' sexual contract' is very relevant 
here. 
As a second layer, the Civic Records Code (L.R. 711211951) also confines women to 
the religious category. This goes against the arguments claiming secular-religious 
dichotomy between the state and the religious institution. 149 In the early post-conflict 
period, the government launched a much-publicised campaign to remove the 
sectarian affiliation from national Identity Cards. This measure was part of the state' s 
effort to ' desectarianisation' . This measure responded to one of the most traumatic 
149 This generalisation is common among Lebanese jurists and academics such as Edmond Nairn 
(1996). 
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war practices known as 'execution based on ID cards' (al qatl ala al-hawiyya). 
During the civil war, various Militia groups liquidated thousands of citizens by 
simply checking their ID cards on checkpoints. Effectively the Ministry of Interior 
issued new ID cards with no sectarian category on them. This measure was widely 
acclaimed by the general public and helped sustain the myth of desectarianisation 
generated in the Taif agreement. 
However, the Ministry of Interior applied only cosmetic and partial 
desectarianisation of civic records. The sectarian category was only removed from 
ID cards. The Directorate of Personal Status at the Ministry of Interior uses it as a 
main classification system for civic records. Hence citizens are organised according 
to sectarian categories that are used in the sectarian voting system and family law. As 
a result, civic records classify women's legal personhood under the sectarian 
category. Women's legal personhood is mediated through a double ring of legal 
personae of the family and religion that complements that of the two other legal 
frameworks of personal citizenship, namely the constitution and family law. 
Women go through 'revolving doors' of enactment of legal personhood created by 
the multiple authorities of the judicial and supra/ultra-legal authorities. I illustrate the 
argument by explaining the situation of W3 (2005). W3 is a Syrian national residing 
in Lebanon. She was married for 12 years to an undocumented Lebanese man and 
thus is legally unrecognised as a Lebanese citizen. However, he is recognised by the 
'Latin'ISO Church as a religious person since he was christened there. He was 
previously married but could not annul that marriage. In order to be remarried, they 
did the round of several religious authorities in order to have a marriage contract: 
INTO I: At first, when your husband was married and you wanted to elope, who came up 
with the suggestion, or how did it happen that he converted to become Muslim? 
W3: He went to their Archbishopric, and they would not give him [divorce]. His wife 
wanted $5,000. He told them "I don't have a single dollar from the $5000, from where 
do I get them for her?" He went two, three times. According to what he said, they had 
ISO The 'Latin' Church (Ta'ifat AI-latin) is a small Catholic denomination that exists in Lebanon and 
the Levant that is associated to the Carmelite Order. It was originally founded by Roman papal 
delegates who settled in Mount Carmel near Haifa. 
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told her, she was infonned and she started screaming in the court, and they kicked her 
out of the court. They told her "we judge, not you" 
INTO 1: And they did not rule in his favour? 
W3: No they did not. She reported first time, second time, third time, and she did not 
come. The fourth time she did not come, so they closed the issue. 
[ ... J 
So then he told them that he wiJI become Muslim and they told him "do whatever you 
want, there is nothing we can do" 
INT01: And what was your opinion? 
W3: There was no other way. We went before to the Sayde church in Achrafieh and we 
told the story to Father Elias and he said "we cannot, his wife is still under his name, we 
cannot do it" 
INTO I: The Sayde church is Orthodox 
W3: Yes and they too did not agree. Then we went to the Archbishopric, and I went 
with him to their Archbishopric. Same answer, no way. 
[ ... J 
INTO 1 : Where was the Sheikh you went to? 
W3: In Jbeil. 
INTO I : And how was it? 
W3: There were witnesses and he told him the story and all. He said okay no problem. 
So he converted - "istashhad", "Sh!had", I don't know what they say. I did not because 
I have not been married before. And he gave him the marriage certificate (watheeqat al-
zawaj). 
INTO 1 : How was the Sheikh? How was he dealing with the issue? 
W3: He accepted with an open heart (bi kill sadr rabb), he did not have an issue (ishkel). 
He asked him "how long have you been separated?" He told him "It has been 9 years, 
10 years since I have been separated from my wife". So he told him "yes it is your 
right," and it worked out. 
Their marriage was never registered in court or in civic records and when their 
marriage fell apart; they did not go through any legal divorce procedure, although 
their separation is recognised by her as 'divorce'. Since her former husband is 
undocumented, her son is also denied an officially recognised citizenship status. Yet, 
her son is recognised as a Maronite person since she had him christened at the church 
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to which she is subscribed. The local Maronite church provides him with free 
education because of her tight financial situation. Because of this complexity, her son 
is unable to cross the borders to visit his grandparents in Syria because he is 
undocumented and would limit his life options in the future. At the time of the 
interview, her family was exploring solutions for her undocumented son by trying to 
register him in the civic records as her brother. When I asked W3 whether she would 
marry again, she replied, "it would be only to someone who would accept to register 
my son under his name". In an indication of how the complexity of legal personhood 
is affecting her, the disciplinary power of multiple legality is sensed here. 
The multiplicity of legal frameworks has also a profound disciplinary effect on the 
way legal personhood is 'imagined'. It affects the ways in which individuals assess 
the 'problem' of family law and the implications the system has on them in four 
ways. First, individuals try to hold on to a state-centred universalist definition of their 
legal personhood. An example of this is a discussion I had with W4. I met W4 at the 
office of L WNGO 1 located in a central part of Beirut. W 4 was in her mid-thirties and 
lived in a lower-middle class suburb of Beirut and has been using L WNGOI 's legal 
and psychological support services for a few months. She described herself as a 
housewife (sift bayt), marrying young at 18 years old and missing out on higher 
education. She was fighting a legal battle at the Armenian Orthodox family law court 
to divorce her violent husband and gain custody and alimony for her two daughters. 
At the time of the interview, her case was continuously delayed by religious judges 
and she was worried that they would not rule in her favour. 
W4 (2005) came across as an articulate woman who knew a good deal about the 
complexities of the legal system and was eager to find answers. She welcomed me 
with this opening stance by way of greeting: 
Where is the state? Tell me? For it to grant me my rights. [ ... ]. The woman is not 
secured in Lebanon. She does not have rights at all. She is humiliated and beaten up and 
starved and she is not secured by the state. [ ... ] who do I turn to now? [ ... ] I got this 
problem (mu~lba). I can't get out of it. But I did not get my rights until now. 
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W 4 expressed her legal personhood in terms of expectations from the state. She 
pointed to the disconnect between the concept of 'legal right' as a commodity and 
the enactment of norms associated to family relations. She showcased 'rights' against 
the "self regulat[ed] [practices] of a semi-autonomous social field" (Griffiths 
1986:38). Most importantly, W4 did not primarily identify with the religious 
authority of her religious community under which her marriage was contracted. 
Second, individuals tend to identify with an ideal of secular legal personhood despite 
the inconsistencies of the actual provisions. For example, a young couple subscribed 
under the Muslim category insisted on contracting a civil marriage in Cyprus because 
they believed in the principle of secularism. However, they were well aware that this 
contract does not count because they are both included under the Muslim category. 
Instead, their civil marriage contract will be converted instead to a Muslim contract 
as per Decision 53 (30/03/1939). The couple decided not to engage with the religious 
code despite the implications on their legal entitlements. As they left it for the 
Ministry of Interior authorities to convert it automatically to Islamic jurisdiction, 
they effectively subscribed to the multiple nature of Islamic jurisdiction that tends to 
compromise women's entitlements. Thus, they missed out on the chance to amend 
the terms and conditions of the Islamic marriage contract that could protect the wife 
(such as the right to divorce, among others). Their decision is derived from an 
institutional subjectivity that attaches progressive meanings to 'civil marriage' 
despite the lack of validity of this contract in the material sense. 
Another pattern is to idealise formal religious frameworks as a pure form and 
denounce its perceived ill 'application'. This could be found with W3 (2005) who 
reflected on her interlegality: 
I didn't register [the marriage contract] at the Court, only the Sheik signed them If it 
were registered, the laws would apply. Then they would be able to get me my rights 
with ease (bi kill tawliduC), but now there is no evidence you see. I do not have papers 
there with them. [ ... ] If I was married in church (mzawwaje kanll'seh), there is the 
Spiritual Court (el-ma1;tkame el-roubaniyye) that solves your problems, but with the 
Muslims you cannot. You can when you are legal/legitimate (SharCiyye), you can get 
your rights from him. Whether he was working or not working, he must secure your 
living (yiamminlik ma1"shtik). But now since I am not registered and I have not 
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registered my marriage, no one can do anything for me. [ ... ] Even if I want to go to the 
parish and talk to them, they will tell me "you are not married in church (mkallaleh) 
here, how can we solve your issue?" So on both sides you cannot do anything. 
W3 considers that she is excluded from an idealised equitable legal order. This has 
serious implications on their agency and how women negotiate their rights. This is 
discussed in chapter 8. 
Finally, individuals weave out various permutations of imagined legal personhood 
according to the infinite constructions of 'jurisprudence knowledge' on family law. 
Legal personhood is modelled according to selective validation of various quotes 
from the Quran or the Bible or attributed narratives of prophets and saints. This mix 
constructs conflicting views of what a 'legal person is' among individuals in social 
circles. One example relates to WI's situation mentioned in the introduction of this 
thesis. At the first instance, when contacted her parents and extended family network 
about her husband's kidnapping of her children, she was reassured that her husband 
was at fault because allegedly according to the Sharica, the custody of boys turns to 
the father much later, at the age of seven. Her mother, a spiritual woman, resorted to 
reading the Quran and the Bible in order to find 'the true directives of religious 
legislation'. She often quoted selections from both texts that support women's 
entitlements in the family in the numerous meetings they had with their lawyers. 
However, this type of religious evidence does not have any weight in court and 
eventually the husband ended up winning the court cases based on the political 
enactment of religious authorities and jurisprudence. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the way family law frameworks constitute techniques of 
disciplining within the order of gender governance. It argued against statutory 
understandings of religious legal frameworks that essentialise and confine legal 
provisions and structures into an a-historical fixed construct. Rather religious family 
law frameworks were developed as "a product of articulations of legal discourse and 
institutions to varying patterns of society and politics" (Zubaida 2003: 1). Thus, the 
chapter argued that the legal plurality and multiple layers of horizontal and vertical 
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sovereignties and legalities that form family law frameworks act as techniques of 
gender governance that shape legal personhood. 
These legal frameworks have four distinctive features that contest mainstream 
academic and policy narratives of family law and gender equality. First, they are 
crafted by a combination of civil and religious legislation constituting a multiplicity 
of sovereignties (Santos 2002). lSI Second, the multiple sovereignties of family law 
frameworks reflect a multiplicity of legality that is incoherent, conflicting, and 
contradictory. It leads to the fragmentation of the boundaries of women's legal 
personhood. Third, especially for Islamic legislation, the substance or content of 
legal provisions in place largely consist, of an uncodified legislative loop where 
various conflicting legal opinions are in operation. Fourth, multiple sovereignties, 
legalities, and provisions have a direct and profound gendered effect on gender 
equality. In this sense, family law frameworks constitute a complex 'system of 
differentiation' (Foucault, Burchall et al.) that is based on sustaining the tension 
between the communitarian imaginary and the promise of the fair 'secular' nation-
state. 
These two techniques include the multiple legal authorities of Lebanese family law 
legal structures, and the blurred family law jurisdiction. These techniques create a 
disciplining effect in three ways. First, they confine women's legal personhood into a 
communitarian category. Second, they also fragment it over official and official 
realms. Third, they construct usher women's legal SUbjectivity into constructing an 
imagined coherent version of legal personhood that is removed from the complexity 
of the enacted one. 
The next chapter carries on from this analysis by elaborating on the 'normative 
plurality' of current family law frameworks that is reflected in the gendered norms 
and values surrounding women's role in the family. 
lSI The post-colonial State is classically analysed as a modem and fixed set of legal structures that 
operate within universal human rights frameworks (reference). It is assumed to be held back by a 
static, largely a-historical, and at times pre-modem religious structure of a religious institution. This 
religious institution is portrayed, as in the quotes above, as gripping the state and imposing a well-
defined power over it. This could explain the insistence by civil society activists on locating the 
problem within women, and calling to 'educate' from 'legal ignorance' about their family law rights. 
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN Gendered moralities and the ethics of subjectification 
7.1 Introduction 
As long as my heart beats and I have strength, you will be a queen never 
to be disheartened 
[ ... ] We don't have any girls who work with their degrees, our girl gets 
pampered and has everything at her service 
[ ... ] You'd better get the idea out of your head, why do you have to run 
after trouble? 
I refuse to let you work, what would we do with your beauty? 
[ ... ] Women's rights are all fine with me but I wish you would attend to 
my feelings 
Your presence by me gives me strength and this is paramount 
[ ... ] Your occupation is my heart, passion, and tenderness, you will have 
no time for anything else 
It is enough that you are the president of the republic of my heart 
(Iskandar 2010) 
In the summer of 2010, this pop-folk song topped the charts in Lebanon. It was 
played at full volume everywhere in Beirut, in cafes, bars, and cars. Thousands of 
wedded couples have danced to it at wedding parties across the country. The song 
caused a stir, to the delight of the singer who boasted, "no other song ever generated 
such controversy". A few feminists wrote comments in a handful of highbrow 
newspapers. In addition, a (woman) singer released a 'feminist' song in response, to 
a less popular reception. 
Apart from its catchy tune, the song's significance lies in its formulation of 
contemporary Lebanese women as social subjects enrolled in particular gendered 
dynamics of personal relations. It is also about the enmeshment of conflicting norms 
and discursive practices that individuals engage in when dealing with personal 
gender norms. 
This chapter explains how the order of gender governance of family law forms 
'regimes of truth' about the expected gendered roles of women when engaging in 
personal relations. It discusses how women shape their understandings of their 
185 
personal selves in relation to these dominant norms and how their lived experiences 
of marriage alter these understandings. 
Building on the discussion in the thesis, this chapter goes further to explain how legal 
categories of personhood extend to social categories of womanhood and wifehood to 
create a gendered moral order of family law. It asserts that particular moralities 
around family law construct what Foucault (1980) calls 'regimes of truth' that enrol 
individuals into their 'episteme' and thus maintain the gender order of family law. 
The chapter builds on Foucauldian-inspired frameworks of subjectification adopted 
by Mahmood (2005) and Rose (1999), as well as Hacking's (1986; 1995) conception 
of 'kind making' and 'looping effect' discussed earlier in chapter 2. 
The chapter explains how the order of governance of family law constructs norms 
regulating women's entitlements and obligations when engaging in a marriage. These 
norms are drawn from an array of moral authorities, such as religious, folk and 
modernist arguments. These moralities are disseminated through various institutional 
moral channels with varying impact and degrees, including the family (both their 
own and their husbands '), religious actors, as well as support workers. These 
institutions rework legal norms of family law frameworks and tailor them by 
retaining gendered aspects and weeding out progressive legal provisions to produce 
gendered family law regimes of truth. These regimes of truth enrol women in a 
continuous process of ethical adjustment with dominant gendered moralities of the 
married self. Women engage in a process of subjectification that is enacted through 
the repositioning of their own ethics against other moralities. The 'wife kind' acts on 
the four dimensions of the self, namely ontological, ethical, technical, and 
epistemological, developed by Rose (1999) and applied to family law. 
These norms establish and reinforce a dominant gendered 'woman ideal' that I refer 
to as the dominant category of the 'wife kind' (borrowing from Hacking 1995). 
Women engage with these 'regimes of truth' or 'wife kind' through a fluid process of 
subjectification. They initially incorporate these moralities, then they contest it, and 
then they replace it with the alternative categories of 'mother kind'. 
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The two 'kinds' of 'wife' and 'mother' reflect different gendering effects of the order 
of gender governance of family law. The 'wife kind' is primarily focused on the 
dominant family law norms of the wife's duty to remain in the marriage and perform 
marital duties, what I call 'marriage normativity'. This category includes other 
subsequent or derivative marital roles such as being a good mother, a homemaker 
and so on. By destabilising this category, women reverse the hierarchy of family law 
norms. As their subjectivity shifts to the 'mother kind', they identify themselves 
primarily as mothers, while they forego the imperative of remaining in the marriage. 
The implications of this shift are that while women resist some aspects of the 
gendering effect of family law, their subjectivity is still framed within broader 
gendered notions of womanhood based on procreation. 
The chapter unfolds in four sections. The first section discusses how women enrol in 
the process of 'wife making'. The second section explains how women destabilise 
the 'wife kind' by questioning the dominant norms to which they subscribe. The 
third section details how women dissociate themselves from the 'wife kind' as they 
ethically disengage from the dominant norms of the wife. The fourth section analyses 
the ways in which this process of making and unmaking the 'wife kind' results in an 
interrupted looping effect where women's subjectivity is displaced to the 'mother 
kind' that follows dominant gendered norms to a large extent. 
7.2 Process of subjectification: Making the 'wife kind' 
This section explores the ways in which women engage with the 'family law regimes 
of truth'. They do so by enrolling with multiple norms constructing the dominant 
category of the 'wife kind'. These dominant norms revolved around shaping 
women's ontological selves around entering marriage, remaining in it, and belonging 
to a 'marriage unit' that is headed by the husband and requires the woman's 
compliance to him. The 'wife kind' is constructed through four gendered moralities 
which are explained below. 
7.2.1 Engaging with the normativity of marriage 
Marriage has been established as a central institution in women's lives in the Middle 
East (Abdo-Zubi 1987; Obermeyer 1995; Yount and Rashad 2008; Zinelabidine 
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2002). This section explains how institutional norms about 'being married' are 
manifested among women respondents. 
From the interviews, women respondents mentioned that being married was central 
to their ontological self. Several respondents explained that being married was 
equivalent to a wholesome individual self. WI belonged to a secular middle class 
Shica family in the Southern suburb of Beirut. WI (2005) explained how her focus 
on marriage was formed: 
I was always a 'model' child, always expected to be the top of my class. [ ... ] My 
mother used to always to tell me: [you get] the [university] degree in one hand, and the 
groom in the other. That was the goal, to get married. And this is what I did as soon as I 
got my degree 
WI recounts that when she finished her university degree and considered travelling 
abroad for further education, her mother told her that she "can only do this with [her] 
husband". In that sense, marriage was an essential ticket to a promise of a better 
future life. 
Similarly, being married was perceived to bring an emotionally stable self. W2 was 
20 years old when she was engaged. She comes from a lower-middle class Shica 
family who migrated from South Lebanon to the Southern suburb of Beirut. She 
recounts that in her teenage years she suffered from depression and eating disorder. 
Her mother encouraged her to get married because she thought it would help her feel 
better (W2 2005). 
However, marriage was not expressed as necessarily desirable. It was rather an 
organising principle that they operated within and identified with as part of their 
expectations from their social selves. (52 WIO (2005) was a middle-upper class Druze 
woman in the coastal part of Mount Lebanon who expressed that she "did not 'need' 
to get married". Her explanation was that she only got married because her family 
152 These fmdings concur with Pankhurst's (1992) interesting study on the varied marriage patterns 
among Ethiopian rural women. In that sense, the reasons for getting married, and the choice of 
partner, reflected a broad spectrum of marriage nonnativity beyond the unitary interpretations of 
'patriarchal submission' (one example of this view is Moghadam 2003). 
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thought that she was 'getting old and had to get married'. W9 came from an upper 
middle class Druze family residing in Mount Lebanon. After her first divorce, she 
was pressured into remarrying because her parents thought it unacceptable for her to 
remain divorced. Both respondents did not particularly feel a special bond to their 
husbands and explained that it was 'the thing to do' (Fieldnotes 2005). 
The normativity of marriage also extended to remaining in the marriage and an 
aversion for divorce. As WI (2005) explains: 
I was raised on [the premise] that, in our family, there was no divorce. It always 
happened to other unknown others who were less fortunate than we were. I grew up in a 
cocooned household where my parents taught us that the happiest of marriages are those 
without quarrels. [ ... ]. The irony was that I realised later on that two of my aunts - one 
on each side of the family- were divorced earlier on in their lives. No one used to bring 
it up. [ ... ] I also realised that my parents used to fight in private, behind our backs. It 
was all about preserving this image of a perfect happy family. 
These norms were part of gendered discursive practices that encourage women to 
identify with the category of the good wife. During the period of their engagement, 
W2 sensed that her husband failed to meet her expectations. She questioned her 
engagement but ended up going for it 
So I was engaged and one wishes to have the best time during the engagement period, 
going out, sightseeing, and the man would pamper her. The engagement was not like 
this. [ ... ]. I would have wished I broke off the engagement. 
As implied in the earlier comments, the family was an important source of moral 
authority in the normativity for marriage. However, while the family sustained the 
normativity of marriage, there were several considerations as to the choice of partner, 
marriage age, and general suitability. As WI mentioned, "it was important that the 
prospective husband would be 'respectable'''. Similarly, although W4, W5, and W8 
each came from a different religious background, they faced similar reaction from 
the families who did not initially agree to their marriage. They raised issues about 
them being too young (for W4 and W8), or the prospective husband not being 
suitable (W5 and W8). WI2 also mentioned that her father wanted her to continue 
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her education rather than get married. In this sense, the normative role of the family 
is more nuanced than some accounts on the Middle East suggest (Joseph and 
Slyomovics 2001). 
The norms of the family were also linked to the dominant gendered norms attached 
to the legal frameworks. W2 explained that it was difficult for her to take the 
decision to break off the engagement because of the stigma of divorce. In a practice 
common within Muslim marriage norms in Lebanon, W2 like many couples actually 
signed her marriage contract (katb kitab) during her engagement period in 
preparation for the wedding and the move to the marital home (naC/eh).153 She 
explained that it would not 'look good' for her to get divorced at that stage, so she 
opted to go on with her wedding. She mentioned that after her experience, her 
mother changed her views about this practice and did not allow any of her sisters to 
do it (W2 2005). 
The religious institution was not found to be a direct source of authority to the norm 
of marriage. As Afshar (1993:13) notes about Islam, and which here I argue applies 
to various religious categories, religion "is only one of the many contributory factors 
that shapes the lives of women in the Middle East, and cannot be seen as the primary 
and causal element in confining them to subjugation." JS4 While most women 
respondents contracted marriages with men from within the religious 
circumscription, they did not initially consider their marital status within scriptural or 
jurisdictional contractual terms. Rather, women respondents explained that marriage 
contracts were only a formality because "when you are getting married you don't 
think of divorce", or "I didn't know that I would ever need to go back to it" (W2, 
W9, WIO). The marriage contract was just a formality that would get them into the 
married self. Respondents 'stumbled upon' the unfavourable terms of their marriage 
contracts - both literally and in terms of their effect, only when they faced marital 
problems. 
153 It is common practice among many Lebanese Muslim couples to contract their marriage prior to 
the official wedding celebrations. With this arrangement, women are legally bound to their fiances 
prior to the actual move into the marital home. Through this practice, women's families relax their 
social restrictions about free movement and intimacy with their prospective husbands. 
154 Afshar (1993:13) mentions that "when it comes to evidence, Islam proves more elusive and less 
universal" in a hint that is socially constructed that varies according to the "specificities of women's 
lives and circumstances". 
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Moreover, the techniques of making the 'wife' (as a normative descriptive category) 
complied more with socially dominant norms rather than with religious directives. 
One example is that in Muslim religious contracts, women are entitled to include the 
right to divorce (u$ma) in their marriage contract. None of the Muslim women 
respondents included this clause in their contracts because it does not fall within the 
gendered norms of the 'good wife' that often include renouncing their marriage 
entitlements. 
However, parallels could be drawn between women respondents' ethics of marriage 
normativity and the moralities propagated by both Maronite and Shica religious 
leader respondents. ISS The explanations they provided relied on scriptural grounds. 
RCL2 (2005) explained that "marriage was a 'sacrament'" and that "the woman was 
created in the image of man. Men and women in a marriage are one body, one 
decision." Similarly, Shica clerics explained that "marriage is a holy bond with a 
contractual pact" and used a well-known Quranic verse to reiterate this 
understanding (RCL3 2005): "Among His signs is that He has created spouses for 
you from among yourselves so that you may console yourselves with them" (The 
Quran surah 30 verse 21). These examples indicate that religious actors primarily 
rely on doctrinal sources of moral authority to back their claims (Bowen 2003). 
7.2.2 Gendered norms of finances and marital rights and obligations 
The ethics and moralities of women's economic contribution revolved around norms 
of the 'good wife' in the accounts of both respondents among women and religious 
leaders, albeit in reversed ways. Most women respondents stated that they adopted a 
'hand in hand' attitude and were accepting of tolerating financial duress with their 
husbands in order to comply with the category of the 'good wife'. Their ethics were 
mainly centred on understanding their husbands' hardships, economising and 
together securing a common future from scratch. 
At home I was doing everything so that he does not have an excuse. I would stay up late 
at night working and organizing the home. And I tried as much I could to focus on my 
work. Although, I swear, I worked for six years, I would come and give him my salary 
ISS These findings match with the study by Dahl (1997) on religious family law in Egypt. 
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at the end of the month in an envelope, in order for him to be content (ta yirQa), so that 
he lets me work and see that I am planning for the future (Cam bundhur la baCden). (W12 
2005) 
Women's ethical selving of compromising their financial independence is consistent 
with dominant marital norms that discourage women from delineating an 
autonomous married self as discussed in the case of Indonesia (O'Shaughnessy 
2009). Most importantly, these accounts dispel classical feminist assumptions that 
draw a linear link between women's economic power and their independence 
(examples of such accounts are found in Dallos and Dallos 1997). 
Religious leaders also included finances within a whole moral framework of rights 
and obligations that were very removed from the discursive practices of women 
respondents. Their discourses revealed tension between an ideal doctrinal conception 
of rights and obligations that is pinned down to obedience on one hand, and the lived 
experiences of financial and work arrangements between couples on the other. As 
one Maronite religious leader respondent explained: 
Women need to have patience and resilience. Nowadays there are different 
circumstances. Previously it was not accepted that the woman would get out of the 
house. Now women are out to work. Work means contribution to the finances and 
asking for more rights. (RCL I 2005) 
Shica religious leader respondents explicitly relied on ideal financial contractual 
terms to justify norms of husbands' control over women:·'6 
The SharC gave women their rights and freedom. In Sharc the wife is not supposed to 
cook and clean. The husband needs to provide a cook and a domestic servant for her. 
She is even entitled to be compensated for the milk from which she is breastfeeding. He 
is not entitled to use her personal wealth in any way. Even if she receives inheritance, 
he is still entitled for spending on the household. Husbands suffer the burden to provide 
for their wives and the family in every way. Wives are not requested to do any work in 
the household. Husbands have to provide decent housing that is of equal standards to 
the wife's own family home. Wives are also entitled to work and hold on to all their 
.'6 These roles extended to women's rights in custody of children (set at the age of two for boys) and 
guardianship (set with the paternal grandparents). 
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wealth, and to be granted paid domestic assistance. Husbands also are required to 
compensate her for the milk they provide to their children during lactation. Wives have 
only two duties, pleasuring and obedience. (RCL5 2005) 
This clear division of responsibilities contrasted with the gendered ways in which 
religious leaders analysed the roles of wives and husbands in economically related 
marital problems. RCL4 (2005) explained the main reasons for people to seek his 
advice at the RAB as follows: 
[the first reason is that] these days that we live in, people are pressured by hardship. 
When a man's salary is hardly enough to sustain him, then bickering and quarrelling 
starts at home. So the man is not able to provide for his family, the woman takes the risk 
and goes to her family. Then her father is not able to provide income for the family. 
And her situation worsens - if not worse but at least the same situation. [ ... ] the fourth 
reason lies with the wife. She can be negligent or underperforming (muq8$ira). She 
could be employed, or working, or holding some social function/activity, she dedicates 
much time outside the house, which reflects on her household. 
The gap between the normative frameworks and the discursive practices of religious 
leaders tends to reinforce the gendered moral effect of family law frameworks. They 
often used the language of rights and obligations to hold women to religious law, but 
are lenient in interpreting men's failure to subscribe to them as discussed in 
O'Shaughnessy (2009). The focus on economic issues was also prominent in Mir-
Husseini (2000) research on family law in Iran and Morocco. In both contexts, 
religious judges implicitly recognised the contradictions between Islamic ideals of 
economic independence of women and gendered social practice pressuring women 
into relegating their finances (whether savings or income) to their husbands. 
7.2.3 Control over women's bodies and movement 
Norms of compliance with the wife category was manifested in allowing husbands' 
control over their bodies and their movement. In terms of control over body, women 
respondents did not enroll completely in their husbands' moralities, but still allowed 
them to prevail over their own ethics. One example is the experience of several 
respondents in wearing the Muslim headscarf. W 12 was pressured by her husband to 
wear the scarf despite her opposition to it. 
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I love religion very much, and God knows how close I am to him, but for me religion is 
not a scarf. My understanding for religion is different. Religion is inside, a connection 
between a person and God, and no one should know about it, and no one should bargain 
over it, and it should not be about appearances. [ ... J I found it difficult, I don't know. I 
refused at first, but then I gave in, even though it was disgusting for me, but I wore it. 
In another contrasting example, W5's (2005) husband insisted that she takes off the 
scarf despite her preference to keep it. She describes: 
I tried to convince him. I kept saying no for around 8 months. I would tell him: "how 
can you be ok, with me showing my hair to the others? Here I am, fixing myself for you 
inside the home." He likes to show me off in front of people. So there were problems 
and evil got the best of me (Allah yUCan al-shitan) and I took the veil off[ ... J. Because 
we fought a lot about it, I took the veil off. When we were separated I put it back on. 
The control over women's bodies was also manifested in restricting their movements. 
The husband of W5, despite forcing her to take off her headscarf, forbid her to leave 
the house or even to go out to the balcony without him around. W 4 also faced similar 
restrictions: 
I did not go out, I was not allowed to; even if I had to go to the [corner shop] I had to 
take my husband's permission, or go with my mother-in- law. If I needed something, I 
had to ask my mother-in-law or someone from his family to go get it for me. 
These examples indicate more complex processes of relating to the scarf as a marker 
for identity than literature on Islamic revivalism suggest (one example is Hessini 
1994). 
The control over movements was also directly related to the ways the 'good wife' 
was drawn in relation to the institution of the family. Suad Joseph (2001 : 1) explains 
that the patrilineal family "lies at the core of the Middle Eastern and North African 
society - in political, economic, social and religious tenns". Extending from the 
categorisation of legal personhood discussed in chapter 6, women's communal self 
was linked to their own families. The control over women's movement was primarily 
located within their own families before marriage. W2 recounts how her mother 
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managed her movements when she was engaged: 
My parents were strict and didn't approve of him wanting to drop by and visit me at 
midnight. They did not agree and asked him to come by earlier and leave at midnight. 
Alternatively, he could come to take me out for example, but he didn't. He used to come 
and sit here. My mother asked me to tell him "you have to respect this house so you 
cannot come at midnight." It would seem as ifhe did not respect me because he was not 
working until late, he used to just be out with friends. [ ... ] I wanted to break ofT the 
engagement because of this [behaviour] [ ... ] 
Women's communal self was included under that of their husbands and in-laws after 
their marriage. The marker for this shift was the husbands' and in-laws control over 
movement. Most women respondents stated that they were banned from visiting their 
families. W2, W4, and W5 explained that they were banned from seeing their 
families for more than two years. They did not ethically subscribe to these 
restrictions, as W4 explains: 
I gave up a lot of my rights. From the first day, I gave up my rights and this is why he 
thought I am weak so he got increasingly dominant. Year after year, he became a 
mountain that no one can shake. At first, I gave up my rights not to see my parents [ ... ]. 
I agreed to live with his parents; I agreed not to go to the supermarket. I would say 
okay, okay, okay, to everything. Why? Why should I be so weak? 
Women's own families also subscribed to this arrangement. W14 (2005) stated that 
her mother does not support her decision to leave the house. She tells her "do not 
think of coming here. A woman does not leave her house". This is in line with the 
collective circumscription of legal personhood of women within a communal 
patrilineal family framework discussed in chapter 6. 
However, as indicated in the next sections, this relationship is more fluid than often 
assumed in the literature (such as in Joseph 2001). Several women respondents 
mentioned that their families agreed not to get in touch with them either because they 
thought they were happy and did not want to interfere (W2), or because they did not 
want to aggravate the problems between the couple (W8). 
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This analysis reveals that women respondents enrolled almost fully and thus 
compromised their own ethics around norms of marriage normativity, control over 
movement, relations with their own families, and finances. In contrast, they 
reluctantly complied with control over their bodies in relation to the veil and the 
reproductive selves related to parenthood roles. 
7.3 Destabilising the 'wife kind' 
This section explains how the process of subjectification is fluid and comprises a 
stage where women question the dominant 'wife kind' in which they were initially 
enrolled. At a particular stage of their relationships women sensed the 
inconsistencies of the dominant 'wife kind' through a clash between the telos of what 
a wife should be, and the epistemological self that is revealed against the practices of 
the husbands (Rose 1999). Here, women respondents still legitimised the ethical 
frameworks of their husbands but questioned their practices. This process is 
controlled by the discursive practices of 'moral containment' propagated by various 
moral authorities. 
7.3.1 Conforming with gendered ethics of resilience 
In contesting the 'wife kind', women's ethics clashed with the practices of their 
husbands. In order to keep with the dominant norms of sustaining marriage discussed 
in the previous section, women respondents reported adjusting their selves in order to 
adapt to their husbands ill practices. They enrolled in a dominant norm of 'resilience' 
that is discursively attached to the good wife category and is focused on complying 
with the husbands. As W12 explains: 
I tried as much as I could to go along with him (sllyro) and do what he wants. 
Sometimes I would pretend I do not know them and I go ask him about them in order to 
make him feel that I need him. I tried all things impossible (al-mostahilet). 
Resilience also revolved around reinforcing the sexualisation of the married self. W4 
recounts how family and neighbours pressured her to reconcile with her estranged 
husband after he violently assaulted her daughter: 
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I did not agree for him to come back [to the home]. But after two months, because 
[family and friends] nagged so much, I called him and told him "I want us to reconcile 
and for you to come home". He said: "I don't want to come back home." I said: "Ok. 
Come over and let's get intimate (ghannijneh)", he said: "Yes, if that is the case then I 
will come by, but do not expect more than that". [ ... ]. This went on for two months. I 
felt he was coming only to serve his needs. If I wanted to work in this job, I would have 
made a lot of money. I was feeling like the lowest in the world and the cheapest woman 
in the world. [ ... ]. He would tell me: "I want you as a lover; I don't want you as a wife." 
What does a lover mean? And what does a wife mean? 
Resilience was also manifested in covering for husbands' reputation in front of 
people, as W2 explained: 
He did not have a job, but I used to tell my parents that he has work. I used to lie for 
him in front of my parents so that they would not fall out. I was not feeling good about 
it, because he could see me lying for him and it did not feel good. If a woman is 
comfortable with her husband and she does not want to have problems she would do it. 
If a woman is comfortable with her husband and he does not want to go to visit her 
parents for instance, then she could lie. But I was not comfortable with him and I had to 
lie to cover for him, I would find it difficult. 
These formulations of the self were changeable and went in line with what Foucault 
(Foucault and Hutton 1988) described as 'practices of the self that subjects weave 
from the impositions of their surrounding culture, society, and social groups. 
7.3.2 Containing the 'wife' within the normativity of marriage 
The practices of the women respondents were reinforced by various institutional 
moral authorities, including the family, religious leaders, lawyers, and social 
workers. These actors all discouraged women from divorce or separation in varying 
ways and degrees. 
In many cases, the family also played an important role in sustaining the norms of 
the 'wife kind' and encouraged women to remain in the marriage. W12 recounts that 
her mother discouraged her from leaving her husband despite his violent behaviour: 
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My mother told me "maybe you made some mistakes at times. Tomorrow he will come 
to his senses (byiCqal), and he is a man." She was saying what all mothers say. "The 
man is 'protection' (sitra) and you cannot raise your children by yourself. Be patient, 
this life needs patience." Y~u know; it's the kind of talk that wears you out (byimqitlik 
qalbek). 
The discourses underlining this advice relied on the notions of obedience, productive 
dependence, and resilience discussed above. 
Religious leader respondents confirmed the gendered differentiation in exiting from 
marriage. One Shica religious leader respondent considered that "the woman cannot 
marry one day and divorce the next and similar to the man. It is unacceptable, from a 
religious and a social perspective" (RCL4). Similarly, a Maronite religious leader, 
(RJ3 2005) respondent explained: 
Today the trend is to annul or revoke (faskh) the marriage. It depends if the man leaves 
the home [ ... J. It is only accepted if the man leaves the home. How can a child bear the 
idea that the mother lives with another man? They would hate him. If the man leaves the 
woman, then that is different. 
The explanations provided by respondents among religious leaders were based on 
rational and seemingly non-gendered grounds contrasting with the gendered 
nonnativity of sustaining marriage. RCL 1 found that couples usually choose to get 
married after undergoing several premarital religious preparation sessions in the 
church. Hence, they have to bear the responsibility, because "marriage is not a 
game". The argument was built on the notion of persons being rational agents. 
RCL5, a Shica religious leader, gave a similar line of reasoning. He likened women 
in an unhappy marriage to a work situation, "if you are employed in a company and 
you get a bad manager, what would you do? You would stay, since you in need of it." 
These interpretations concur with Bowen's (2003:11) view that while the "public 
reasoning" of religious law "retain its foundation in comprehensive doctrines", it is 
also concerned with "interpreting religious texts in such a way that they are 
compatible with other ideals", in this case, dominant gendered norms in the family. 
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Civil society actors providing support for women respondents also prioritized norms 
sustaining the marriage. Social workers insisted on containing marital disagreements 
as much as possible in order not to 'wreck the marital home' (SW3 2005)IH. This 
explanation referred to prioritising the collective organising unit of the family at the 
expense of women's fulfilment. SW2 (2005) explains: 
Nobody should interfere between the couple, not the family and not the social worker. 
The social worker is not God; she is a person after all. If any outsider interferes between 
them, then problems will fester. Only when it reaches a point of no return then 
intervention becomes acceptable. 
Lawyers also expressed similar norms. LEI (2005), a lawyer volunteering at 
WNGOI, explained to me the case of one of her clients in terms of 'conscience', 
without referring to any specific scriptural reference: 
LEt 
You know in the beginning I tried to sense her reaction as to whether she would go back 
to him, and tried to say good things to bring them together, but she did not budge. 
INTO) 
Why did you do this? 
LEI 
I don't know. It's just my conscience. I like to reconcile people. 
INTO} 
Even if he is a bad guy? 
LEt 
Yes I don't know. No one told me to do it. It's just my conscience. IfI can bring people 
together then that is very good. It's just my conscience. I don't know. I feel better if I do 
it. So I tried to gauge her stand towards it to see if she would change her mind. But she 
was adamant. So now I know that she does not want to go back and I am clear on the 
line that I need to follow with her. He seems to still love her I think. He wants her, but 
what happened is that in the beginning, there were some problems and he acted with 
little dignity (ken qaJn karartle) towards her. So she got repulsed by him (kirihto). 
IS7 This expression is very popular in Lebanon and is used to refer any attempt to hann anyone. 
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In these accounts, dominant gender norms of personal relations directly influence the 
role of actors involved in issues of family law. 
7.3.3 Containing the wife within elusive norms of embodied obedience 
Women respondents expressed several layers of norms of bodily control. For 
example, WI I (2005) found that avoiding violence can be part of the technical 
selving of women: 
When the man hits the woman, he feels that he is weaker than her in order to hit her. 
You know why? Especially that you are an educated woman. If she is better than him, 
and in order to destroy her character, he hits her. If she is smart, she treats him in 
accordance with his level (btitCamal maCo Cala qadd mostawe). Then he stops hitting her. 
She would not let him hit her. 
W3 also reflected similar views: 
[Hitting is] okay if I quarrelled with my husband. For example, he tried once to hit me 
(ymidd 'ido Calayye), there is nothing to it (rna flya shD. One takes it into consideration 
as unleashing momentary anger (fashshit khiliq). But not all the time. 
These perceptions were also reflected by the support workers. When I asked SW2 
about her clients' responsiveness to her advice she smiled and mentioned that some 
were not convinced and not satisfied with her advice. She attributed it to the type of 
women and their character, as some are "very negative and don't accept to look at 
positive prospects". She mentioned that she becomes fed up by their negative 
attitude, and concluded "that's why their husbands are fed up with them or take up 
other wives". SW3, who works in WNG02, a radical feminist group, concurred by 
saying "between us, some women deserve to be beaten up; they push it to the extent 
that makes the husband lose his temper (ytall 'ulu dino [Arabic slang])". In these 
accounts, social workers shift between their professional and personal norms in a 
process of 'bracketing of differences' that contribute to disseminating dominant 
moralities about the 'wife kind' (Bierschenk cited in Shrestha 2006). 
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These norms constrain women under the dominant category of the 'wife kind' and 
normalise notions of husbands' control. For example, this was sensed in the advice 
that SW3, a social worker in WNGOI, the leading NGO working on domestic 
violence, gave to W20. One morning, W20 called the NGO's domestic violence 
hotline. She complained about her husband's over restrictive behaviour towards her, 
such as locking her up in the house and banning her from any communication with 
anyone, including her own family, in addition to cutting down on her allowance and 
verbally abusing her. SW3 explained to me that the case was "not as bad as it 
sounded" because the husband "was still buying into his wife" (baCdo shariyii 
[Arabic slang]), in the sense that he still wanted her as his wife. Her advice to W20 
reinforced the sexualisation techniques of the married self that were discussed 
earlier. She explained to me that: 
[ ... ] the woman was also at fault, I told her that she did not take care of her appearance 
enough, always scruffy and smelling of cooking. It is understandable that [her husband] 
feels repeIled by her. I told her she should make an effort and try harder to win him 
over". (SW3 2005) 
Religious leaders pathologised violent men in order to sustain the good wife 
category. During my interviews with religious leaders, I challenged the notion of 
obedience or patience they advocated by putting forward the example of a woman 
who was repeatedly heavily beaten by her husband. RCL 1 (2005) explained that in 
such cases, the husband would be considered "psychologically ill and the wife had 
the duty to stand by him until he is cured". 
Similarly, RCL5 provided a gendered hierarchical understanding of authority in the 
family: 
It is not acceptable for the man to hit his wife. But the woman wants to always do as she 
pleases. The nature of humankind means that there should be a law. You are educated, 
and well rounded, and are continuing higher education, and your conduct is sound, it 
does not mean that you want to manage the home and the family. Maybe you could be 
stronger than your husband inteIlectuaIly and maturity-wise, and that is found in many 
households, and we now caIl this age as the 'women's age'. But if you have all these 
qualities, it doesn't mean that you rule the household. There should be one ruler of the 
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household. The household that has two leaders is ruined. The woman should defer 
(twatti) to the man but not for her to be humiliated. Humiliation is rejected, but God has 
instigated 'management' [The Quran verse that mentions that] "men have primacy 
(qawwamiin) over women" should not be interpreted in the sense that he renders her a 
slave, but from an administrative and management perspective. 
Police officers were another group of actors to legitimate violence as authority. In a 
training workshop to police officers run by WNGOI on violence against women, 
participants tried to discount the evidence of domestic violence by claiming "it is 
unfair to always blame the man for all violence, as if he were a monster. It is only a 
minority; most men are caring and protective of women [ ... ]" (Fieldnotes 2005). 
Then they relied on an array of scriptural references to legitimise violence against 
women, such as Quranic verses relating to "the right of the man to discipline the 
woman". They also referred to old Arabic sayings, such as one that likens women to 
an "olive that needs to be pressed (rass) for a better taste". These examples reflected 
the ways in which socio-cultural norms override professional practices. 
7.4 Rejecting the dominant 'wife kind' 
This section discusses how the selving process of women shifts away from the 
dominant norms of family law. This shift occurs when women interpret their 
husbands' practices as a marker of adverse ethics. Women dissociate from the 
gendered norms of the marital unit by contesting the embodied norms of obedience, 
regaining financial autonomy, and contesting the norms of reproduction and 
parenting. 
7.4.1 Dissociating from the gendered norms of 'the marital unit' 
Interviews with women respondents indicated that their lived experiences led them to 
contest tying their social self to the 'marital unit. This fusion primarily revolves 
around linking their reputation to that of their husbands, as indicated in other 
contexts (Dallos and Dallos 1997; O'Shaughnessy 2009). As W2 explained: 
[ ... ] I was living with him and I could not badmouth him like couples do. When I 
badmouth him, it is as if I am badmouthing myself. This is my opinion. For example, if 
I say that my husband is an imbecile and is ill mannered, while I am living with him it is 
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as if I am so too, the same thing. I only tell him off when I don't want to live with him 
anymore, when I become separate, when I don't want him anymore. 
The impact of this fusion seemed detrimental to women as it meant embodied 
obedience manifested in control over the body and movement. W9 found that: 
[T]he woman always lives in gUilt thinking "maybe I did something wrong to him, 
maybe it is my fault" [ ... ]. To tell you honestly, in the beginning, when I first married 
him, I would think, "do I put this here or there? What he if he wants it there?" But 
whether here or there, he is always upset. I would feel so tired. Do I open the window or 
close it? He ties you up (bi rabbtik) at every step. 
Women respondents also relied on the impact the normative practices of their 
husbands had on their epistemological self. W4 recounted how she questioned the 
'wife kind' as it was manifested in her being rendered invisible by her husband: 
He would enter the house and act as if I didn't exist. If I sat next to him he would say: 
"go inside, take your children and go inside". What was I doing? What was my role in 
this house? Ok I am a mother and I make sacrifices, but ones like to hear a nice word. 
Similarly, W9 recounted a discussion with her husband when she left the marital 
home after a fight. When her husband called her to discuss the issue she noticed that 
he addressed her by her first name. She replied by saying "first of all, thank you for 
showing that you know my name, for five years you have been calling me 'hey' 
(waynek) and 'you' (inteh) and 'look here' (laykeh)". 
Women respondents also directly contested the dominant gendered character of the 
'wife kind'. These two accounts revealed the ways women sensed the gendered 
pattern of the embodiment of the 'wife kind'. 
I was sick of it. Imagine that in the end he was setting conditions that I cannot go out, I 
cannot open the window. The window I wanted to open was as small as a cat flap (ajalik 
ta'et hammem). It was as if I was imprisoned between four walls. I was like in a prison 
sentence and I didn't know when it would end. I don't when I will be released. I swear 
to god I told him this. How much can a woman put up with? (W5 2005) 
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I told him: It is my right to know". He said: "No I am a man; you don't have to know 
every step I make." I said: "so now I am a woman and you have to know every step I 
make. But you are the man and I don't have to know anything? Do you think this is 
marriage? You are the man and you do whatever you want and I don't?!"(W4 2005) 
The dominant category of the married self was gradually devalidated when women 
respondents framed their husbands' behaviour in terms of restrictive and gendered 
ethics. Women respondents framed their husbands' practices as indication of their 
ethics in four ways. First, women respondents rejected the impact of the dominant 
norms on their ontological self: 
I was patient, but in the end, I exploded. How long can I take it? He broke three ribs 
here, this shoulder he dislocated it, and this other shoulder he also dislocated, my leg he 
broke it. I would work with both my legs broken [ ... ] I couldn't come up with excuses 
for him anymore, beating is only for donkeys. (W3 2005) 
Second, women respondents set their 'selves' against their husbands as an 
antagonistic 'other', such as the case ofWlO: 
I could not take it anymore. It got to a point where I felt annihilated. There was not one 
drop of self-worth left in me. And for what? [ ... ] I did not care anymore what everyone 
would think. It was not worth it. There was nothing left to fight for. 
Third, the husbands' ethical self was read as ontologically inadequate and harmful: 
I use to tolerate, but in the end when you find that there is nothing in return you feel that 
you are been treated unjustly, and you are being hit, and deprived. [ ... ]. There is no 
result. I tried and in all possible ways. I tried to be a lover. I tried to renounce my pride. 
I tried to deprive myself. I tried to deprive my children. [ ... ] I tried everything. All 
possible ways for this family to stay together. There comes a time when a person re-
visits himself. [ ... ] I am personally like this. When I go to sleep I revisit everything that 
happen to me during the day to see where is the wrong and where is the right. [ ... ] I was 
tolerating everything and saying: "it is ok; he will wake up some day." But where is that 
day? Where is that day? As I see it, he is not going to wake up. [ ... ] I was sure one 
million per cent that there is no conscience or feeling. (W4 2005) 
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Fourth, the husbands' ethical self was considered as fixed and unchangeable: 
We were married for 8 years and II years in total if we include the engagement. It is a 
lifetime. Therefore, it is obvious that one would not change after this period. (W2 2005) 
At this stage, women were able to dissociate from the dominant norms of the 'wife 
kind' by contesting their husbands' ethics. This process is in line with Haraway's 
(2003) 'located positionings' where individuals are able to reflect on their past 
experiences critically. 
7.4.2 Asserting norms of financial autonomy 
The productive self was questioned also when women experienced lack of 
appreciation of their financial contribution to household expenses. As this example 
illustrates, women respondents questioned their husbands' practices that include 
appropriating their wives share of finances. 
Before we got married, 1 put money in the bank in his name and mine. No one does this. 
He was saying at first "I have, I have, 1 have", but it turned out that he did not have 
anything [ ... ]. This money that I put, I did not know how it disappeared, and where it 
went. I do not know where it is. [ ... ] In the end, I do not have money anymore. Now I 
woke up. Now I started to ask. [ ... ]. (W14 2005) 
Similarly, women start questioning the practices of their husbands that exclude them 
from shared property. W15 (2005) explains how her quest for financial security 
created problems in her marriage. Her husband was in an unstable mental condition 
and had a volatile temper and repudiated her once on a whim and then claimed her 
back. Her problems worsened when they decided to buy a flat: 
I asked him to register the flat in my name, not out of greed, or snobbery, but as a 
guarantee, so that 1 wouldn't wait another 10 or 15 years more of my life to find myself 
on the street. He got offended and said "am 1 disabled, am I dead for you to register the 
flat in your name?" Another man who would be 'buying' into his wife and children 
would do the impossible to satisfy her. I told him I would not abandon you or the 
children, 1 would not put you in the street, I would divorce you like you did to me, but 
he did not agree [ ... ]. 
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In some cases, women stopped relying on their families' approval. One example is 
the case of W23, who sought divorce after 20 years of a generally harmonious 
marriage, because she blamed her husband for an undisclosed 'gross misconduct'. 
Her family did not justify her stand and sided with her husband and considered him 
an 'ideal son in-law' (Fieldnotes 2005). Her parents even confiscated her jewellery -
her only assets from the dower, in order to prevent her from covering costs of a 
lawsuit. She ignored them and relied on friends to go into hiding until the divorce 
was finalised. 
Undoing the productive self was by dissociating their contribution from that of their 
husbands and claiming recognition for it. As W4 explains: 
Once he said he wanted to leave the house. I sent after his brother and sister. I told them 
"ask him why he wants to leave the house". He said "I always come home and she is in 
a bad mood (mkashshra) and she is this and she is that". In front of his brother and sister 
I told him "I will ask you and you answer. I don't want anything else from you. How 
long have we been married?" he said "12 years". I asked "in these 12 years how much 
have you spent on me? Have you bought me clothes?" he said "no". I said "did you give 
me money for me to have a hairdo?" he said "no". He does not even get medicine. I get 
everything. Then people tell you "you are stronger". I was put in this situation. People 
tell you "it is your mistake because you got him used to this", but I say that this has 
nothing to do with it. In my opinion, I took him like this. Because since we got married, 
he is like this. I took him like this. [ ... J. People say "you got him used to this because 
you depend on yourself, so he got used to it." [ ... ] This is a character in the human 
being. It is not me who got him used to carelessness or dependency. 
Women's subjectivity shifted further away from the dominant 'wife kind' when they 
questioned the gendered norms and practices of financial allocation. 
7.4.3 Contesting the dominant reproductive self 
A crucial point of contestation was when women's ethics clashed with dominant 
nonns about reproduction and parenthood. W12 explained how her husband sought 
the help of religious leaders to force her into complying with having more children: 
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I stopped at the first child, no "you have to get another child", and he started taking me 
to religious people. [ ... ]. He took me to the [RAB] of Sayyid Mohammad Hussein 
Fadlallah. Al Sayyid asked, "what is wrong?" I explained that he wants children. I do 
not want children. Then, the Sayyid told me ''you cannot do this. If he wants children, 
he wants children." He started threatening, "if you don't get me a child, I will take my 
son." Under this pressure, I got a child, who is my daughter Sarah. Then his condition 
was for a third child. I had my third child and by then things had become very bad [ ... J. 
Reproduction also intersected with the norms of control over their movements by 
their in-laws. W4 stated that her husband and her in-laws pressured her over having 
children as soon as she got married. They had the ultimate say in the process, 
choosing the doctor she had to visit during her pregnancies and not informing her of 
the ill health of her first baby. 
Women's notions of reproduction also included expectations about their husbands' 
obligations in showing assistance during pregnancy and delivery. WI experienced 
this when she was about to deliver her second son in France. Her husband, in 
Lebanon at the time, did not come to be by her side during labour, despite her many 
requests. She recounts that he explained it in terms of his work obligations that take 
primacy. Similarly, W2 explained that her husband was not concerned with her 
difficult pregnancy: 
When I was about to deliver, he did not show support. During my pregnancy, I was ill 
and was at his parents, he brought me from his parents to my parents' place, which is 
quite close, and told my parents, "she is ill". Who took me to the doctor? My mother 
and my brother'S wife. You know parents gossip. I used to be frustrated that he did not 
accompany me. Even if he had work, only once, he could have done it. He could have 
spared one hour to take me. 
These expectations clashed with dominant norms that restricted husbands' 
reproductive roles as control over fertility and 'ownership' of children. 
The turning point was when women respondents realised that the husbands' practices 
also targeted children. W3 recounted: 
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1 had three miscarriages of three twins because of him, as he used to hit me and beat me 
so much. He started hitting my son and beating him, when he was not even 40 days old. 
Once my child had stomach cramps, he came and put the pillow on his mouth, he 
wanted to suffocate him. 1 asked him "what are you doing?" he said "I am quieting 
him", so I said "is this how a child is quietened?" From then, 1 began to be careful and 
watch out from him. 1 did not have trust. I used to send my son to school and finish my 
work before my son gets home. [ ... ]. This is my son, not his. His son is not accepting 
him. I accepted him and tolerated for the boy's sake. More than this, 1 cannot take. 
In this sense, women rejected reproductive and parenting norms when they tied the 
ill practices with poor ethics of care towards their children. W4 explained: 
Because he has abandoned his conscience and his children. Ifhe hadn't and I felt that he 
could still have mercy on his children, I would think that it's ok, let me stay here it is his 
house and he is welcome to return to it (ahla w sahla fi). But now no. 
Here women contested the dominant 'wife kind' by opposing gendered norms of 
their reproductive selves against those of their husbands. 
7.5 Interrupted looping effect and displacement of women's subjectivity 
7.5.1 Alternative categories for the 'wife kind' 
The process of kind making and unmaking was not completed as Hacking suggested 
for several reasons. The dominant 'wife' category persisted to be a mainstream 
desirable category, both legally and socially, while women with family law issues 
were re-categorised into three other 'negative' categories. One legal category is the 
'unruly wife' (niishez) that is commonly adopted by Islamic courts based on 
interpretations of the Shar' about women who desert the marital home against their 
husbands' approval and thus unilaterally separate from them. Wives who are 
categorised as niishez are required to go back to the marital home, or are otherwise 
stripped of their marital rights, such as alimony and custody of children. WI provides 
one example of this category after her husband left her in France and came back to 
Lebanon with the children without her knowledge. When she refused to join him, she 
was ruled as niishez by the religious court and was thus denied all her legal rights, 
including custody of children and alimony, and a ban on travel was placed against 
her. 
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The categorisation of niishez pressures women into remaining under the control of 
the husbands. As RCL3 explains, "the deviation (nushuz) usually is attributed to 
women as they are required to be obedient and maintain the continuity of marriage. 
However there are several views in this area." While religious judges confirmed that 
ruling of nushuz are subject to several conditions (RJ2 2005), several lawyers (LE I) 
and women respondents (WI, W8, W5) reported that they tend to be used as a first 
resort and applied liberally in courts. Continuing with the example of WI, the Jaafari 
judge issued a ruling of nushfiz in the first hearing of the court case. In this instance, 
the lawyer accepted the ruling as 'common practice', and failed to challenge it 
although the case did not meet all the nushuz conditions. In this sense, the category 
of the niishez becomes a dominant social category reinforced by gendered political 
practices of judges and litigants, as Nahda Shehada (2009) concurs in her study on 
the provision of house of obedience (bayt a/-ta 'a 158) in the Gaza strip. 
Women were also categorised in another 'negative' category of the 'divorcee'. The 
negative moral implications on this category are socially rather than legally 
constructed. When women manage to obtain divorce, they are subject to the negative 
norms associated with it. The 'divorcee' provides the moral antithesis of the 'good 
wife' and where women are blamed for the failure of the marriage. These constraints 
affect women's chances to negotiate future relationships. W5 mentioned that after 
she divorced, one suitor faced opposition by his parents because she was divorced. 
Another example is W2 who emphasised divorce as a decisive marker for a change 
in subjectivity: 
I told you I don't get out of my house except if I am divorced. He told me that he will 
change his ways, but I told him that there is no woman who would go back to an ex-
marriage and find her life going for the better. I don't want to do this back and forth 
divorcing and getting back together. I have tried you and you won't change. It wasn't 
until two months ago that he accepted the divorce and we have been divorced since for 
two years. 
m The House of Obedience (bayt a/-ta 'a) is the term used to indicate the legal requirement of a wife 
to return to the marital home, failing that she would be considered niishez and loses all her rights to 
alimony and custody. 
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A third category is that of the "re-married woman'. Legal frameworks tend to 
disadvantage re-married women by restricting their custody rights. In many cases, 
former husbands manage to strip women from their children's custody if they decide 
to remarry. Men place conditions on the divorce settlement at the religious courts, or 
they use their influence to revoke custody (Fieldnotes 2005). Social stigma tends to 
be greater depending on the type of marriage they contract. For example, WlO 
remarried someone from outside her sectarian circumscription. Her parents did not 
approve of this marriage and ended up not attending her wedding, as they were 
ashamed that she has 'sinned'. Her mother still lamented the fact that, since she 
married a non-Druze and became excommunicated, WIO would not be buried in the 
family religious cemetery. While these categories are not incorporated into women's 
ethical selving, they still constitute part of the kind making that fails to transform into 
a positive political classification. 
7.5.2 Displacing subjectivity to the 'mother kind' 
I start here by detailing the dominant moralities of religious authorities on 
'motherhood' and custody rights that are removed from women's construction of 
motherhood. RCL5 justified the men's right to children's custody in gender terms 
where ''the woman is not to be given ownership, not to be given authority. The nature 
of women is not equipped for this. But men are." 
When asking RCL4 about the reasons for the discrepancy between girls' and boys' 
age of father's custody (7 and 2 years old respectively), he provided a gendered 
analysis of the issue that is drawn from social norms rather than any specific 
scriptural texts: 
The girl needs more love and affection. For boys it is up to 2 years old as it is the age of 
breastfeeding. So regardless if the mother breastfeeds her son until he is 2 years old or 
not, she would still keep him until that age. Even if she gets married during the custody 
period, the children remain with her. [ ... ]. A young boy aged two needs his mother's 
affection, I agree with you, but he is with his father who would probably get support 
from his parents. Boys are more capable of handling emotional shocks than girls. Girls 
do not take it well. That's why girls stay with their mothers until they are 7 years old to 
give them an the support and affection they need. The custody age for boys is related to 
the fact that there is no need for much emotional guidance as with girls. There is a 
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saying that mentions that no matter how boys behave they are still men. With girls, it is 
different. Their behaviour changes as they grow up. They need someone to protect 
them. As the saying goes: the man is a seeker and the woman is sought after, the man is 
seductive and the woman is seduced. Such an intricate make up that not you or I have 
created. God almighty created this attraction between the two parties. So the boy's 
custody age of2 is enough to give him the needed love and affection. 
The central attributes of the 'mother kind' related to protecting their children from 
the husbands' harm. The ethical selving of a good mother focused on the notion of 
'sacrifice' that was expressed in several ways in relation to the children. The 
technical selving related to women's decision to remain in or leave the relationship 
being dependent on their ability to protect their children. W3 explained: 
I stayed that long for the sake of my son. But then his son was not accepting him. [ ... ] I 
accepted him and tolerated for the boy's sake. I cannot take more than this. In the end I 
did not fear for myself, I feared for my son. My son whom I was able to have out of 
seven children. I had three miscarriages (mrawwba tillt btiln) and the three were twins, 
three boys, and three girls other than this son. 
Another notion of the good mother was that they would not abandon their children. 
I told the judge yesterday, if I were a bad woman I would have thrown the children to 
you and lived my life. (W 15 2005) 
SW3 told me about this woman who hasn't seen her child for 10 months and she has not 
dared to call her husband. I said by God I would go and wrestle with him (wallah brah 
habbsho). I want to see my children, he doesn't dare take them, I would hit him 
(bkassro). I would sacrifice everything for my children sake. He knows that. I have told 
him several times I would sell my parents, I would sell you and everything, but I don't 
sell my children. I would fight with my teeth and my hands in order to raise them and 
stay with them. (W4 2005) 
In cases where women were separated from their children due to custody rulings, 
they translated their ethical selving as the 'good mother' as symbolic unwillingness 
to give up their children where the separation of women from their children was 
considered as forced and temporary. One example is with WI who has not seen her 
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children in 10 years. After several years of negotiations, her husband agreed to 
divorce her under the condition that she would legally revoke her right to the 
children's custody despite them being over the legal age for mother's custody. While 
this agreement would have granted her a long sought divorce and visiting rights to 
her children, WI did not agree to it on ethical grounds. She expressed it as follows: 
I cannot willingly abandon my children. They were taken away from me, and not the 
other way round, and I would never want them to think that I was the one to abandon 
them. I just cannot. I know I am materially losing a lot, but I cannot get myself to do it. 
At the end, they will understand what happened and will come back to me. 
The techniques to maintain the ethical self of the good mother related to bargaining 
over custody. After her divorce, W2 negotiated custody of her four year-old daughter 
with her former husband. She explained that this bargaining affects her daughter's 
upbringing because she has to go by her ex-husband's rules or otherwise he threatens 
to regain custody. Her ex-husband required that their daughter would wear the 
head scarf although she is too young of age to do it according to Islamic Shiea 
religious directives (usually required at puberty). Although W2 wears the headscarf 
herself, she reluctantly agreed to it: 
My daughter is still too young to wear the headscarf (tit!)aijab). I wanted her to enjoy 
her childhood and grow up to decide whether she wants to do it or not. However, her 
father [Le. ex-husband], because he is in the Party (!)izb) [Le. a member of the 
Hezbollah party], wants her to wear it and I have to comply. Otherwise, he will use it as 
an excuse to take her custody away from me. 
At the same time, women also constructed their ethical selves as good mothers by 
refraining from challenging the fathers' authority: 
I refused [to file a law suit] because in the end I will appear weak. In the future when 
my children grow up, they will know that I stood in front of their father in court. This is 
not fair to them (mish !)ilwe bi !)aqqon) at all. It is not fair to my daughter. (W 12 2005) 
They love their father a lot. Because I have never told them to hate their father, until 
today I tell them: "This is your father." Yesterday, for example, my daughter was asking 
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me: "What will the lawyer do? inshallah you get divorced." I asked: "Why are you 
saying this. Isn't it shameful ('ayb) to say this? This is your father. [ ... ] Can you forget 
your father? If you can forget your father then you can forget me too." She said: "No 
but because he did all these things" I said: "No, your father will always be your father 
and you should love him and respect him regardless of what is between me and him. He 
is your father." (W4 2005) 
In this sense, the 'wife kind' did not lead to a looping effect. Instead, it resulted in 
the displacement of women's selving to another category of 'mother kind' that 
combines both elements of dominant and less dominant norms. 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter traced the ways in which the norms of family law frameworks regulate 
women's legal subjectivity. It did so by exploring the normative basis behind 
women's enrolment in the 'marriage project' and development of their ontological 
and ethical selves as the 'wife kind'. 
The analysis revealed that the norms of family law frameworks are disseminated in 
society through various 'moral authorities' that tend to sieve statutory and broader 
legal norms on family law and retain the gendered norms inherent in them. Women 
initially intemalise these norms by subscribing to an aspirational ethos centred on the 
normativity of marriage and the gendered role of the wife. The family and religious 
leaders arguably played a crucial role in validating these gendered norms. However, 
the subjectification process is also strengthened when other actors tend to perpetuate 
these gendered norms. Women developed ethical selving of the 'good wife' by 
enrolling in, and complying with, without necessarily validating, the dominant norms 
instituting their husbands' authority over them. 
Women's subjectification is shaped by the interlocking of the dominant moralities of 
family law frameworks and women's constructed ethics on their roles in personal 
relations that are produced through the discursive practices on gender equality in 
family law. It appears in three stages. First, the stage of compliance is where 
women's ethics are in line with dominant moralities and discursive practices follow 
accordingly. Second, women destabilise the 'wife kind' when women's ethics clash 
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with the dominant moralities, but they maintain compliant discursive practices. A 
third stage is when women's ethics overtake dominant moralities and align discursive 
practices with their own ethics. IS9 This subjectification process is effectuated in 
tandem between two 'techniques of the self. First, women stop considering their 
husbands' ill practices in isolation of their ethics. Second, women's ethics are 
reformulated to reject obedience and assert a sense of autonomous subjectivity 
instead. 
In this shift, their subjectivity is reshaped from the category of 'wife' to that of 
'mother'. While the epistemological and technical selving goes against the dominant 
categories of 'mother', the ontological and ethical one remains in line with the 
dominant morality of the gendered 'mother' category. In this sense, it adds to 
Hacking's (1995) notion of a looping effect where individuals categorised under a 
certain 'kind' manage to contest it by formulating alternative subversive meanings to 
it. The case of women categorised under the dominant 'wife kind' category slightly 
modifies this idea. This chapter indicated that instead of altering the political 
meaning of the dominant 'wife kind', women's subjectivity went through a double 
loop where women identified with another category of 'mother kind'. This category 
remains framed within gendered notions of womanhood. However, it stressed a 
different gendered role than that of the wife, which relates primarily to gendered 
dynamics of the couple. This shift can be influenced by the power dynamics in the 
socio-Iegal context. These power dynamics influence the extent to which the 
dominant norms (in this case of the 'wife kind') are deeply seated within the actors 
on which individuals draw on for support (in this case the family and the social 
workers and lawyers). When these actors fail to join women in subverting these 
dominant categories, they develop women's subjectivity in a way that restricts 
agency as is discussed in the next chapter. 
IS9 As I went about the analysis, I noticed that these three stages could be read as following the 
marriage cycle, starting with women's entry into marriage to exiting from it. This linear temporal 
sequencing was expected as most respondents were seeking to exit the marriage at the time of the 
research. However. the various stages of kind making and unmaking can occur at varied periods and 
instances during the marriage and thus it is not necessarily a linear interpretation of the marriage 
cycle. 
214 
8 CHAPTER EIGHT Governance spaces and the construction of women's 
agency 
8.1 Introduction 
I want everyone to hear me. We can't go on being ignored like that. 
(W92005) 
No one wants to talk about it. .. My kids were snatched from me while 
everyone was watching. [ ... ]. I went to women groups hoping they 
would help. All they could say was 'there is nothing we can do, it's the 
law'. If the law was fair, I wouldn't have come to them. What kind of 
[feminist] activism is that? 
(WI 2009) 
When I was conducting my fieldwork, a two-minute video clip circulated on 
YouTube. It was taken from a TV interview between the Lebanese singer Haifa, a 
superstar known for her colourful lifestyle and artistic repertoire, and a famous talk 
show host known for his provocative questions. In the clip, the host brought up an 
issue that had never before been raised in the media. Haifa has a 12-year old 
daughter from a former marriage. Her former husband has not allowed her to make 
any contact with her since she was one-year old. The clip shows Haifa looking 
distressed, bursting into tears, refusing to discuss the issue, and threatening to leave 
the studio. 
The eagerness of women respondents' to voice their issues sharply contrasted with 
Haifa's reluctance to 'go public' with hers. 160 It even contrasted more with the 
subdued manner in which women groups raised the issue of gender equality and 
family law. Women groups from across the ideological board did not engage fully 
160 Of particular interest were the comments on this clip posted by Youtube users. Many viewers 
thought that it was a private issue and blamed the host for bringing it up. A substantial proportion 
blamed her and her lifestyle, deeming her a fallen woman and bad mother. A third much smaller 
proportion defended her and blamed the former husband and religious laws for her inability to see her 
daughter. These views link to the discussion on dominant norms in chapter 6. 
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with the issue. The former director of a prominent women studies research group 
stated that "there should not be any reforms of family law, they are a private issue" 
(Fieldnotes 2005). Leftist groups were discouraged by an unfavourable political 
environment, as BM 1 explained: 
It is not that we want to postpone dealing with [family law], but every time that the 
campaign is held, the forces that involved were not so large in order to exert effective 
pressure. [ ... ] Now the sectarian mentality considers itself as the most powerful [ ... ]. So 
secular or democratic forces are not currently strong. [ ... ] It is like blowing in the wind 
and we don't want to reach this point. So there is a need for a change in the mentality. 
So how would you change the mentality? [ ... ] We said let's start with demanding 
[gender] equality in other laws [ ... ] until there is a strong lobbying force on the ground 
then we can proceed with the issue [of family law reform]. 
This chapter discusses how the order of gender governance of family law shapes 
women's agency. It links the previously discussed enactment, moralities and ethics 
of family law frameworks and policies to women's capacity to act on gender 
discrimination in their personal relations at both collective and individual levels. The 
main finding is that the gender governance order strengthens women groups' 
expertise on action on family law, which disconnects and restricts women's agency 
in individual and collective policy spaces. It also constructs women's agency in 
multiple directions through contested notions of resistance and freedom beyond the 
conventional Western perspectives. 
The chapter contextualises the ways in which women groups engaged with the post-
conflict policy making process discussed in chapter 5. In this process, women groups 
strengthened their role as 'experts' on family law and reinforced internal bureaucratic 
practices through 'projectisation' of collective action. Their expertise is strengthened 
by managerial approaches to non-governmental collective action and the gendered 
norms generated by the enactment of family law policies. The thesis traced these 
changes at the two levels of analysing the policy problem, and redrawing women 
with family law problems as target populations and regulating their agency in 
collective and individual spaces. 
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Findings reveal that the expertise of women groups is restricting women's agency on 
gender equality in family law in collective and individual spaces. In collective 
spaces, women groups are reducing women's participation to that of passive 
'beneficiaries'. In individual spaces, women groups' expertise sustains the gendered 
norms and practices of family law policies rather than challenge them. These changes 
influence women's agency away from collective action and towards individually 
negotiating their freedom in personal relations in varying and multiple ways. 
The first section links to chapter 5 by explaining the role of women groups in 
reformulating the policy problem of gender equality in family law in the post-conflict 
policy setting. The following section details the way women groups regulated the 
inclusion of women in the collective spaces for action on family law. The third 
section discusses the role of women groups as experts in regulating women's agency 
in individual policy spaces. The last section analyses the way in which the order of 
gender governance enacted in women's social spaces affects the direction of 
women's agency and the many definitions of 'freedom' produced. 
8.2 Repositioning collective action and reframing the policy problem of family 
law 
This section traces the new roles that Lebanese women groups adopted in response to 
the change in their positioning within the post-conflict policy making process 
discussed in chapter 5. During that period, women groups actively engaged in global 
and local policy episodes and contributed to the discursive changes in framing the 
policy problem. Hence their role was gradually modified from representatives to 
'experts' in the sense elaborated by Foucault (1989) as exercising the power to shape 
discourse and action on gender equality in family law. I explore these roles of 
expertise in relation to Lewis and Mosse's (2006) typology ofNGOs as 'brokers and 
translators'. At the end of the section, I propose a notion that complements these two 
roles and explain their positioning in the policy process. 
This section starts by explaining how women groups acted as 'gender brokers' by 
shifting from representatives of women's rights to advisors on gender equality. This 
shift is noticeable in their roles during the transition period from the conflict period 
to the post-conflict era. Changes to the role of women groups are traced at both the 
217 
general level of gender-related policy making and implementation and the more 
specific one related to family law policies. 
During the civil conflict, women groups acted as representatives of women's rights 
due to the breakdown of state institutions during the civil war. Up to the end of the 
1980s, an array of leftist and nationalist women groups occupied the central scene of 
women's rights activism. They were positioned at the centre of the global and local 
feminist and socialist activism spaces. They received substantial funding from the 
political movements to whom they were affiliated and started originally as the 
women's committees for these parties. Both LWNGOI and LWNG02 were part of 
prominent national leftist political parties. Hence, they were closely linked to 
international socialist feminist movements. 
Another group of activists also claimed representativeness of women's rights by 
adopting a universalist approach to gender equality in family law based on the 
international human rights framework. Human rights activist lawyers focused on 
statutory rights of gender equality in family law and built their human rights platform 
in 1984 by establishing the Lebanese Organisation for Human Rights (LOHR) as an 
affiliate to the International Federation for Human Rights. Activists at this 
organisation constituted the cross over between women and human rights groups. For 
example, the co-founder of the LHRO Laure Moghaizel presided over the national 
umbrella of women groups, Lebanese Council for Women (LCW) in the 1980 and 
90s (Moghaizel Law Offices undated). 161 
As representatives of women's rights, women groups had a specific approach to 
gender equality in family law. Their engagement with gender equality appeared in 
collective public action based on legal expertise and advocacy for gender equality in 
family law. The transition into the post-conflict era gradually rearranged the 
positioning of women groups in relation to emerging policy actors, and particularly 
state actors. Several policy episodes led in the reduction of women groups' 
representation power among actors to a gradual shift towards a more advisory role. 
161 They were among the first civil society actors to contribute to the personal rights debate by 
proposing a unified civil personal status law proposal that they developed in 1950 while they were 
members of a small secular political group named the Democratic Party. 
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The role of women groups significantly changed during the institutionalisation 
process of the CEDA W mechanisms in Lebanon in the early 1990s as discussed in 
chapter 5. Women groups were centre stage in the initial phase of the preparations 
for the Beijing Summit, which were initiated in 1993. Upon ministerial decree, 
women groups were officially appointed as part of the national delegation along with 
a pool of officials that included the wife of the president of the republic who headed 
the delegation. At that stage, women group leaders acted as gender experts and 
introduced state actors to the global gender regime. 162 They asserted their leading 
position by providing the material for the national delegation on the situation of 
women's rights in Lebanon as expressed by BM2 (2005): 
We were the pioneers in promoting women's rights. When we asked Mona Hrawi [the 
president's wife] to give a speech on the International Woman's Day, she didn't know 
what 8 March was. But now, everyone talks about it and claims to have initiated it. 
As implied in the quote above, the representative role of women groups gradually 
narrowed following the Beijing Summit and the follow up mechanisms of the 
CEDA W process. As part of the formalisation process, the Lebanese government 
established a national commission for gender issues. It had the role of the official 
representative of gender issues. As per the directives of the CEDA W mechanisms, 
the Non-Governmental Committee for the Follow up on Women's Issues (NGCFWI) 
was established as a monitoring body affiliated to NCLW. 
Women groups gradually lost their leadership of the gender equality agenda to state 
actors who held official decision-making power at both administrative and 
operational levels. As discussed in chapter 5, the NCL W also acted as a gatekeeper 
for women groups' participation in the process. Despite CEDA W regulations, the 
status of women groups as a non-governmental committee within NCL W was not 
mentioned in the commission's by-laws. In 1998, the non-governmental committee 
broke off from the NCL W and established itself as an independent woman group 
(L WNG05) after disagreements with the board members. As the leadership of the 
NCLW board changed a few years later, the president of L WNG05 returned to the 
162 The Lebanese government appointed the wife of the then president of the republic as the head of 
the Lebanese delegation to Beijing. 
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board position. These examples indicate the political negotiations in which women 
groups were enrolled. As NCL W was further formalised, it claimed the role of the 
official representative and decision-making power from women groups. 
With this reversal in roles, women groups focused on their expertise in legal 
knowledge. The CEDA W follow up mechanisms required specialised legal skills to 
cater for their requirements of reporting to the UN committee and reviewing and 
comparing legal provisions. For example, the NCL W and the L WNG05 jointly 
drafted a National Lebanese Strategy in 1997. Expert lawyers from within women 
groups stepped into this role relying on their experience in the field. 
The representation claims of feminist groups over gender equality in family law was 
also compromised by the campaign for an optional civil marriage law reform 
launched by the then president Elias Hrawi in 1996 and discussed in chapter 5. 
Women groups had a mixed response to the campaign (AI-Bizri 2000). The 
L WNG02 and L WNG03 actively joined the campaign whereas other organisations 
remained in the background. At the time, the L WNG06 - the representative umbrella 
of women groups in Lebanon - was also part of the campaign because it was 
presided over by the president of L WNG03. Participating women groups subscribed 
to the overall demands of the campaign focusing on the issue of consociational 
secular citizenship without including a manifest gender equality angle. I discuss their 
discourses in the next section. This seemingly ambivalent position of women groups 
later unveiled changes in the power dynamics between various policy actors. 
In a follow up episode to the reform campaign, the dynamics between women groups 
and state actors further reduced their representative roles. In the two years following 
the reform campaign, significant changes took place within the space for feminist 
collective action. As BM13 (2005) explained, socialist and secularist groups 
gradually lost their grounds within the feminist collective action space in that period. 
Changes were reflected mainly in the L WNG06. As the term ended for the leftist 
L WNG06 president, the L WNG06 elected a new president who was closely 
affiliated to political actors, particularly the then Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who 
opposed the reform campaign. In addition, the L WNG06 broadened its membership 
to include a large number of small religious community women groups working on 
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charitable service provision for women. With this new make-up, the L WNG06 
distanced itself from the secular claims on family law. 
In the summer of 2001, women groups joined international efforts to hold the first 
World March of Women, a global event calling to end poverty and violence against 
women (World March of Women website). LWNG02 and the LWNG06 set to 
organise the march and draft a common agenda of local demands for women's rights. 
In drafting the agenda, women groups disagreed over the issue of optional civil 
marriage law reform. Leading leftist groups, such as L WNG02 and L WNG03, held 
on to their secular stance and insisted on including the demands. On the other side, 
despite its general commitment to a universalist gender equity agenda, the L WNG06 
objected to this demand because it went against the political agenda of a large 
number of its women group affiliates. 163 
The L WNG06's stand was strongly backed by two women MPS. I64 As no agreement 
could be reached, and facing the secular groups' pressure to uphold the optional civil 
personal status laws demands, the L WNG06 and its affiliates boycotted the march. 
This disagreement fragmented the representative role of women groups as advocates 
for family law reform. This episode helped in diversifying women groups' stance on 
gender equality and family law and their formulation of the problem as is discussed 
in the next section. 
As women groups diversified their stances, they approached collective action as 
knowledge communities bearing gender specialists roles. Women groups moved on 
from the charged politicised climate and reorganised collaborations across women 
groups in issue-based networks. These networks were funded by western donors and 
drew new linkages across women groups that were still based on political alliances, 
in the broadest sense of the term. 
Alongside the policy episode of family law reform, women groups strengthened their 
gender specialist roles by catching up on new global discourses around gender 
163 L WNG06 considered optional civil marriage to be threatening inter-religious peace consolidation 
and 'shared livelihoods' and unsuitable for Lebanese social and religious nonns. 
164 MPs Bahia Al-Hariri and Ghinwa Jalloul were both affiliated to the coalition of the then Prime 
Minister Rafik Hariri. 
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equality in family law, such as the prominent shift in from a legal approach to family 
law towards the lived perspective of Violence Against Women (VAW) approach. 
This global shift sought to address the resistance by several Arab and Islamic states 
to ratify or remove their reservations on the CEDA W convention. 16s The first event to 
introduce the V A W approach to the Arab and Lebanese feminist collective action 
was to hold a public hearing in Lebanon on 29 and 30 June 1995. Arab and Lebanese 
women groups organised the first public hearing including public testimonies of 
women enduring domestic violence by their husbands or in-laws. 
On I December 1996, exactly one week after the launch of the secular civil marriage 
reform campaign. Several Lebanese and Arab women groups met in Rabat and 
agreed to formally establish the Permanent Arab Court to Resist Violence Against 
Women (hereafter Arab Court), and hold its headquarters in Beirut. L WNG03 took 
the lead on the issue and appointed the director from one of its members. Later in 
1997, LWNG03 and several Lebanese women groups formed LWNGOI, the first 
Lebanese network specialised in working on resisting YAW. Despite the optional 
secular reforms campaign reaching its peak at that time, L WNGO 1 did not mention 
the issue in any of their statements. The parallels went on as the second public 
hearing was held in Beirut between 15 and 17 March 1998 to coincide with the 
cabinet's voting round on the president's optional secular marriage reform proposal. 
As with the previous event, the Arab Court did not refer in any way to the turbulent 
debate over optional civil marriage reforms. Women groups thus initiated another 
track for action that is based on legal speciality and service delivery, thus confirming 
their roles as translators of gender knowledge that reconfigured the meaning of 
gender equality in family law. 
With this new track, women groups asserted their role as legal specialists and service 
providers. Gradually women groups turned this track into gender ·projectisation'. 
Within two years, LWNGOI mutated from its initial network structure into a formal 
Lebanese NGO and established itself as the only Lebanese specialist women group 
dedicated to resisting YAW. In a reversal of power dynamics, state actors were 
brought into this policy episode as implementation actors rather than policy and 
165 See Mayer (1995) and COMors (1996) for a useful discussion of the reservations of Arab states 
and their arguments on possibilities for the compatibility of the CEDA W with Islamic family law. 
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decision makers. For instance, LWNOOI teamed up with the Ministry of Social 
Affairs (MOSA) to implement a training programme on detecting and referring 
victims of domestic violence. Eighty social workers from MOSA's Community 
Development Centres (CDCs) around Lebanon were trained for that purpose and a 
domestic violence guidebook was also drafted (PM! 2005). Similar to Hammami's 
(2000) findings on Palestinian NOOs since Oslo, Lebanese women groups have 
renegotiated their position vis-A-vis the state by positioning themselves as political 
actors and 'experts' with significant influence on the policy making process. 
As we can see from this analysis, women groups had a crucial role in steering the 
discourse on gender equality and family law. They actively reformulated the policy 
problem of family law towards the notion of Violence Against Women. This notion 
is useful to bridge the plight of women across various family law frameworks. It 
however shifted the governance spaces from family law frameworks and their 
enactment towards the domestic and individual spheres. Their collective agency 
shifted towards establishing themselves as 'gender experts' by translating particular 
knowledge on gender equality in family law and brokering the agendas of local and 
global policy actors. Hence it is useful to think of the collective action space 
constructed by these women groups - and NOOs in general- as 'discursive 
connectors' .166 Hence women groups' collective action space draws legitimacy from 
the international and local gender equality regimes and acts as a hub for power 
relations between various discourses on gender equality and family law of policy 
actors and women with family law problems. 
8.3 Expert feminist action and women's representation and agency in 
collective spaces 
This section explores the ways in which the agency of women with family law issues 
is enacted in the collective spaces of action on gender equality in family law. It 
unpacks the expert roles of women groups and explores its impact on women's 
agency. Women groups sustain their expertise roles by reinforcing the exclusivity of 
'activism' in opposition to women with family law issues. The notions of brokerage 
166 My notion of connectors is different from 'interfaces' in that the latter assumes a neutral entity 
between two worlds (Long 2001). Considering NGOs as connectors recognises their roles as vehicles 
of power relations (Foucault 1980) and discursive translators (Lewis and Mosse 2006). 
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and translation run through all levels of the organisational structure of the women 
groups. 167 
8.3.1 Gender experts and lay followers 
Women groups were able to strengthen their expertise role by maintaining 
exclusivity and a sharp dichotomy between the roles of 'activist' and 'lay' women. 
The intra-women groups' dynamics revealed a strong hierarchy that is a combination 
of two factors. First, women groups in the post-conflict period followed the 
historically gendered and hierarchical patterns of organising discussed in chapter 4. 
These dynamics are in line with Suad Joseph's (1997) study of women groups in 
Lebanon, where there is little mobility and tum over in leadership. 
One example is the conference that I participated in during my fieldwork on the 
achievements and challenges of the feminist movement in Lebanon. In one of the 
discussions, several feminist activists lamented the fact that the burden of collective 
action has become increasingly too big to bear, as there the numbers of new feminist 
activist joining women groups was very low. The discussion between long standing 
activists and other younger members of the audience explained the conundrum of the 
'feminist activist'. Two feminist activists gave different explanations. The president 
of L WNG05 found that there was "low commitment by young generations to the 
issues of women's rights" (Fieldnotes 2005). The president of L WNG03 rather 
attributed it to the "burdens of economic constraints and the domestic pressures that 
women face by their family obligations" (Fieldnotes 2005). These two explanations 
framed individuals - and primarily women - as either unconcerned or constrained, 
but in both cases defaulting from the 'activist' role. While the discussion went on 
along these lines, an unaffiliated young woman participant asked to speak. She 
explained openly that she and her friends are interested in working on women's 
issues, but they feel "crowded out by long standing members in rigid organisational 
structures" (Fieldnotes 2005). The young woman's views pointed to a sense of 
exclusion that individuals might have within feminist circles. 
167 The findings help rethinking Lipsky's (1980) concept of 'street level bureaucracy' that focuses 
only on the personalised interactions of frontline social workers with concerned populations. 
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Findings from my fieldwork sustained this exclusionary situation. 168 As extensively 
discussed in the NGO literature, the organisational structure of women groups in 
many contexts often includes rigid governing structures. Most studied women groups 
were run by the same president or board members for long years including leftist 
groups like WNG02 and WNG03. WNG02 adopted a devolutionary system of 
governance where each branch elected their own committee from the local members 
and set their own priorities. However, these structures were composed of the same 
members, elected repeatedly. Another pattern is for women groups to mirror the 
Lebanese political governance system. WNG06, the largest umbrella alliance 
gathering around 120 women organisations in Lebanon, alternates presidency terms 
between Muslim and Christian presidents, a long-standing practice that was resumed 
in the post-conflict era (PM2 2004). 
These rigid structures demarcate clear lines between long standing gender 
'specialists' and other uninitiated individuals. These roles have become part of the 
gendered and hierarchical organisational practices inherited since the formation of 
women groups as discussed in chapter 4. As the next section shows, these roles are 
also strengthened by the projectisation of family law centred collective action. 
8.3.2 Embedding gendered norms of family law within expertise 
The expertise of women groups further removed 'lay' women from the collective 
space by perpetuating the stigma associated with gender equality in family law 
discussed in chapter 7. Women group activists reinforced the role of 'gender experts' 
by distancing themselves from the 'policy problem' of gender equality in family law. 
Gender discrimination in family law was displaced as an external social 'problem' 
outside the boundaries of the collective action space. This was achieved at two 
levels. 
First, the 'problem' was considered a taboo at the level of board members. Activists 
at LWNGOI provide an example of this situation. In its capacity as leading NGO on 
domestic violence, LWNGOI brands itself as a 'platform for women' (LWNGOI 
168 In her anthropological study, Suad Joseph (1997) compared the organisational and strategic 
patterns of one of the most established women organisations to the structures found among small 
family businesses or 'shopkeepers'. 
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2005). At the time of my fieldwork, three board members were going through family 
law problems. However, they kept their problems away from other members. 
Furthermore, they did not use the legal and counselling services provided there or 
sought any advice on where to seek it elsewhere. One of the concerned members, 
BM5 (Fieldnotes 2005), told me that she suggested to other members forming a 
support group amongst themselves, but no one was willing to open up. Activists 
dissociated themselves from the problem and thus from the 'users' associated with it, 
namely women with family law issues. 
Second, the hierarchical organisational practices discussed in the previous section 
reduced the level of trust provided for support staff who tend to be the most 
vulnerable. For instance W12, one of the support staff at LWNGOI, sought this job 
to after problems with her estranged husband. Despite her ongoing family problems, 
she did not use the help of the group. This is despite the fact that she closely related 
to a board member who was an old friend and supported her in her situation. W12 
explained to me: 
INTOl 
Did you contact anyone in this organisation for support? 
Wl2 
No, no, no. 
INTOl 
Why not? 
Wl2 
Because first of all, I do not like my story to be spread everywhere. I like secrecy. Then 
again, what would one benefit? Scandal and humiliation Uorsa w bahdale w sharshaba). 
And I do not have trust ... I don't know what to tell you. I cannot say anything. I work 
here. 
In this situation, again the dynamics between individuals within these women groups 
were rearranged according to the gendered norms surrounding the problem of gender 
equality in family law. This example dispels the myths of solidarity and sisterhood 
often attributed to women groups and revealed the cross-cutting differences and the 
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marginalisation that women can face within feminist spaces. 
I found a similar situation at another government support centre. I approached social 
workers in the centre to point me to potential respondents. During that period, very 
few women with family law problems used their services, so they were at a loss of 
trying to help me for about two weeks. Then in discussion with SW6 (2005), she 
suddenly remembered one 'who could be sort of a case'. It was W3, the caretaker of 
the building who lived in a small room by the main lobby. SW6 described W3 as "a 
destitute woman (mCattra) who has been having difficult problems with her husband 
for quite some time". When I asked her whether she used their support services, she 
replied that she didn't. W3 was not categorised as a 'user'. 
My interview with W3 turned out to be very insightful as she recounted her 
experience of dealing with severe violence by her husband and seeking support from 
various actors. She recounted one episode when she did not receive the help she 
sought from the centre: 
W3: Once [my husband] hit my son with a stick on here, he almost split his head into 
two. [ ... ] I was up on the eighth floor, I went down barefoot on the stairs, I don't know 
how I got down. I saw my son on the floor telling me "dakhilik mama, my head" [ ... ] 
[my husband] started hitting me and beating me. I went up to [the tenants] and told them 
[ ... ] "go down and see if there is a solution with him. If you don't want him [to work as 
a caretaker] anymore, tell him to leave, because I cannot tolerate this anymore. They 
told me, this is your husband, it's your problem, you deal with it between you and him 
(stofli minnik la i10), we do not want to interfere. I went back down here, and he began 
cursing and swearing [ ... ]. 
INTO 1: When you went to talk with the people in the building, the [support centre staff] 
were here? Did you talk to them? 
W3: Yes, yes, I talked to them. I told them, that there is no way for agreement. I told her 
"please if you could send someone from your part, you as the ministry, as the 
government, maybe he would listen and be convinced." She told me "we cannot 
interfere in such issues." 
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In the case of W3, social workers considered her situation as outside of the realm of 
formal diagnosis of V A W situations. Although closely associated to the centre, they 
did not offer her any legal help that they usually provide to users of these services. 
8.3.3 Expertise and projectisation of gender equality in family law in collective 
spaces 
The projectisation induced by the gender order of governance of family law further 
strengthened the expert role of women groups. The shift towards service delivery 
with the V A W approach created new expertise roles for activists as translators of 
knowledge on gender equality in family law. It also included professional staff as 
new operational translators of this knowledge. As discussed below, this division of 
labour worked in tandem to further marginalise women's participation in collective 
action. 
These exclusionary dynamics lie in the division of roles between board members and 
professional staff. In some women groups like WN GO 1, professional staff were not 
considered part of the decision makers as they were not invited to consultations over 
project design or future vision. On the other hand, board members did not have a say 
over the substance of the implementation. Professional staff had full autonomy over 
the diagnosis, follow up and referral of users and claimed expertise due to their 
formal employment status, or their specialist knowledge as social, psychological or 
legal professionals. There were no formal substantive reporting mechanisms 
presented to board members (or higher management in case of the government 
outlets) beyond the basic quantitative assessments. 
The quantitative assessments translated women's knowledge into projects outputs. 
The projects outputs set by women groups and donors are focused on the numbers of 
'cases' dealt with per week rather than the number of women succeeding in making 
progress in their family law issues. These outputs reduced women to 'cases' with 
legalistic and psychological indicators. 169 This term was in currency among all 
support services actors in a reminder of the expert role they hold. The information 
169 The use of 'cases' to refer to women with family law problems was initially adopted to preserve 
women's anonymity. Yet this terminology reminds of the one used by medical experts in clinical 
assessments. 
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collected about women's experiences was restricted to basic bio-data, which was not 
sufficient to compose an informed assessment of their overall situation. In addition, it 
was not used to provide a base for project design. At WNG01, this data was used for 
reporting purposes rather than informing project ideas and grant proposals 
(Fieldnotes 2005). 
Another exclusionary use of women's knowledge was through translating their 
experiences into victims' narratives while denying them ownership and voice. This 
translation is found in the information disseminated in V A W related public forums or 
publications. For example in the public hearing of the Permanent Arab Court To 
Resist Violence Against Women held in Beirut in 1995, several 'testimonies' were 
used to inform participants of the nature and extent of violence practiced against 
women. These testimonies consisted of anonymised narration of women's 
experiences. The 'testimonies' focused almost exclusively on the graphic details of 
the violence exerted upon them: 
I got married at the age of eighteen, said Z.B from Syria. My husband deprived me of 
the opportunity to continue my university studies, and forced me to serve his mother ... 
He started to beat me to severe bleeding ... He then drove me out of my house with no 
clothes and no money ... My husband started to drink heavily and got into womanizing 
to the extent that he started to get some women into our own apartment. 
He kept insisting on the need to give birth to a son. As soon as I had given birth to our 
son, his attitude worsened. He prohibited me from going out of the house ... Beating and 
abuse were no longer confined to our home. He began to torture me while starving my 
kids and myself. He began to threaten me of throwing me out of the house. One night, 
he severely beat me. I tried to commit suicide but my parents saved me. 
The Court did not rule that I get alimony, because my husband claimed to be poor. 
When my eldest daughter reached the end of her nurture age, my husband took her and 
started setting her against me. She now considers me repulsive and refuses to see me. 
Lately my husband took my other children. But two days later, he sent our young son 
home and said: "I will take him back when he grows up." He denies me any chance to 
see my daughters. I'm raising my son without any alimony and without being divorced, 
while expecting his father to take him away from me. 
(Arab Women Court undated) 
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This testimony focused on constructing the image of a victim. This type of accounts 
was restricted to the phenomenological description of their experiences, without any 
comprehensive analysis of the broader social dynamics in which women are 
involved. Women who used the services were not invited to the public events or 
conferences that were held. As Helms (2003) argues in the context of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, women groups' categorisation of women as constitutively falling 
outside of the socio-political power relations (as agents of peace for example) 
presents a paradox that excludes them from participating effectively in the political 
sphere. 
A contrasting example is of WlO who sought the services of WNGO 1, seeking help 
in her custody battle. During the interview, she mentioned that she wrote a novel 
about her experience of violent marriage and her legal battle for custody. She 
repeatedly asked WNGO 1 staff and board members for help in publishing it. Board 
members were not interested in publishing it and they turned it down without reading 
it. This segregation reinforces the gap between activists and users and hinders 
possibilities for building a momentum of significant grassroots movements on the 
issue. 170 
Social workers also helped construct the separate category of users by primarily 
translating women's knowledge about family law problems and fitting them into 
'specialised' pathological categories. This process excluded the most vulnerable 
women and delegitimised their experiences. For example, in the WNGOI socio-Iegal 
support centre in Beirut, women were informally classified according to their 
'credibility' as users. For instance, W12 had been seeking support for more than one 
year at the time of the interview. She claimed repeated abuse by her husband and his 
family over a long period. Her accounts were repeatedly dismissed by social 
workers, and she was the joke of the centre. As SW3 (2005) scheduled me for an 
170 In 1998, a small group was fonned from around 15 foreign women mainly from Europe (or 
Lebanese with dual nationalities) who were married to Lebanese men under Lebanese family law. 
These women organised into a group after they experienced first-hand the discrimination of Lebanese 
religious legal provisions when involved in divorce and child custody cases. They gathered support 
from international human rights organisations and their official bodies such as ministries of foreign 
affairs and embassies to pressure the Lebanese state for fairer tenns. They tried approaching the main 
women groups but they were not supported. 
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interview with her, she warned me "you will see, she is a nut case, she is a sex-
obsessed fraudster who keeps coming here to talk about dicks and fucks to waste our 
time". The interview was one of the most difficult to hold, as W22 had difficulty 
narrating her story coherently, and the discussion mainly revolved around repeated 
abuse by her husband's family and various instances of forced sexual encounters 
earlier in her life. After the interview, suspecting that W22 could be suffering from 
mental illness, I raised my concerns to the two psycho-social workers and had the 
following discussion (Fieldnotes 2005): 
INTO 1: She seemed quite disturbed, I couldn't get much of her situation, she mostly 
focused on the sexual abuse she went through. 
SW3: I assure you she doesn't suffer from anything, she has got nothing, she is a liar 
and a charlatan; she is just makes all these things up because she is sex-obsessed. That's 
all. 
INTO 1: She seemed rather more disturbed than a fraud. As if she was really traumatised 
by several issues. 
SW3: No, she really has nothing. We had several sessions with her and couldn't get any 
coherence either. She just comes up with a new [sexual] story every time and enjoys 
talking about it. 
INTO 1: She might be suffering from severe mental illness beyond the usual counselling 
that is provided here. 
SW3: No, she just is this way, we even sent her to the psychiatrist. He diagnosed her 
with delirium and gave her some pills. But that's it. Apart from that, she has got 
nothing. 
SW4: Yes [SW3] is right. She is mentally ill, she has got no issues of abuse. 
The two social workers agreed on a diagnosis that reflected a narrow and exclusive 
focus on V A W 'symptoms'. They considered segregated mental illness from any 
other loosely identified symptoms related to YAW. Both social workers did not 
conduct any further assessment related to her situation, such as a home visit or 
sustained referral to mental health professionals. Her claims were dismissed and she 
was dropped from the user category (Fieldnotes 2005). 
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This section revealed that instead of maximising women's agency, these collective 
spaces restrict women's agency and reduce their possibilities for action. These 
findings coincide with Islah Jad's (2004) research on Arab women groups which 
need to be considered as part of the historical and socio- political context and do not 
necessarily further socio-economic development. In the case of this research, these 
practices were noted to limit the agency of women with family law issues by 
excluding them from active involvement in collective action and reducing their 
voice. Women are pushed to the margins of the collective action space and towards 
individual spaces for action. 
8.4 The enactment of expertise in women's individual spaces 
This section is concerned with the ways the gender order of governance is enacted by 
women's collective action to regulate women's agency in individual spaces. 17\ It 
assesses how women groups' expertise discussed in the previous section understand 
the role of various actors involved in women's agency in individual spaces. Findings 
reveal that because of this understanding, women groups' role of expertise restricts 
women's agency in everyday resistance of gender discrimination in family law. This 
process of containment is enacted in two ways. First, the expertise of women groups 
limits women's agency by reducing the avenues for interaction between women and 
other actors. Second, they funnel women's agency towards their expert role of 
psycho-legal support that is underpinned by hierarchical and gendered norms 
discussed in the previous section. 
8.4.1 Women groups and various actors involved in women's individual spaces 
Assuming their expert role, women groups construct a coherent and simplified 
understanding of women's relations with other actors in their individual spaces. This 
framework is based on dismissing women's knowledge and interpreting the 
dynamics of their interaction with other actors into reductionist binaries. It was noted 
at the level of three actors: the family, religious leaders, and police forces. I discuss 
these below. 
111 I use the term individual spaces to describe the 'communal' spaces that women operate in while 
seeking solutions for their family law issues. These involve their immediate environments including 
their husbands, children, in-laws, own families, and friends and neighbours; the law enforcing 
authorities such as the police forces; the religious court system; and the religious communal 
authorities like the religious advice bureaus or local parish priests. 
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Women groups' discourses simplified the family that is the immediate environment 
of women as an essentialised oppressive institution. These discourses are traced in 
women groups' publications such as WNGOI's newsletter. Every issue of the 
newsletter incudes a description of one 'case' that is commented on by 'social' and a 
'legal' experts. The commentaries perpetuated the essentialised notions of the family 
as in this example of a social commentary starting with a description of the 
immediate environment of an abused woman as "a big sized family, poverty, 
backwardness, and ignorance" (Newsletter 2004). These perceptions were translated 
into women groups' action. In several interviews, social workers indicated that they 
do not do any home visits and they do not have any contact with the users' families. 
By maintaining strict separation between collective and individual spaces, women 
groups and other gender-concerned policy actors entrench the assertion that the 
problem of gender discrimination in family law lies in individual or domestic spaces. 
They thus construct collective spaces as unique sanitised and professionalised forums 
for helping women. 
However, regardless of women's perceptions of their families, findings show that 
actually the immediate environment is the first and recurrent port of call for women. 
The institutional-legal framework of personhood discussed in chapter 6 strengthens 
the linkages women and their families in Lebanon. As women's subjectivity is spread 
at a continuum composed of their own and their husbands' families, women's agency 
is geared towards seeking their help - regardless of whether they will get it or not. 
Women respondents noted that the 'family' was composed of multiple, less coherent 
actors than portrayed in women groups' discourses. F or instance, women 
respondents such as WI2, W4, and W8 reported that their fathers were more 
supportive of their issues than their mothers, contra reductionist gender analysis. 
Similarly, brothers were also often identified as supportive of women respondents, as 
with W4, W5. W3, in tenns of defending their sisters' safety from their husbands' 
violence or helping them with their legal battles. W12 and W14 also reported that in-
laws were supportive of them. Other sources of help and support were the neighbours 
or friends who were called in for help in instances of domestic violence for example. 
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However, this is not to say that family support is always existent, swift, systematic, 
or unconditional. As discussed in chapter 7, support tends to be erratic and framed 
primarily within marriage normativity. Women respondents explained that support 
from their families could be especially tricky when it involves seeking them for 
shelter or financial support. They commented that "I cannot burden my family with 
myself and my kids" (WI5), and "everyone has got their own problems and I cannot 
add to theirs" (W9). Women's decision of leaving the marital house when in an 
unhappy relationship was very much linked to their ability to find shelter with their 
families. These findings support research undertaken in different contexts and 
revealing the complexity of the relations between women and their family 
environment. In contexts as various as Iran and the US, Women often rely on their 
kin and family relations for social survival when dealing with their family law issues 
which in turn could compromise their capacity for taking action (Welchman 2004). 
Women groups also reduced the array of religious actors to one category of 'religious 
leaders'. Religious leaders were portrayed as ultimate decision makers and a 
hindrance to the legal reforms of family law. Leftist women groups (WNG02 and 
WNG03) hold a categorical position that considers religious leaders as antagonists 
with irreconcilable opposing interests 
"[ ... ] there is no hope of talking to them, [ ... J don't expect that religious leaders will 
help you. On the contrary, there are some enlightened ones [ ... who] on personal basis 
they might be in favour, but publicly they don't, from all sects. We visited the Druze, 
Shica, catholic, Greek Orthodox [leaders] and they all provided different excuses for 
their refusal ofreforms."(BM3 2005) 
Other women groups differentiated between religious leaders and agreed to link only 
with the more 'progressive' ones. For example, WNGOI held occasional roundtables 
in 2002-03 with religious leaders on the topic of violence against women, without 
further follow up. However these 'progressive' religious leaders tend to be at the 
margins of the decision making power as they do not hold high positions within the 
religious councils. Sometimes they can be even excluded by the decision makers 
within these religious councils. WNG04 is the only women group to break this 
exclusion and develop consistent relations with official religious authorities 
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including the heads of the religious councils and their regional affiliates In the 
process of lobbying them to reform clauses within religious law (BM3 2005). 
These accounts can be interpreted as part of the gendering effect of the enactment of 
family law frameworks. Women groups acknowledged religious leaders to be gender 
biased in their interpretation of religious legal frameworks. However, there is more 
to gender discrimination within the work of religious leaders. Women groups failed 
to address the institutional gendering effect inherent within the practices of court 
procedures of religious leaders, an issue that is not technically related to 
'jurisdiction'. One could note the gendered practices of religious leaders in the 
subdued presence of women groups within religious courts. For instance, during 
several hearings at the Shica religious court in the southern suburb, volunteer lawyers 
from WNGOI concealed their affiliation with the group and merely introduced 
themselves as legal representatives of the clients. One lawyer justified this practice 
by saying that judges would be uncooperative if they would learn about their 
affiliation (LEO 1 2005). The gendering effect of family law frameworks curtails 
women's agency -both as representatives and defendants. 
Within the category of religious actors, two groups were dropped from women 
groups' discourses.172 The first is that which I term the 'administrative authorities' 
who run the religious legal system, such as judges in religious courts and the rest of 
the administrative team of clerks. It is striking that they were not considered relevant 
policy actors by WNGO 1 for instance, an organisation that is specialised with 
providing legal advice and representation activities in religious courts. The second is 
the group of 'religious community leaders' who run the RABs or community church 
priests and provide religious litigation (in case of RABs) and counselling services to 
women as discussed in chapter 6. While these two groups were excluded from 
women groups' analysis, they featured as main players at various points in the 
process. Women respondents expressed that they interacted with them at various 
points of their problems. 
172 As of 2009 some recently formed women groups started engaging with religious actors through 
efforts to modernise the Islamic courts and introducing digital database system for archiving and 
producing manuals aimed at raising awareness on gender discrimination in family law. 
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Findings reveal that these religious actors heavily influence women's agency through 
a crucial dynamic of informal mediation where they get to articulate gendered norms 
of family law. This mediation role was also found with religious leaders in other 
Islamic contexts such as the Gaza strip (Shehada 2006). This informal mediation was 
noted at both levels of formal litigation, such as in religious courts, or less formal one 
such as the case of the religious community bureaus. 
Mediation occurs continuously during the litigation process. One example of these 
informal mediation practices took place during a court observation. J accompanied 
LEI and WI5 to the Shica religious court in the Southern Suburb to follow up on her 
request for alimony from her estranged husband. At the start of the session, the judge 
decides to turn the hearing into an informal meeting without prior notice and for no 
specific reason. WI5 explains that her husband did not pay the tuition fee for her 
children's schooling as he promised in an earlier meeting with the judge two days 
ago. The judge immediately started by discrediting her story. He then summoned the 
clerk from the other room and asked him to call the husband from the handset on his 
desk. The clerk acts as the mouthpiece of the judge who is dictating his directives: 
Clerk (on behalf of RJ I) 
You have not paid to your wife and children's expenses despite your promise to me one 
month ago. (On behalf of the husband) he says he paid them Judge. 
Wl5 
No he didn't your Honour. 
RJI 
You haven't, your wife is here asking for it. 
Clerk (repeating RJI's sentence and replying on behalf of the husband) 
He promises to do it in two days. 
WI5 
Your honour he already promised to do it several times and failed to keep his word. 
RJ I (picks up the phone from the clerk) 
Let me talk to him. [Shouting]: (To the husband) you are not the one who makes the 
decision. Okay? You are not the one who decides. I told you to enrol the children at 
school. If you don't enrol them, I will grant her a decision where they [the police] 
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would take you from your job and put you in jail. Do you hear me? [The husband is 
trying to plead]. You can't say any word. You go enrol your children and then you 
come and talk to me. [The husband is trying to plead]. It's not for her to enrol them. I 
am telling you, you need to go and enrol them at school, you pay the fees, and you do 
everything. [ ... J (To WI5) that's it, he will pay them. 
WI5 (anxiously) 
But your Honour, he is a liar, he won't do it. I can't take it anymore. I want a divorce. 
JRI 
This time he will comply, ifhe doesn't then we will see. 
The meeting closed briefly after. No records were kept for the decision or the 
discussion. This informal approach to dealing with legal issues draws the importance 
of legal pluralism where informal interpretation of Shari' a takes over the formal 
applications. This trend is noted by (Berger 1999) in his study of mosque circles in 
Syria where an informal application of Shari' a is widespread. Berger also finds that it 
is important to address motivations and emotional value when analysing these 
situations. As we exited the meeting, LE 1 explained the practices of the court: 
INTO I 
What about these meetings? Are they kept on record? 
LEI 
No, they are not. Only the court cases are, and any written requests that you put 
forward, but not these discussions. The judge likes to solve things in an amicable way 
like he did today. So these do not get recorded. These requests can be varied such as 
requests for instalments, or lifting ban of travel, or preponing the date of a court 
hearing. But usually I don't put forward a request for that. I usually ask him verbally, 
sometimes he agrees in which case it is fme. Otherwise, there is no point putting it. 
INTO I 
To what extent these informal meetings are common and are they effective? 
LEI 
Yes there are loads. The style of this judge is to operate in this way, informally and 
amicably. And many times I work with him over such issues. And these practices are 
effective as long as there is good will from both sides. 
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LEI's view of effective judicial informal practices did not resonate with women's 
experiences. Wl5 got out of the meeting frustrated and pessimistic of any positive 
outcome. She mentioned that she has already approached the same Judge twice in the 
previous week to place a formal complaint for child alimony. In every instance, the 
Judge held an informal session, called the husband in, and reprimanded him without 
any follow up. Judges extensively use informal mediation mostly in replacement of 
the formal process of litigation, or alongside it. As a result, these informal practices 
are disadvantageous for women like W15 as they delay the resolve of the dispute and 
place them under increased financial burden. 
The other group of religious community leaders, RABs or parish churches, play 
important roles in affecting the agency of women. They mainly act as counsellors, 
mediators between couples and arbitrators (for RABs). In several instances, women 
sought their help in solving their problems. In this role, they legitimise particular 
gendering social practices driven towards marriage normativity. RCL5 (2005) 
illustrated the convoluted techniques he used in mediating between couples seeking 
Shar'i divorce: 
The first step to deal with requests for divorce is to advocate reconciliation. For instance 
a man comes here asking to divorce his wife. We ask him if he certain of his decision, 
and ask him to think about it and then come back and bring his wife once he makes up 
his mind. One week goes by and then he brings his wife here reiterating the divorce 
request. So now we ask her to go and think about her decision and come back when she 
made up her mind. Once they come back, we ask them if they are having a [sexual] 
relationship. She says no, It's been one and a half month that he did not sleep with her. 
So we encourage her to do so saying that you should sleep with your husband, it is your 
marital duty. Now they go away to sleep together and come back after one week. We 
tell them you cannot divorce now because there was intercourse and you need to wait 
for a month until the end of the wife's next period. Another month passes by and we 
would continue to work in this way on setting the mood for reconciliation. They come 
back after two months saying that they want to get divorced. So we tell them they need 
to pay 50.000 LL. The man agrees but he does not have any on him so he asks to come 
back later to pay it. The next time he comes we tell him that the arbitrator (Maw lana) 
did not settle for the 50.000 LL, he now wants 100.000 LL - of course we do not charge 
money here, so this is our way to keep them from divorcing. And they still come here 
once in a while and we send them otT with requests in order to deter them from 
divorcing. 
238 
This example explains how gendered norms of marriage normativity and wife sexual 
obedience discussed in chapter 7 drive actors' mediation roles to restrict women's 
agency. 
Similarly, local churches play similar roles in relation to Christian communities from 
various denominations. These churches, administratively and religiously affiliated to 
the Patriarchates, operate locally to provide social services for their congregations. 
They run 'marriage preparation' courses, a prerequisite for marriage contracts by 
Maronite courts. They also run informal consultation and advice sessions for women 
and men with marital problems. Their advice is based on religious directives selected 
from the Bible and the Vatican mixed with behavioural psychological influences. W3 
and W6 sought their help several times in issues of violence by their husbands, but 
they did not receive any help. 
These various examples of litigation reveal the pivotal role of 'mediation' of judges 
as argued by Bourdieu (1987). The mediation role of various judicial authorities at 
the courts and the RABs is underpinned by using 'law' and 'custom' strategically 
against each other to reinforce their authority (Demian 2003) and restrict women's 
agency. 
Finally, women groups' perceptions of police forces are mostly depoliticised. 
WNGOI ran 'awareness' trainings for officers in order to 'sensitise' them about 
VA W. Overall, women respondents' experiences with police forces have been 
mixed. W4, W12, W5, and W6 reported that the police response to their complaints 
depended on the individual officers handling the case. They also mentioned that their 
complaints were all initially dismissed, and that they had to negotiate the police 
support in various informal ways with varying degrees of success. 
Women's experiences with the police were dismissed also by social workers at 
WNG02. When W4 complained about the bias of police officers in handling her 
case in the police station, SW3 (2005) brushed it off as "they are all like this, we can 
do nothing about it". SW3 thus dismissed the woman's knowledge instead of using 
these ill practices as valuable evidence to be added to her ongoing legal case. 
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8.4.2 Expertise and women's 'free choice' 
As women groups simplify the framework of relations between women and various 
actors, they reinforce their expertise in providing psycho-social and legal support. 
These services are promoted by the combination of expertise between board 
members and professional staff discussed in section 8.3.3. of this chapter. Women 
groups position themselves as external actors who do not interfere with women's 
decisions. In a common narrative among all support centre workers, WNGOI staff 
insisted on "respecting women's decision and refraining from providing any advice" 
that related to any action that they need to take (SW3 2005). 
However, this approach to non-interventionism relates to gendered nonns of 
marriage normativity discussed in chapter 7. For example, SW3 stressed that "we 
don't tell [a woman] divorce your husband or not, it is something that includes 
wrecking entire households (kharab byout) and we don't take this responsibility". By 
emphasising women's 'choice', women groups' role is positioned as 'external' to 
women's prospects of effective decision-making and social change. However, their 
discursive practices had a direct impact on women's agency. 
The discursive practices of psycho-social workers showed that they affected the 
decisions of women through perpetuating gendered nonns on family law. For 
example SW2, working in a CDC but trained by WNGOl, recounted this discussion 
with a user: 
[User] told me "if the religious law would have guaranteed children's custody to the 
woman, then I could have divorced and Jived on my own with my children". I told her 
that she was "dreaming too much" and being very unrealistic. I told her to think of how 
this is impossible to be achieved, how difficult it will be for her to work and provide for 
herself. This is unthinkable and it can never happen, she will never have custody of her 
children. 
Lawyers volunteering on behalf of WNGOI also influenced women's agency while 
representing them in courts. LEI agreed to represent Wl5 in her request to divorce 
her violent husband who deserted her and their three children without income. As she 
did not work, she moved to her parents' home and helped in running the family 
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comer shop. The following events took place on an observation at a Shica court in the 
southern Suburb. As I met both of them at the entrance, Wl5 explicitly told LEI: 
"I don't want to be with [her husband] anymore, I just can't. You need to do everything 
you can to get me the divorce. Also make sure that I get the custody of my children. 
can't leave them to him". 
LEI promised to do everything that she could. After the hearing with the judge, we 
paused to discuss the meeting. W15 was confused as to the outcome of the meeting 
and asked LEI "do you think he will push for divorce? I really hope so". LEI 
explained that she was focusing on pushing for divorce and that she has put it in a 
formal written request that will be dealt with in the following court hearing. Wl5 
then pointed out "you have not brought up the issue of the custody of my children. I 
don't want a divorce without having custody. I don't want to leave the kids with 
him". LEI reiterated, "the most important thing now is to get you the divorce. After 
that we will sort out everything else". 
After WI5 had left, I asked LEI ifit would be possible to grant W15 the custody of 
her children after she gets divorced. She replied "No, unfortunately she won't be able 
to because at their age they are entitled to the father's custody as per Shica law. But I 
could not tell her this because if I do she will back out from divorce and she 
shouldn't because she really wants it". The lawyer was concealing the truth from her 
client and making a major decision on her behalf that went against her wishes. 
While women voiced these views to women groups, the issue of shelter is 'out of the 
discussion'. None of the policies on gender equality and family law, whether 
governmental or non-governmental, included provisions for shelter. As BM6 (2005) 
mentioned to me "this is a red line that women groups cannot cross. There is a 
'political decision' not to allow it. They will be seen as threatening the societal 
order" (8MI3 2005).173 The translation of women's knowledge relies on dismissing 
women's experiences, and linking it to larger processes beyond their control. Once 
173 In exceptional cases, WNGO I sent a very smaII number of women (Jess than five at the time of the 
interviews) to secret locations such as monasteries or mental health hospitals where they could be 
'hidden' from their violent husbands. In some cases women were traced by their husbands and were 
harmed. 
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agam, women groups position themselves as 'external' to the power dynamics 
surrounding the problem of gender equality in family law. The major impact of this 
containment of women's agency is that the legal process seems fixed and 
unchangeable. Thus, women's agency takes different directions that accommodate 
the various constraints placed on them as discussed in the next section. 
8.S Resistance and direction of agency 
This section is concerned with the effect of the order of gender governance on 
women's agency in relation to their family law issues. The discussion below 
indicates that women's agency is not uni-directional and does not aim towards a 
universal (read Western-centric) notion of formal statutory freedom. Rather, it is 
constructed by the gender order of governance of family law as enacted in 
techniques, moralities, and arrangement of spaces for action. 
However, women developed a context-specific sense of freedom rather than rejecting 
it altogether as Mahmood (2005) asserted. In this sense, Mahmood used an 
essentialised understanding of freedom and did not deconstruct its political-
contextual permutations. For women respondents, freedom was enacted following 
the formulations of Foucault (and Brown) as the "struggle against what otherwise be 
made to us". 
For women respondents, freedom was unpacked into resisting a host of constraints 
that prioritised 'what is made' to them, to use Brown's (1995) words. Women's 
agency was thus geared towards more compound and context-specific notions of 
freedom that are framed by the legal and normative frameworks of family law. 
Women's agency emphasised that freedom was about exiting an unhappy 
relationship in ways that are in line with the construction of their subjectivities 
discussed above in chapter 7. Hence, the direction of agency revolved around four 
interrelated factors: physical separation from husband; women's own reputation vis-
a-vis their children; custody of children; and securing financial means. 
Women expressed their will to exit the relationship primarily in terms of physical 
separation from husbands. However, the terms of separation depended on women's 
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constructed ethics on the issue. While separation was prioritised, the tenns of this 
separation varied. The level of fonnality of the separation sought varied and was 
closely related to the nonnativity of marriage and the derogatory nonns concerning 
divorced women. As mentioned in chapter 7, the stigma around divorce meant that 
women did not consider it as an emancipatory goal for their agency. It was rather 
considered in conjunction with other nonns. For instance, W3 did not find the need 
to seek an official divorce despite being adamant on severing any ties with her 
estranged husband. Since she had initially contracted an unregistered marriage, she 
did not recognise it as valid and did not see the need to pursue it, as it would not have 
affected her situation. In contrast, W23 insisted on getting an official divorce from 
her husband (Fieldnotes 2005). However she considered it as a crucial tool for her to 
renegotiate her position in the couple before reconciling with and remarrying him a 
year later. For WI, obtaining official divorce was important, but it was less of a 
priority, as she preferred to forego it in order to managing her relationship with her 
children as explained below. 
As women's subjectivity was constructed in tenns of the 'mother kind', as discussed 
in chapter 6, women prioritised their perceived reputation vis-a-vis their children as a 
crucial component of freedom rather than effective custody. For example, in order to 
confonn with the gendered 'good mother' role, W12 gave up all her legal rights and 
refused to file a law suit against her husband, because she was worried her children 
would blame her for standing against their father. Her reputation vis-a-vis her 
children extended to preserving a religious outlook. In her immediate environment, 
she wears the headscarf. However, as she is employed by one of the women groups, 
she comes to work and takes off her scarf all day. None of the employees or board 
members knows that she wears it. This came to my attention only when I dropped 
her off once on my way home. Just before we entered her neighbourhood, she put on 
her headscarf. She justified her action by saying that she did not "want people to talk 
and affect her relationship with her children" (W12). Hence, W12 made an effort to 
preserve her outlook as a religious adherent because it was valued within her 
immediate circle. She considered that her preserving her reputation vis-a-vis her 
children was related to her social reputation. 
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The 'mother kind' informed the agency of women at a discursive rather than a 
material level. For WI, what mattered most was the way she thought her children 
would perceive her as a mother. She did not settle for a divorce in Lebanon because 
her husband wanted her to revoke any custody claims for them. Instead, she opted for 
being only physically separated without being divorced from her husband in order to 
hold on to her ethics of not abandoning her children. Her agency was directed 
towards a particular understanding of freedom as a discursive image of a good 
mother, exemplified by the fact that she was not able to have any contact with them 
since 2001. 
Women constructed their agency within the constraints of unfair custody rights. For 
example, WIO had to forego her custody of her daughter as she remarried because 
the religious court automatically grants it to her first husband custody in this case. As 
she was aware of this when she remarried, she thus reformulated freedom in terms of 
maintaining a close relationship with her daughter, rather than the actual custody 
rights. Also her first husband considered her 'morally unfit to keep in touch with her 
daughter' after she remarried to someone who did not belong to her own religious 
circumscription, a practice that is banned according to the Druze family law 
frameworks. Hence, her first husband played on her social reputation and tried to ban 
her from visiting rights, but she won them after lengthy litigation. 
A final aspect defining women's agency is the bargaining power over property and 
financial arrangements. As Rao (2007 ) notes in the context of India, this relies 
primarily on women's social positionality ensuing from the hybridisation of 
dominant legal and normative frameworks. In several cases, financial arrangements 
were a bargaining tool in favour of women. For instance, W24 nailed an equitable 
divorce by negotiating over much of her husband's properties and finances that were 
legally registered in her name. Similarly, W23 managed to negotiate a swift divorce 
by threatening to expose her husband's shady business deals. Although coming from 
a modest social class, W5 was able to obtain a quick divorce and custody of her son 
because her husband did not have the means to provide for him. A contrasting 
example is that of W25 who decided to remain legally married to her husband 
despite their official separation because of the extra child/education benefits she 
received from her work in her status as a married employee. These findings concur 
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with research from Palestine, where women respondents related to a broader sense of 
justice than a drive for divorce, and thus opposed reform suggestions relating to 
Khulu' because it stripped them from their marital assets (Hammami 2004). 
This discussion highlights the role of informal power dynamics in constructing the 
agency of women in negotiating their exit from their marital relationships. Women's 
agency was thus shaped by the various components of the order of gender 
governance of family law. 
8.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the ways in which the order of gender governance policies of 
family law shape women's agency. The first section discussed how the repositioning 
of women groups resulted in a change in the problem of gender equality in family 
law from the communitarian argument of optional reforms to V A Wism. The shift 
resulted in 'projectisation' of women groups' action on family law at the expense of 
advocacy. The third section discussed the effect of projectisation on the enactment of 
women's agency. It revealed that feminist collective action marginalises women and 
frames them as 'users'. The fourth section analysed the ways in which women's 
collective action has also restricted women's agency in individual spaces. The final 
section explained that women's agency is context specific and constructed by the 
various components of the order of gender governance. While it is directed towards 
separation, the terms and the extent of the formality of that separation varied 
considerably. 
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9 CHAPTER NINE Conclusion 
In this concluding chapter, I discuss the main contribution of the thesis in terms of 
conceptual ising family law policies as an order of 'gender governance'. This order is 
a historically evolving and gendered normative framework that organises how people 
think about, and act on, personal relations at the legal and the social levels. It draws 
on gendered moralities of family law 'truths' derived from socio-cultural and 
political expressions of religious doctrine. It also applies disciplinary techniques of 
policy and law making to control women's action at both collective and individual 
spaces. 
In the first part of this chapter I justify the main contribution to research by revisiting 
the research question and highlighting the main findings. In the second section, I 
outline the limitations of the findings at the thematic and contextual levels and 
explore future directions for research. Finally, I examine the policy implications 
related to the main findings and offer some suggestions for women's action on 
family law in Lebanon. 
9.1 Conceptual contribution ofthe study 
9.1.1 Undentanding family law policies as an order of gender governance 
In order to assess the contribution of the thesis, I reiterate the aim driving me to 
conduct this research. At the start of the study, I set out to explore the various ways 
in which family law policies affect women's personal lives in contemporary Lebanon 
and how women experience and deal with gender discrimination in family law at 
both discursive and practiced levels. My inquiry was driven by the main research 
question: How does the enactment of family law impact on the ways women 
negotiate their personal relationships in post-conflict Lebanon? 
To answer this question, I adopted two complementary theoretical and 
methodological approaches. My theoretical approach relied on post-structural 
theories of social and political analysis, grounded in three areas of Foucault's work. 
First, Foucault's (1980) concept of 'governmentality' helped me analyse family law 
policies as a form of state governance aimed at organising the affairs of popUlations 
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by reworking their perceptions of their own selves and their action in society. 
Second, I used Foucault's (1989) notion of 'genealogy of law' to analyse family law 
making as a dynamic institutional process located in time and place and reworked 
within the context of Lebanon. Third, I applied Foucault's (Foucault 1980) 
conception of 'power as enactment' in analysing the dynamics between various 
policy actors and, in particular, women's action on the issue. 
I collected my primary data using a qualitative methodological approach that fits 
with post-structural inquiry in two ways. First, my methods were informed by an 
ethnographic approach to understanding family law policies. I primarily relied on 
participant observation of the interactions of women with family law problems and 
women group support workers, lawyers, and religious leaders. I also conducted 59 
semi-structured interviews and observed three conferences on gender equality and 
one training workshop for police officers. The popularity of ethnography has been 
recently noted in research on policy and development, such as with the works of 
Mosse (2005) and Ferguson (1994). This approach was useful because it offered 
fine-grained data and enabled a critical reading of the policy making process. 
Second, I conducted an ethnographic reading and discourse analysis of policy 
documents and my interview transcripts as a supplementary methodological lens to 
analyse my data. This method complemented my ethnographic inquiry by comparing 
it to the official policy and political discourses of various actors. Also, it informed 
this research as it revealed the underlying discursive implications of both interview 
and written accounts. Striking examples are found in the difference between the 
written and verbal accounts and practices noted with both religious leader and 
women group respondents. These two methods informed my post-structural approach 
as they accounted for the power dynamics between the researcher and various 
respondents involved in the study. 
The findings from the thesis show that family law policies constitute an order of 
gender governance that continuously rearranges women within gendered norms of 
marriage normativity and limits their capacity of taking action and finding equitable 
solutions for problems of family law. 
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In one way, this order of gender governance can be likened to a complex set of 
gendered and gendering clockwork mechanisms where many different small 
components interact in complex ways to produce policy outcomes. It operates 
through the interactions of various institutional actors involved in family law 
policies. However, the analogy of clockwork mechanisms differs from similar 
conceptions, such as Ferguson's (1994) 'anti-politics machine'. Rather than insular 
and fixed machinery, this order is dynamic and fluid. It is weaved through the 
historical reworking of political, social and legal action and discourses. 
Second, as this order of gender governance depends on power dynamics between 
actors and discourses, it does not exercise a unified and totalising oppressive effect. 
As the findings indicate, the fact that policy actors and women experiencing family 
law issues perceived family law frameworks as locked, is in itself part of the 
dominant discourses or 'regimes of truths' perpetuated within the order of gender 
governance. However, the findings noted the fluidity of power dynamics between 
actors, which means that the effect of family law policies on gender equality is 
changeable. This was noted in the varying ways women act on their family law 
issues depending on the multiple constraints imposed on them. 
9.1.2 The enactment of the order of gender governance 
Through the findings from my research, I made an analytical shift away from my 
initial standpoint to analyse religion as an organising principle for family law. 
Instead, I placed gender at the heart of my analysis of family law frameworks in 
multi-religious settings. The reason for this is that, during my research, it became 
increasingly clear that gender discrimination was the common denominator across 
most existing codes, as well as seemingly secular policy formulations. 
Hence, gender discrimination was the power driving this clockwork mechanism, 
while religious structures and directives constituted parts of the machinery at work. I 
explain below the evidence supporting this analytical shift at three levels. First, the 
family law order of governance has gender discrimination as its organising logic and 
constant denominator. Second, it relies on restrictive elements of ethnic-religious 
stratification to drive gendering discursive practices. Third, it enacts a profound 
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gendering effect that organises family relations In consistently discriminatory 
patterns. 
Gendering logic underpinning family law regime of truth 
From the findings, I have drawn out three ways that reveal that it is gender, rather 
than religion, that forms the underlying logic for family law. Here, my intention is 
not to propose a dichotomy between gender and religion. Rather, it is to problematize 
the blanket use of 'religious ascription' as an analytical lens and highlight the 
restrictive gendered logic included within both religious and secular family law 
directives. 
In the case of Lebanon, gender discrimination was a constant logic in family law. 
Both religious and secular family law policies were shown to be gendered. In 
contrast, the religious categorisation was rather inconsistent at several levels as 
discussed in chapters 4 and 6. These findings resonate with other pluralist 
frameworks of family law, such as in India, where the problem lies in their 
articulation and formulation rather than opposing them to a unitary approach (Desai 
2009). Hence, it is useful to consider 'religion' in terms of a system of 
communitarian citizenship categorisation that accommodates various degrees of 
discrimination against women. In this sense, exclusionary gendered claims can be 
traced in other forms of citizenship frameworks. 
Various permutations of the gendered logic were also traced in an array within 
religious and secular social norms relating to the family as discussed in chapters 6 
and 7. Finally, the gender logic was manifested in the multitude of contested sources 
of secular and religious, and intra-religious, legislative authority as detailed in 
chapter 6. Legal sources and authorities were contested among actors at several 
levels of religious-secular, intra-religious, and intra-secular debates in line with 
experiences in other contexts, such as Palestine (Welchman 2003). It is thus 
important to consider the implications on gender discrimination in the extent to 
which it constitutes a common denominator across various ideological positions. 
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Operations and disciplining techniques 
The gender order of governance has the communitarian legislative and judicial 
apparatus as its modus operandi. It enacts gendered configurations of family law 
through three disciplining techniques of governance. The first technique is embedded 
in the dynamics of the policy making process. A web of power relations brings 
together political, religious, and policy actors who converge over gendered 
translations of policy making. At the same time, policy actors fragment the policy 
problem of gender equality in family law. They do so by operating in 'policy 
pockets' and dismiss unfavourable actors. One example is the way women groups 
excluded religious leaders from their activities until 2009. The selection and framing 
of family law policy issues was noticeably gendered in both gender-focused and 
gender-blind policies, as discussed in chapters 5 and 8. Second, judicial structures 
enact gendered practices through religious judges who act as translators and 
mediators of legal directives, as discussed in chapters 6 and 7. Third, the 
administrative configurations of legal personhood in the state institutions follow 
gendered patterns through the communitarian system of citizenship, as argued in 
chapter 6. 
Gendering effect on women's subjectivity and agency 
The gendered aspect of the order of governance is manifested in its effect on 
women's subjectivity and agency. Women are particularly affected by it because the 
implemented provisions and practices are gendered, as discussed in chapters 6, 7 and 
8. As with other contexts, it is recognised that ''the impact of 'deep legal pluralism' 
disproportionately affects the rules that govern the lives of women (Welchman 
2000: 16). The order of gender governance has also fragmented the concept of 
equality in family law and scattered collective action focused on family law reforms, 
as discussed in chapters 5 and 8. Its effect on women's subjectivity is noticeable. 
Women's subjectivity is confined within a gendered moral and ethical framework of 
family relations discussed in chapter 7. Similarly, women's agency is restricted 
within gendered directions that also shape their capacity for resistance, as discussed 
in chapter 8. 
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9.2 Empirical contribution of the study 
My thesis is, to the best of my knowledge, the first detailed empirical analysis of the 
enactment of gender equality and post-conflict Lebanese family policies. By 
applying the conceptual framework of family law as order of gender governance, this 
research offers several empirical contributions. I detail below the usefulness of 
applying the theoretical framework of gender order of governance on the Lebanese 
case and highlight the main empirical findings. 
The first empirical contribution lies in the focus on family law as policy. By using 
this approach, I intended to restore historicity to Lebanese family law frameworks. 
The findings revealed that family law frameworks are far from being fixed and 
immutable, as often assumed in the literature on Lebanon (Shehadeh 1998; Shehadeh 
2004; Zuhur 2002). By tracing the development of pre-independence and post-
conflict family law policies in chapters 4 and 5, I highlighted the importance of 
various historical policy moments that shape the gendering effect of family law, such 
as the competition between colonial rulers (chapter 4), and the post-conflict CEDAW 
ratification process (chapter 5). Thus, family law is a dynamic construct rather than a 
fixed immutable system. 
A second contribution lies in the implications of the analytical shift from religion to 
gender. This shift allows for a more nuanced understanding of the discriminatory 
workings of family law. While my research recognises that religious politics matter 
to the formulations of Lebanese national identity and citizenship (el-Khazen 2000; 
Haddad 2002; Kerr 2006; Picard 2002), it reveals that gender discrimination is not 
only a by-product of family law policies, but an exclusionary aim reproduced by a 
web of policy actors. Hence, I moved beyond the narrow analyses of the role of the 
religious institution (examples of such analyses are Khalaf 2002; Shanahan 2005). I 
instead expanded the analysis in two ways. First, I unpacked the legal authority that 
manages family law and traced intimate institutional links between religious and civil 
legal actors, as discussed in chapter 6. Second, I found that the policy making 
process of family law involves a much broader network of institutional actors 
including, but not restricted to, religious, political, and civil society actors, not least 
feminist actors and gender concerned institutions (chapters 5 and 8). 
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The focus on the gendering processes also highlighted the breadth and depth and the 
various pennutations of gender discrimination embedded in seemingly 'progressive' 
gender equality policies, such as the institutionalisation of CEDA W mechanisms and 
the Optional Secular Marriage Campaign discussed in chapter 5. These findings 
suggest that the gendering effect of family law is steamed through both gender blind 
policies, such as consociational secular calls for refonns, and gender-focused family 
law policies, including statutory amendments and the V A W approach. 
A fourth contribution was to realise that family law entrench gendered legal 
personhood in Lebanon through the enactment of the communitarian political and 
administrative system in general, rather than religious family law in particular. Legal 
personhood in Lebanon is gendered, as it is ring-fenced under a communitarian 
classification of the patriarchal family discussed in chapter 6. In this sense, reforms 
need to address gender discrimination at the level of categorisation of legal 
personhood and not family law provisions only. 
A fifth contribution is to challenge the mainstream feminist notions of 'womanhood' 
found in the -literature (for example Elshtain 1995). The research contributed in 
accounting for the polyvocality of women's experiences and positioning by focusing 
on the micro-dynamics of the gendering effect of family law. Women's personal 
subjectivity was found to be fluid and intimately shaped by legal personhood (Abu-
Lughod 1998; Boyd, Chunn et a1. 2007; Butler 2003; Butler 1999). Women's 
experiences of family law shaped various permutations of subjectivities that were 
largely constituted by the gendered norms of legal personhood as discussed in 
chapter 7. 
This had two major implications. First, women's subjectivity is more complex than 
the assumed normative 'womanhood' ideal (Cosslett, Easton et al. 1996; Lieblich 
and Josselson 1994; Shoshan 2000). Women developed their understanding of their 
selves through a spiral gendering process facilitated and reinforced by discriminatory 
social nonns and values of the various actors who provide them support, such as their 
families, social workers, and police forces, as discussed in chapters 7 and 8. 
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Second, the research also revealed the intimate relation between personal subjectivity 
and agency. Mainstream assumptions about women's emancipatory agency do not 
hold anymore (Blee 2002; Braig and Wolte 2002; Jeffery and Basu 1998; Lind 2005; 
Mateo-Diaz 2005). Findings from my research reveal that women's agency was 
arguably framed by discursive gendering constraints of the normative-legal family 
law framework. At the collective level, women's agency was restricted within 
feminist spaces. Far from being emancipated, women were largely excluded from 
women groups' action and confined to the category of beneficiaries as chapters 7 and 
8 discuss. At the individual level, women understood freedom in various ways and 
resisted their constraints in an array of contextualised strategies that enabled them to 
produce any change they could get, rather than opt for optimal entitlements. 
9.3 Limitations of the thesis and future directions for research 
As with any piece of research, there are limitations at several levels because of 
various conceptual and contextual considerations. 
Conflict and the gendering of personal citizenship 
The first set of limitations relates to the fact that the thesis did not trace the historical 
changes to family law policies during the war period. The reasons for this omission 
were related to the contextual limitations of the fieldwork discussed in chapter 3. I 
consider that the conflict period is an exceptional context time that responds to 
another conceptual line of inquiry but would not affect or contradict my overall 
argument in the thesis. Also, consulting wartime archives of religious councils and 
courts was a complicated endeavour that would have cost me precious time away 
from the focus on my thesis. 
Hence, some future directions for research would be to explore the dynamics of 
family law policies during conflict. Usually, gender and personal issues tend to be 
silenced during conflict in favour of 'more pressing issues'. This situation often 
offers an opportunity to entrench gender inequality or at the very least prepare 
grounds for entrenching gender discrimination in the post-conflict reconciliation 
period, as was the case in Lebanon. There is a need for a comparative analysis to test 
this hypothesis by examining several post-conflict contexts such as Lebanon, Iraq, 
and Afghanistan. A related line of exploration is to understand the different 
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contextual and political articulations of gender inequality across various settings. A 
third line would be to understand the nature and scope of exclusionary mechanisms 
used in the enactment of family law frameworks during times of conflict and 
situations of displacement. 
Gender equality in family law and religious exceptionalism 
While this research rejected the religious exceptionalism attributed to gender 
discrimination in family law, it remained mostly focused on the Shi'a family law 
framework with some insights from the Lebanese Maronite and other frameworks. 
Further research can build on several valuable contributions in family law that 
rejected religious exceptionalism (Bowen 2003; Dupret 1999; Welchman 2004). In 
order to extend the argument, one avenue would be to conduct a systematic 
comparison between various legal frameworks in Lebanon. Another comparison can 
be drawn between different pluralist frameworks. In several Middle Eastern contexts, 
such as Syria, interesting variations were noted at the level of communitarian 
formulations of personal citizenship and the trajectory of post-colonial state 
formation (Rabo 2005). It is also important to examine the relationship between legal 
personhood and subjectivity through the exploration of the official and non-official 
religious legal realms of family law and secular arrangements. In addition, there is a 
need to compare women's subjectivity and agency not only across religious 
affiliation but also at the socio-economic and socio-geographic levels. 
Global citizenship, multiculturalism, and law enforcement 
The thesis was mainly concerned with the domestic frameworks of family law but 
only briefly touched upon the enactment of law enforcement of the pluralist 
legislation and the official and unofficial nexus and their global ramifications. There 
is a need to thoroughly explore the enactment of law enforcement within pluralist 
legislation in Lebanon and the ways in which it impacts legal personhood and 
subjectivity between Lebanese in diaspora and home country. 
Feminist collective action and advocacy 
Finally, the thesis focused on the intersections between collective and individual 
women's action. It did not conduct an in-depth analysis of feminist collective action 
or individual spaces. Research here can be developed in two lines. One line is to 
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conduct an ethnography of feminist collective action and family law policies. 
Another possible line is to explore women's individual agency and interaction with 
the law and family within individual spaces, especially women's 'agency pathways' 
where they challenge gendered ideals of obedience as they transit into different 
stages of their marriage. There is no doubt that women who have not sought support 
of women groups constitute the majority, and hence it is crucial to explore the nature 
and dynamics of challenges that they face and the types of support networks and 
resistance strategies to which they resort. This would inform research on the gap 
between women's individual agency and their low access to collective action. 
9.4 Implications for policy 
At the level of policy, the shift from religion to gender moves the analysis beyond 
the impasse of secular-religious dichotomy of equality and law making. By analysing 
enacted gender equality, it is possible to identify reform areas within both 
frameworks. It allows for unpacking mechanisms for religious law making by 
dispelling the uniformity of jurisprudence and pushing for progressive religious and 
civil jurisprudence. Resorting to an analysis of the power dynamics between different 
policy actors helps identify the nodes of complexity and actors behind them, and thus 
lobby where it matters most. 
The case of Lebanon sustains various policy recommendations calling for codifying 
family law directives. The thesis demonstrated that piecemeal codification, in Islamic 
family law in particular, significantly hinders women's ability to negotiate 
favourable statutory and enacted terms through the legal system. Any policy 
measures need to aim for a more equitable reconfiguration of citizenship, both across 
and within religious communities, coupled with a focus on substantially improving 
their lived experiences of negotiating their marital relations. Hence, interventions 
need to provide an array of options that would address the wide range of lived 
constraints detailed in the thesis, (including providing economic support, safe shelter 
for women and services for their children) rather than adopting a unidirectional 
statutory approach to equality. 
Finally, a focus on the policy making process opens up possibilities to unlock the 
gendering process by identifying crucial moments of the process of change of 
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subjectivity and intervene accordingly. It helps unlocking constraints to agency and 
the factors restricting it. Identifying the discursive factors within women's collective 
action helps attend to their gendering effect on subjectivity and focus on 
strengthening and assisting women's individual resistance. 
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